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Interview with RADM Joe Carnevale (ret.), SCA Senior Defense Advisor
The US Navy is sailing towards troubled waters, as tough decisions between strategic requirements, budget necessities, and the sustainment of the industrial base lie ahead during the upcoming years. On the occasion of the Surface Navy Association’s 24th National Symposium, taking place in Washington, D.C. on Jan. 10-12, Nicolas von Kospoth of defpro.com asked Rear Admiral (ret.) Joseph A Carnevale*, Senior Defence Advisor of the Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA), to provide his insight on current issues and trends within the US shipbuilding sector in this challenging environment.
NvK: First, could you please outline the mission and the activities of the Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA) to our readers? How does to SCA promote the shipbuilding industrial base in the defence sector?
Joe Carnevale: SCA is the national trade association representing the US shipyard industry. The SCA members constitute the shipyard industrial base that builds, repairs, maintains and modernises Navy ships and craft, United States Coast Guard vessels of all sizes, as well as vessels for other government agencies. In addition, SCA members build, repair and service America’s fleet of commercial vessels.
The Council represents 50 companies that own and operate over 120 shipyards, with facilities on all three US coasts, the Great Lakes, the inland waterways system, Alaska and Hawaii. SCA also represents 72 affiliate members that provide goods and services to the shipyard industry.
SCA members also directly employ 50,000 American jobs. SCA works with the Congress, the Department of the Navy and the US Coast Guard to promote shipbuilding and ship repair, maintenance and modernisation.
NvK: The United States are carefully shifting their attention from current operations in the Middle East and Central Asia to the Pacific. Do you expect that this strategic shift, and a possible reassessment of budget priorities due to changing naval requirements, could benefit the shipbuilding industry?
Carnevale: Recognition of the critical role our Navy has in national defence is important, not just to our industry but to the American people. The Navy’s importance in the Pacific cannot be overstated. However, the Navy’s contribution to ballistic missile defence, strategic deterrence, and promoting stability worldwide is equally important. The Trident strategic ballistic missile defence programme is the Navy’s survivable leg of the nuclear triad and, thus, a key element as well.
One would hope that all of these essential missions would be considered, as budget priorities are reassessed. However, it remains to be seen how this scope of capabilities will be supported in future budgets. I think there is a sentiment that, at some point, the budget pressure becomes so significant that the Department of Defense will have to decide what missions they cut back on. There will be capabilities or options that they will not be able to sustain because they do not have the necessary budget. We rely on that process being a rational one, with sufficient analysis that is built essentially on the important missions the Navy will have to accomplish.
NvK: Today, affordability is the determining factor of future shipbuilding programmes. Which efforts must the US naval shipbuilding industry undertake to meet the Navy’s financial options while remaining competitive and sustaining key capabilities of the national industrial base?
Carnevale: Industry must work with its Navy and Coast Guard customers to stabilise programmes, promote efficiencies and resolve issues. It’s got to be team play. Shipbuilding, and especially lead ship building, is a complex, difficult undertaking.
Our shipyards have made significant capital investments to deliver quality products. Continuing, essential efforts have been made to build a trained workforce and provide them the necessary tools and processes needed for efficient production. Those efforts must continue.
NvK: While European shipbuilders, in particular submarine manufacturers, can no longer exclusively rely on their domestic markets and make great efforts to expand into important export markets, US shipbuilders appear to avoid looking abroad. What has been the reason for this position?
Carnevale: US shipbuilders have looked abroad on many occasions. Offering ships, craft and systems that are supported by and in operation with the United States Navy is a great selling point. The complexity and sophistication of most of the ships being procured by the US Navy have typically been more than most foreign navies have wanted. There are variants of the sea-based Aegis ballistic missile defence system being fielded by foreign countries. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) affords an opportunity for foreign sales that we haven’t seen since the construction of the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate (FFG-7) concluded.
NvK: From an opposite perspective, it appears to be difficult for foreign companies to enter the US defence market. However, Austal has been able to make an impressive entry with the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and the LCS programme. What is your explanation for this particular success story and what is your assessment of opportunities for other foreign manufacturers, suppliers and service providers on the US market?
