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Admiral Mike Mullen: “We Cannot Win From the Pentagon”
Better late than never! Even though critical and well-founded voices were heard in the early stages in the United States and NATO countries concerning the political and military leaderships’ approach in Iraq and Afghanistan, those voices did not receive enough attention. It is history repeating itself, and everybody knowing very little about the past in Afghanistan and about the cultural and religious environment will know that efforts to truly interact with the people of the country have only scratched the surface of what is possible and necessary.
It is not only a matter of understanding the regional history and culture, but also of accepting it. Even though it may afford a little more time, the greatest progress in Afghanistan generally has been made when the Allied nations approached the leadership and the people of the country with tolerance and in accord with the regional traditions and basic cultural rules. The stigma of the western colonial past is still very much present in the reluctance of many countries of the region to follow another country’s examples and regulations or even to accept its help if this would unsettle the traditional structures. And it is well-known that in Muslim countries this reluctance reaches as far back as to mediaeval times, respectively to the crusades – in fact the local press willingly picks up this motive to express the people’s anger about any more or less comparable appearance of western countries.
One of history’s best and most enigmatic examples of the clash of cultures in a conflict, as well as for the various problems and opportunities of co-operation, has been Tomas Edward Lawrence’s account of his involvement in the Arab uprising against the Ottoman rule in his formidable “Seven Pillars of Wisdom.” And though Afghanistan cannot be compared to the Hejaz region of 1917, it is the principle of and the requirements for effective inter-cultural co-operation and understanding that make those experiences most important for today’s challenges in the Middle East.
Mullen: “We are still learning about the various cultures”
It is to this great person of history, known to most as “Lawrence of Arabia,” that the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, made reference to in a speech at The American Legion on Tuesday. And it is by correctly applying this unique example that Mullen outlined how trust and a partnership borne of understanding – not simply military might – is what is needed to quell conflicts and establish rules of law in troubled regions of the Middle East.
“Despite all that's been done to bring stability to that region, really since the end of World War I,” said Admiral Mike Mullen, “we are still learning about the various cultures that shape the region's landscape. Because understanding takes time and without consistent engagement - a willingness to see things from another's perspective - there will always be a trust deficit. And where trust is lacking, partnerships falter.”
Mullen cited the example of British officer Lawrence as one of enlightened leadership during the so-called Arab Revolt. “During World War I, (he) and a few others committed themselves to learning the customs, the languages and the cultures of the people of the Middle East. They fought beside them; earned their friendship. But, most importantly, they won their trust.”
“We cannot win from the Pentagon” – or from anywhere else outside the region
This principle of combining a strong military force with cultural sensitivity applies equally to today's conflicts centred on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mullen said. In his words, “We cannot win from the Pentagon.” He further explained, “You have to be there, you have to see and hear firsthand what the issues are. You can't hope to see problems through someone else's eyes if you aren't looking into those eyes.”
But what is more important for any future strategy adopted to bring peace and stability to the region is that the fact has to be accepted that the cultural and political ‘comforts’ of western countries must not necessarily be the best solution for Middle East countries. It is not a matter of progress, as progress in large historical dimensions is not always something that has been brought to humanity deliberately. The recent presidential elections in Afghanistan clearly show that, first, the country is not yet ready for democracy and, second, that the path to anything near stability in Afghanistan is still longer than anyone may anticipate at the moment.
Let’s hope that the few voices of today will be heard by the political leadership to finally establish an elaborate long-term strategy for what Afghanistan should really look like in the future and by what means this is to be achieved. I, for my part, have not seen any strategy paper which really addresses the current problems of Afghanistan with the acceptance of actual historical, cultural and religious facts that need to be dealt with unconditionally. Should anyone have one ready in his drawer, please let me know.
