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Study depicts Israel’s options for an attack against Iran
Last week reminded us once more of how probable an Israeli attack on Iran could become during the next few years (or perhaps even months?), in the event that Iran further approaches the capability of producing a nuclear weapon. After the new Israeli government expressed its commitment to stop Iran’s nuclear programme by every means, one did not have to wait long for a reaction from the United States.
Early last week US President Barack Obama warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, through CIA chief Leon Panetta visiting Israel, not to carry out a military attack against Iran. According to the Los Angeles Times, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered the same message during a speech to Marine Corp cadets in Washington and cautioned Israel about the dangerous consequences of such a military intervention. These demands and warnings are not new and reach back also to the Bush administration, having regularly asked Israel not to attack Iran or at least to coordinate its military actions with Washington.
The Obama administration understandably should be worried, on the one side, about the strategic position of the US when caught off guard by such attacks and, on the other side, about the position Israel will find itself in once Pandora's Box has been opened. Israel’s diplomatic response: it will inform the US early enough (‘inform’, and not ask for permission). Undoubtedly, this matter will be discussed enthusiastically behind closed doors on the occasion of mutual visits during the upcoming weeks. While Obama’s visit to Israel is scheduled for next month, he will be shaking hands with Netanyahu in Washington today. After Netanyahu returns to Israel, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman will make his first visit to Washington.
Even though Israel’s military power is not to be underestimated, being technologically sophisticated, well-trained and very determined, it still is limited in numbers and options. Gates accurately pointed out that a strike against Iran’s installations would only delay Iran’s nuclear programme for a few years. Furthermore, according to Gates and different experts it would strengthen Iran’s commitment in this matter.
Study: A daring enterprise
Conveniently, a detailed study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, published in March 2009*, analysed scenarios and options of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) for an attack against Iran’s key facilities housing its nuclear programme. It is worth to take a peek at this 114 page study presenting in-depth information and nicely outlining every aspect of a military intervention.
The quintessence, nevertheless, is predictable: an attack is possible but very complex and the outcome more than doubtful. And the study is very clear about the position of the US in this matter, especially considering the prevention of a military conflict. Yet, if the United States and the international community do not succeed in convincing Iran to stop its nuclear programme (assuming such a programme actually exists, which US intelligence reports consistently deny, and also while diplomatically navigating around the problem of double standards, considering Israel’s WMD and Ballistic Missile capabilities), an attack becomes very probable.
In this event, the study’s authors suggest, that Israel will employ, from three possible routes into Iran, the one along the Syrian-Turkish border. The aircraft would then cross a small portion of Iraq and finally enter Iranian airspace. Taking into account the required number of aircraft for electronic counter measures (ECM), attack, fighter escort as well as refuelling along the way, makes this a very complex mission. Further, different uncertainties (more than the usual fog of war) about the installations and the Iranian air defence capabilities make it an extremely risky enterprise.
As all facilities involved in the Iranian nuclear programme are dispersed throughout the country, Israel will have to select the most important targets that would significantly affect further production. The authors of the study suggest these are the nuclear research centre in Isfahan, the uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, and the heavy water plant, intended for future plutonium production, in Arak. Israel would have to launch most, if not all of its aircraft, to do the job. According to the study, some 90 combat aircraft, including 25 F-15Es and 65 F-16I/Cs as well as their two Gulfstream G550 aircraft for ECM and 5 KC-130Hs and 4 B-707s for air refuelling, would be required. The latter will have to refuel the fighter aircraft on the way to Iran and back, and this outside of Israeli airspace.
The next challenge for the fighter aircraft will be to penetrate Iranian airspace without being detected, and when detected to avoid Iranian air defence batteries. First of all, Iran can deploy Hawk, SA-5 and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles as well as SA-7, SA-15, Rapier, Crotale and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Also, 1,700 anti-aircraft guns are dispersed around its nuclear installations. But, next to a vague number of operational fighter aircraft which Iran could scramble, the greatest threat could arise from the S-300V (SA-12 Giant) anti-aircraft defence system, which Iran may have purchased from Russia. It is not sure whether these have already been integrated into the Iranian air defence, however, Defence Minister Mustafa Najjar claimed in November 2008 that "the S-300 air defense system will be delivered to Iran on the basis of a contract signed with Russia in the past." According to Mark Fitzpatrick, former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, Russia has not yet delivered those systems to Iran: "It seems clear that Russia entered into a contract with Iran for the S-300, but it's also clear that the Russians have not delivered on it and are holding on to it as potential negotiating leverage with the United States over ballistic missile defense and possibly other issues." Should the Iranians employ the SA-12, the authors of the study assume losses of 20 to 30 per cent, meaning some 20 to 24 aircraft would be shot down.
The authors of the study also considered the use of ballistic missiles instead of combat aircraft. As the Iranians do not have the capabilities required to intercept such missiles, Israel could employ its Jericho I, II and III to carry out the strike. The Jericho I has a 500-kilometer range, a 450-kilogram warhead, and can carry a 20-kiloton nuclear weapon. Jericho II has a 1,500-kilometer range and entered service in 1990. It can carry a 1-megaton nuclear warhead. Jericho III is an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 4,800 to 6,500 kilometres, and can carry a multi-megaton nuclear warhead. Yet, the study suggests the use of conventional warheads more probable and say as many as 42 Jericho III missiles would be required to destroy the three Iranian facilities, provided that all hit their target. As the targets have to be hit very precisely, sometimes with a tolerance of only a few meters, this is rather unlikely.
Questionable results
Considering the above mentioned risks, the imponderables of an Iranian retaliation, probably also involving the support of Hezbollah and Hamas as well as the devastating effect it would have on the entire region, it does not seem worthwhile. Yet, it is a question of perspective and of timing. From the Israeli point of view, the window for a possible attack is slowly closing. If the enemy air defences become more sophisticated or, in the worst case, Iran acquires nuclear weapons, an attack would become near to impossible, or rather irresponsible. The study foresees such a situation being possible as early as 2010.
Furthermore, the question remains if an attack would, firstly, effectively stop or at least slow down Iran’s nuclear programme and, secondly, lead to a military and political environment in the Middle East that would provide more security. The latter can be excluded almost with absolute certainty. Any action against Iran would fuel hatred against Israel among neighbouring people. Moreover, Iran would of course leave the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, which until now has enabled the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor its nuclear programme to a certain degree, and so re-acquiring its total freedom to proceed to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons if it wishes so.
For these reasons, the recent tentative moves by the Obama administration for the whole of the Middle East to be brought under strict respect on the NPT – even including Israel – have at least the potential for radically changing the terms of the equation. Far from allowing Israel to attack Iran or even leaning it a hand, the Obama administration is apparently pondering when not forcing Jerusalem to renounce its nuclear weapons, then certainly asking the Israelis to abandon their traditional policy of neither confirming nor denying the possession of such strategic assets, and openly claiming the status of a nuclear power – with all that would imply in diplomatic terms. An interesting assessment of the US-Israeli relationship in this context, published yesterday, can be found on the website of the Israeli Institute of National Security Studies (INSS; www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=2897).
In the light of the above, and in addition to the considerations as expressed by the authors, several other independent analysts have suggested that the real strategic purpose of a conceivable Israeli attack against Iran would not be to decapitate the country’s nuclear programme, but rather to count on the unavoidable Iranian reaction to drag the US into the conflict.
(This entry is an article I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in May 2009)
_____
* The study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman can be downloaded here:
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf
May 18, 2009
May 12, 2009
A Gordian Knot That Cannot be Cut by the Sword
Can the origins of piracy at the Horn of Africa be solved with battleships?
It is more than the traditional picture of a clash of civilizations and it cannot easily be compared to earlier scenarios, be it of the 17th century or the more recent incidents in the Strait of Malacca. The effects of globalisation and the ruptured history of an African state make is a unique situation: Even though piracy still is only a symptom of greater evils, in this case it has a different character and can therefore not be fought as it has been in the past.
The multinational Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) has been underway in the Horn of Africa since 2002 to ensure stability in the region and support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), the latter part of activities referred to as Maritime Security Operations (MSO).