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in August 2009)
August 26, 2009
August 11, 2009
Sisyphus and the Unresting Tunnel Diggers
Israeli Defence Forces do not come to an end in fight against tunnels in Gaza
Tunnels in conflict areas have already reached appalling fame in the past: from the sapping of fortified structures in medieval times to the tunnel system of Iwo Jima and the so-called tunnel rats in Vietnam. Even Afghanistan has seen a similar phenomenon, which led the Russians to train their own tunnel rats in the 1980s. However, the most recent use of ingenious underground engineering is being found on the southern border of the small but densely populated Gaza strip. Whether it is for supporting combatants and terrorists within the isolated territory or just to provide the civilian population with cheap goods, medicine and a possibility to flee the area, the Palestinians have dug hundreds of more or less sophisticated tunnels.
Connecting the Palestinian refugee camp of Rafah with the Egyptian town of Rafah, the tunnels pass under the barrier that was erected in compliance with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed in 1979 in Washington. This relatively fortified buffer zone, also called the Philadelphi corridor, has not been comprehensively controlled by Israel since 2005, when it handed over control to the Palestinian National Authority. The more severe demarcation is, however, being sustained by Egypt, which is afraid of letting Palestinian refugees (along with possible terrorists) cross into their territory. The corridor especially aroused public interest in early 2008 when Palestinian militants tore down several parts of the wall, allowing temporary uncontrolled border traffic.
However, since the border generally remains hermetically sealed and, particularly, terrorists and smugglers in the Gaza strip foster illegal border traffic, the construction of tunnels flourished during past years. That it is a key Israeli interest to stop weapons smuggling was clearly demonstrated in its three-week offensive launched in December 2008, during which hundreds of houses were demolished and suspected tunnels bombed by fighter aircraft. Due to the dense population around Rafah, it has been easy for the Palestinians to connect houses on both sides with tunnels, effectively hiding the entrances and storage rooms.
More than just a military target
The tunnels are generally dug at depths of approximately 15 to 25 meters (49 to 82 feet) and reach lengths of up to 800 meters (2,640 feet). Regardless of the well-concealed underground connections, the tunnel diggers and operators have a tough life as the general location is not difficult to guess (Rafah stretches along some four kilometres of the border) and the Israeli Air Force is not at all hesitant to strike at suspected tunnels. The Israeli Defence Forces claim to have discovered and destroyed some ninety tunnels, an estimated 95 per cent, in southern Gaza between late 2000 and mid 2004. As recent as the 9th of August, IAF fighter aircraft bombed a tunnel, allegedly used for weapons smuggling, in response to continuous firing of Qassam rockets and mortar shells at Israeli southern communities from the Gaza strip.
Nevertheless, the tunnels are apparently not just used to provide terrorists with weapons and munitions. As a British newspaper reported, the tunnels have been advertised as opportunities for doubling and trebling money. It has become a more or less successful business throughout the years, but has also led to unimaginable losses for ordinary residents who have lost their homes after Israeli raids and house demolition. The true money-makers, believed to either be powerful businessmen in Gaza and, reportedly, senior officials in Hamas, have not been seriously affected by these measures and continue to foster this questionable source of wealth or collect taxes from the operators. According to economics minister, Ziad al-Zaza, whose office is investigating the issue, some $100 million have been taken fraudulently from would-be entrepreneurs. Other suggested figures reach as high as $500 million.
As Al Jazeera reported shortly after the Israeli offensive earlier this year, some residents invest large sums of money to participate in this business. The owners of the tunnel, which was visited by reporters, had spent about $90,000 for its construction and were smuggling everything from generators and computers to rice, chocolate and powdered milk into Gaza. Issa El Nashar, major of Rafah and co-founder of Hamas, told a German newspaper that, meanwhile, there are more tunnels than before the Israeli military operation. He stated: “We now have an entire border crossing in Rafah – all beneath the surface.” Some are supposed to be as large as 20 meters and allow easy smuggling of goats, cows and large vehicle parts.