Yet, since early 2006 its focus has almost entirely shifted to the prevention and elimination of piracy. By now the mission unites vessels of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States in this common cause. Also, Combined Task Force 151 as well as an international command are exclusively involved in fighting piracy (see list below). But what have been the results so far?
Where to begin?
The shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia have become the most dangerous waters in the world. The chaotic situation of the African state, resulting from the collapse of its government and the following era of crime, radicalism and terrorism, fostered and maintained by warlords and clan militias, cries for spin-off effects such as piracy. In a country in which poverty reigns, and mischief and lawlessness to the point that everyone is at one’s own, who would wonder about such implications?
18 years have passed since the downfall of the former head of state, Siad Barre. Since then, a culture of survival-of-the-fittest has taken power within this population. An illicit arms trade, fostered by clan militias and radical groups such as “Al Shabaab” or “Hisb Al Islam”, made it possible that even the simplest fisherman can be armed to the teeth. Never-ending, violent interior conflicts between parties obsessed with power have made Somalia a bonanza, yet only for the few ruthless players who pulls the strings.
How are a small number of warships going to tackle such a wasp’s nest? The few swimming satellites orbiting the Horn of Africa in order to protect merchant ships are overstrained by the vastness of their operational area and the swiftness of the pirate actions. More than fifty captured pirates have been transferred to prison in Mombasa, Kenya, while a dozen are being held in pre-trial custody in the US, France and Spain. But the support of fresh, young men is inexhaustible and the attacks on merchant ships – more or less successful – won’t stop.
The so-called pirates’ nests in the Somali harbours of Harardere, Hobyo, Eyl or Bosasso are flourishing: Impressive mansions are being built with expensive off-road vehicles parked at the front porch. A downright service industry has established itself around the down-and-dirty core business. Some of the young men armed with Kalashnikovs even consider banditry as a sort of poetic justice.
As published in an exclusive interview in defpro.com with a Somali pirate in February, the pirates see themselves as Somalia’s coast guard or navy fighting for the right of undisturbed fishing in Somali waters. And beyond that, they do not even seem to be frightened of the flexing of modern Navies’ muscles. “This has absolutely not scared us. We know they have well armed forces on the ships and they stay in the waters off Somalia protecting ships from what they call pirates,” stated the interview’s pirate, “as I told you, I am not a pirate, we are the special guards of the Somali coast. Until there is an effective government, I will perform my duty for my people and my country.” Some may see it as less elevated and have simply found a more lucrative job than fishing.
Scratching the surface
Roughly more than two dozen ships from NATO, the EU operation “Atalanta”, frigates and destroyers from Russia, China, India and South Korea try to oversee a maritime area larger than the Mediterranean, reaching from the Gulf of Aden to the Seychelles in the West and down south to the coast of Tanzania.
While the Navies report of the successful defence of individual attacks and of the capture of pirates, the International Maritime Bureau presents a much different perspective: Compared to last year, the number of pirate attacks has increased tenfold. Generally, the attackers use one or two swift speed boats, supported by a larger mother ship and attack ships with automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers. Often, the battleships’ only possibility to catch up is to send a helicopter, in order to stop the speed boats and then to approach at their much slower speed. In a few cases, suspect boats can be identified by maritime surveillance aircraft such as the P-3C Orion. Yet it usually takes a lot of time, until a warship can intercept the suspected boat. By the time they arrive, either the boat is gone or the arms and other suspicious objects have been thrown overboard.
The international community’s struggle only scratches the surface. Keeping a few speed boats from attacking merchant vessels won’t solve the problem. But what is the next step? Sinking mother ships? Bombing pirate nests? Or do you have to go as far as bringing peace and stability to Somalia?
The Kenyan, Andrew Mwangura, programme coordinator for the Seafarers' Assistance Programme, is convinced that influential clan militias support and organise the attacks. “The men pulling the strings are big fish. They operate from Europe, America or from the Arabian Peninsula. They have networks with international contacts and are very wealthy people.”
Ransom negotiations are being carried out by telephone and sometimes the proverbial suitcases full of money change hands in the lobbies of hotels in European capitals. According to experts, approximately $ 100 million have been pressed by syndicates during past years. Piracy has become a regional economic factor.
The suspicion that this may be used or perhaps even initiated by larger terrorist organisations is manifest. Intelligence services have identified this threat over many years. The CIA’s evaluation on this matter is very clear: terror groups have launched a crucial seafront against western nations. The terrorists want to cut off vital trade connections. But even this knowledge and distant operations in Iraq and Afghanistan against terror networks will not eliminate the breeding ground of piracy.
Now, one of the bearers of hope is the moderate Islamist, Sheik Scharif Achmed, Somalia’s President since the beginning of the year. Ironically, he had been considered to be part of the Al-quaida network by the US and was temporarily arrested by US troops. In April 2009 the UN agreed to support the country’s new government with $ 200 million, seeing the problem’s roots in the anarchy and insecurity on shore, rather than at sea.
List of operations and participating nations
• “Atalanta“ (EU):
Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy
(6 frigates, 2 support vessels, Orion P-3A and P-3C, Breguet-Atlantique)
• “Allied Protector” (NATO, from SNMG1):
Portugal, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, US (associated under national command)
(5 frigates)
• “Combined Task Force 150” (Operation Enduring Freedom, anti-terror):
France, US, United Kingdom, Pakistan
(1 command ship, 3 frigates, 2 support vessels)
• “Combined Task Force 151” (anti-piracy):
US, Turkey, Singapore, South Korea (associated)
(1 destroyer, 1 frigate, 1 cruiser, 3 support vessels)
• Operation under international command (incl. support of the Coast Guard of the Seychelles):
India, China, Malaysia, Japan, Russia, France
(3 destroyers, 3 frigates, 1 patrol boat, 5 support vessels; France’s contribution unknown)
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in May 2009)
It is more than the traditional picture of a clash of civilizations and it cannot easily be compared to earlier scenarios, be it of the 17th century or the more recent incidents in the Strait of Malacca. The effects of globalisation and the ruptured history of an African state make is a unique situation: Even though piracy still is only a symptom of greater evils, in this case it has a different character and can therefore not be fought as it has been in the past.
The multinational Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) has been underway in the Horn of Africa since 2002 to ensure stability in the region and support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), the latter part of activities referred to as Maritime Security Operations (MSO).
Yet, since early 2006 its focus has almost entirely shifted to the prevention and elimination of piracy. By now the mission unites vessels of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States in this common cause. Also, Combined Task Force 151 as well as an international command are exclusively involved in fighting piracy (see list below). But what have been the results so far?
Where to begin?
The shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia have become the most dangerous waters in the world. The chaotic situation of the African state, resulting from the collapse of its government and the following era of crime, radicalism and terrorism, fostered and maintained by warlords and clan militias, cries for spin-off effects such as piracy. In a country in which poverty reigns, and mischief and lawlessness to the point that everyone is at one’s own, who would wonder about such implications?
18 years have passed since the downfall of the former head of state, Siad Barre. Since then, a culture of survival-of-the-fittest has taken power within this population. An illicit arms trade, fostered by clan militias and radical groups such as “Al Shabaab” or “Hisb Al Islam”, made it possible that even the simplest fisherman can be armed to the teeth. Never-ending, violent interior conflicts between parties obsessed with power have made Somalia a bonanza, yet only for the few ruthless players who pulls the strings.
How are a small number of warships going to tackle such a wasp’s nest? The few swimming satellites orbiting the Horn of Africa in order to protect merchant ships are overstrained by the vastness of their operational area and the swiftness of the pirate actions. More than fifty captured pirates have been transferred to prison in Mombasa, Kenya, while a dozen are being held in pre-trial custody in the US, France and Spain. But the support of fresh, young men is inexhaustible and the attacks on merchant ships – more or less successful – won’t stop.
The so-called pirates’ nests in the Somali harbours of Harardere, Hobyo, Eyl or Bosasso are flourishing: Impressive mansions are being built with expensive off-road vehicles parked at the front porch. A downright service industry has established itself around the down-and-dirty core business. Some of the young men armed with Kalashnikovs even consider banditry as a sort of poetic justice.