Science against persistence
As present, measures which the IDF can resort to are confined to reacting, rather than themselves taking the initiative, it is now looking for a decisive technology that would provide the determining advantage. A rather unconventional attempt has recently been reported by the Jerusalem Post. In conjunction with the Defence Ministry's Research and Development Directorate (MAFAT), the OC Ground Forces Commander, Major General Avi Mizrahi, and the head of the Technology and Logistics Department, Brigadier General Shahar Kadishai, decided to send an officer to the US to conduct research on a system to detect and locate tunnels. Named only as Captain Asher, the officer will be working on possible solutions in a leading laboratory that specialises in discovering underground oil reserves.
After different approaches, including specially designed seismic sensors developed by a Rafael Advanced Defense Systems subsidiary, and the use of controlled random explosions underground and along the border to thwart the tunnel diggers (a method used by the US Army along the Mexican border), the newest effort might provide a more precise insight into the underground landscape of southern Gaza. The former solutions proved to be rather difficult to use in urban areas: detonations large enough to affect nearby tunnels may also damage or destroy the weakly built houses and acoustic and seismic sensors tend to pick up false readings due to water pipes and sewer systems.
Nevertheless, any technological solution will not end the Palestinians’ persistence in getting what they need in goods or weapons from abroad. The IDF may perhaps make it more costly and risky, but they will most likely not prevent the smugglers from somehow achieving their goal. As in many other conflict areas, it remains a question whether to fight the means or the origin. Just as piracy on the Horn of Africa will not be eliminated by sending warships, as long as the conflict in Somalia does not come to rest, this particular phenomenon in Gaza won’t end by means of air raids and house demolitions. Not the IDF, but only the involved parties can make the decisive change, which will have to be much more comprehensive than ending the construction of tunnels in southern Gaza. It is especially an opportunity for the international community to excell in a major peace-keeping and humanitarian effort. But, for the time being, any such efforts have almost vanished into inconsequential obscurity.
(This entry is an article I ogirinally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in August 2009)
Tunnels in conflict areas have already reached appalling fame in the past: from the sapping of fortified structures in medieval times to the tunnel system of Iwo Jima and the so-called tunnel rats in Vietnam. Even Afghanistan has seen a similar phenomenon, which led the Russians to train their own tunnel rats in the 1980s. However, the most recent use of ingenious underground engineering is being found on the southern border of the small but densely populated Gaza strip. Whether it is for supporting combatants and terrorists within the isolated territory or just to provide the civilian population with cheap goods, medicine and a possibility to flee the area, the Palestinians have dug hundreds of more or less sophisticated tunnels.
Connecting the Palestinian refugee camp of Rafah with the Egyptian town of Rafah, the tunnels pass under the barrier that was erected in compliance with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed in 1979 in Washington. This relatively fortified buffer zone, also called the Philadelphi corridor, has not been comprehensively controlled by Israel since 2005, when it handed over control to the Palestinian National Authority. The more severe demarcation is, however, being sustained by Egypt, which is afraid of letting Palestinian refugees (along with possible terrorists) cross into their territory. The corridor especially aroused public interest in early 2008 when Palestinian militants tore down several parts of the wall, allowing temporary uncontrolled border traffic.
However, since the border generally remains hermetically sealed and, particularly, terrorists and smugglers in the Gaza strip foster illegal border traffic, the construction of tunnels flourished during past years. That it is a key Israeli interest to stop weapons smuggling was clearly demonstrated in its three-week offensive launched in December 2008, during which hundreds of houses were demolished and suspected tunnels bombed by fighter aircraft. Due to the dense population around Rafah, it has been easy for the Palestinians to connect houses on both sides with tunnels, effectively hiding the entrances and storage rooms.
More than just a military target
The tunnels are generally dug at depths of approximately 15 to 25 meters (49 to 82 feet) and reach lengths of up to 800 meters (2,640 feet). Regardless of the well-concealed underground connections, the tunnel diggers and operators have a tough life as the general location is not difficult to guess (Rafah stretches along some four kilometres of the border) and the Israeli Air Force is not at all hesitant to strike at suspected tunnels. The Israeli Defence Forces claim to have discovered and destroyed some ninety tunnels, an estimated 95 per cent, in southern Gaza between late 2000 and mid 2004. As recent as the 9th of August, IAF fighter aircraft bombed a tunnel, allegedly used for weapons smuggling, in response to continuous firing of Qassam rockets and mortar shells at Israeli southern communities from the Gaza strip.
Nevertheless, the tunnels are apparently not just used to provide terrorists with weapons and munitions. As a British newspaper reported, the tunnels have been advertised as opportunities for doubling and trebling money. It has become a more or less successful business throughout the years, but has also led to unimaginable losses for ordinary residents who have lost their homes after Israeli raids and house demolition. The true money-makers, believed to either be powerful businessmen in Gaza and, reportedly, senior officials in Hamas, have not been seriously affected by these measures and continue to foster this questionable source of wealth or collect taxes from the operators. According to economics minister, Ziad al-Zaza, whose office is investigating the issue, some $100 million have been taken fraudulently from would-be entrepreneurs. Other suggested figures reach as high as $500 million.
As Al Jazeera reported shortly after the Israeli offensive earlier this year, some residents invest large sums of money to participate in this business. The owners of the tunnel, which was visited by reporters, had spent about $90,000 for its construction and were smuggling everything from generators and computers to rice, chocolate and powdered milk into Gaza. Issa El Nashar, major of Rafah and co-founder of Hamas, told a German newspaper that, meanwhile, there are more tunnels than before the Israeli military operation. He stated: “We now have an entire border crossing in Rafah – all beneath the surface.” Some are supposed to be as large as 20 meters and allow easy smuggling of goats, cows and large vehicle parts.
Science against persistence
As present, measures which the IDF can resort to are confined to reacting, rather than themselves taking the initiative, it is now looking for a decisive technology that would provide the determining advantage. A rather unconventional attempt has recently been reported by the Jerusalem Post. In conjunction with the Defence Ministry's Research and Development Directorate (MAFAT), the OC Ground Forces Commander, Major General Avi Mizrahi, and the head of the Technology and Logistics Department, Brigadier General Shahar Kadishai, decided to send an officer to the US to conduct research on a system to detect and locate tunnels. Named only as Captain Asher, the officer will be working on possible solutions in a leading laboratory that specialises in discovering underground oil reserves.
After different approaches, including specially designed seismic sensors developed by a Rafael Advanced Defense Systems subsidiary, and the use of controlled random explosions underground and along the border to thwart the tunnel diggers (a method used by the US Army along the Mexican border), the newest effort might provide a more precise insight into the underground landscape of southern Gaza. The former solutions proved to be rather difficult to use in urban areas: detonations large enough to affect nearby tunnels may also damage or destroy the weakly built houses and acoustic and seismic sensors tend to pick up false readings due to water pipes and sewer systems.
Nevertheless, any technological solution will not end the Palestinians’ persistence in getting what they need in goods or weapons from abroad. The IDF may perhaps make it more costly and risky, but they will most likely not prevent the smugglers from somehow achieving their goal. As in many other conflict areas, it remains a question whether to fight the means or the origin. Just as piracy on the Horn of Africa will not be eliminated by sending warships, as long as the conflict in Somalia does not come to rest, this particular phenomenon in Gaza won’t end by means of air raids and house demolitions. Not the IDF, but only the involved parties can make the decisive change, which will have to be much more comprehensive than ending the construction of tunnels in southern Gaza. It is especially an opportunity for the international community to excell in a major peace-keeping and humanitarian effort. But, for the time being, any such efforts have almost vanished into inconsequential obscurity.
(This entry is an article I ogirinally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in August 2009)
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