As published in an exclusive interview in defpro.com with a Somali pirate in February, the pirates see themselves as Somalia’s coast guard or navy fighting for the right of undisturbed fishing in Somali waters. And beyond that, they do not even seem to be frightened of the flexing of modern Navies’ muscles. “This has absolutely not scared us. We know they have well armed forces on the ships and they stay in the waters off Somalia protecting ships from what they call pirates,” stated the interview’s pirate, “as I told you, I am not a pirate, we are the special guards of the Somali coast. Until there is an effective government, I will perform my duty for my people and my country.” Some may see it as less elevated and have simply found a more lucrative job than fishing.
Scratching the surface
Roughly more than two dozen ships from NATO, the EU operation “Atalanta”, frigates and destroyers from Russia, China, India and South Korea try to oversee a maritime area larger than the Mediterranean, reaching from the Gulf of Aden to the Seychelles in the West and down south to the coast of Tanzania.
While the Navies report of the successful defence of individual attacks and of the capture of pirates, the International Maritime Bureau presents a much different perspective: Compared to last year, the number of pirate attacks has increased tenfold. Generally, the attackers use one or two swift speed boats, supported by a larger mother ship and attack ships with automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers. Often, the battleships’ only possibility to catch up is to send a helicopter, in order to stop the speed boats and then to approach at their much slower speed. In a few cases, suspect boats can be identified by maritime surveillance aircraft such as the P-3C Orion. Yet it usually takes a lot of time, until a warship can intercept the suspected boat. By the time they arrive, either the boat is gone or the arms and other suspicious objects have been thrown overboard.
The international community’s struggle only scratches the surface. Keeping a few speed boats from attacking merchant vessels won’t solve the problem. But what is the next step? Sinking mother ships? Bombing pirate nests? Or do you have to go as far as bringing peace and stability to Somalia?
The Kenyan, Andrew Mwangura, programme coordinator for the Seafarers' Assistance Programme, is convinced that influential clan militias support and organise the attacks. “The men pulling the strings are big fish. They operate from Europe, America or from the Arabian Peninsula. They have networks with international contacts and are very wealthy people.”
Ransom negotiations are being carried out by telephone and sometimes the proverbial suitcases full of money change hands in the lobbies of hotels in European capitals. According to experts, approximately $ 100 million have been pressed by syndicates during past years. Piracy has become a regional economic factor.
The suspicion that this may be used or perhaps even initiated by larger terrorist organisations is manifest. Intelligence services have identified this threat over many years. The CIA’s evaluation on this matter is very clear: terror groups have launched a crucial seafront against western nations. The terrorists want to cut off vital trade connections. But even this knowledge and distant operations in Iraq and Afghanistan against terror networks will not eliminate the breeding ground of piracy.
Now, one of the bearers of hope is the moderate Islamist, Sheik Scharif Achmed, Somalia’s President since the beginning of the year. Ironically, he had been considered to be part of the Al-quaida network by the US and was temporarily arrested by US troops. In April 2009 the UN agreed to support the country’s new government with $ 200 million, seeing the problem’s roots in the anarchy and insecurity on shore, rather than at sea.
List of operations and participating nations
• “Atalanta“ (EU):
Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy
(6 frigates, 2 support vessels, Orion P-3A and P-3C, Breguet-Atlantique)
• “Allied Protector” (NATO, from SNMG1):
Portugal, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, US (associated under national command)
(5 frigates)
• “Combined Task Force 150” (Operation Enduring Freedom, anti-terror):
France, US, United Kingdom, Pakistan
(1 command ship, 3 frigates, 2 support vessels)
• “Combined Task Force 151” (anti-piracy):
US, Turkey, Singapore, South Korea (associated)
(1 destroyer, 1 frigate, 1 cruiser, 3 support vessels)
• Operation under international command (incl. support of the Coast Guard of the Seychelles):
India, China, Malaysia, Japan, Russia, France
(3 destroyers, 3 frigates, 1 patrol boat, 5 support vessels; France’s contribution unknown)
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in May 2009)
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