Carnevale: Traditionally, there has been a great presence of US manufacturers in Europe. All big US defence companies have had for a long time significant operations in Europe and other places overseas. I would not agree that it has been difficult for foreign companies to enter the US defence market. Quite the contrary! Over the last 10 years we have seen a great influx of European companies into the US market; we have seen Thales, BAE, Fincantieri, Rolls Royce, Alstom and numerous other foreign companies open successful American subsidiaries. Considering that they are manufacturing in the United States, it certainly helps the American industrial base.
Austal’s success, in my opinion, resulted first and foremost from offering a product that met the Navy’s needs then following through in delivering it. Beyond that, they developed a very productive partnership with their local community and the members of government at all levels that represent that community.
I don’t see any significant obstacles to foreign manufacturers, suppliers and service providers but they must realise it is a highly competitive field in a decreasing budget environment. They will need to evaluate their opportunities and measure that against the investment necessary to pursue them.
NvK: The replacement of the United States’ Trident ballistic-missile submarines, planned for 2027, is not that far away, when considering the usual time spans for R&D and production. The budget for this project can be expected to be very tight. How is the submarine shipbuilding sector positioned to address the Navy’s future requirements under these market conditions?
Carnevale: I think the submarine shipbuilding sector is very well positioned for the replacement of the United States’ Trident ballistic-missile submarines. The success of the Virginia class submarine construction programme is a testimony to the solid base they have built. There are many lessons learned, systems and processes that will roll over from Virginia class to the Trident replacement. One thing is certain; they must get it right the first time. This programme must be provided the resources to ensure success.
NvK: Which key lessons learned from the Virginia class submarines programme would you highlight with regard to the development and production of future submarines for the US Navy?
Carnevale: The essential lessons learned from the Virginia class programme are, first, that evolutionary development is of great importance. The evolution from Los Angeles/688 to Seawolf to Virginia was to a great extent leveraged by the submarine community. This evolutionary approach paid significant dividends.
Further, the Navy’s ability to fix the requirements before the involved companies entered the design phase significantly benefitted them. They also completed a substantial portion of the design before they went into production.
Finally, the programme recognised the need to get onto a learning curve. That was challenging at first, with procurement of only one submarine a year and two shipbuilders building the submarines. Each shipbuilder builds all of a specific submarine section. One half is kept and assembled there and the other half is shipped to the other builder for assembly. Manufacturing two submarines a year, as considered in the Navy’s 2012 shipbuilding plans, will enhance the learning curve. Some of the pricing associated with this rate of production reflects that.
NvK: With the landing platform dock (LPD), the JHSV, the LCS and the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class, the US is executing important programmes to shape the future of its fleet of surface combatants. Will these programmes provide a sufficient basis for US shipyards to adequately sustain their capabilities and workforce during the next decade?
Carnevale: The 2012 shipbuilding plans presented by the Navy, while not necessarily robust, did have carriers on five year centres, two submarines a year, amphibious ships, DDG 51 restart, LCS, TAO-X pull ahead and other positive features. However, even with all the positive aspects, it did not meet the Navy’s own goals for the size of the fleet.
We are very concerned that the budget cuts being faced will fall heavily on the procurement accounts in general, and for us, the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion (SCN) account in particular putting the fleet at risk of even fewer ships. There will be a collateral effect on the industrial base.
NvK: What are the prospects of small- and medium-sized businesses in the supplier community? Which trends can be observed in terms of market structures as well as business opportunities with prime contractors within this increasingly competitive market?
Carnevale: Given the potentially dire effects future budget cuts may have on the industrial base, small and medium sized businesses face some level of risk. While we haven’t seen many go out of business yet, we do continue to see consolidation in the industry.
It is in the small- and medium-sized area in which we will see the most change. That is a trend that we have observed for quite a while now, but it ebbs and flows. I do not perceive any probable mergers among the giants of the shipbuilding industry. Mergers and procurements will mostly remain in the small- and medium-sized sector.
NvK: Constantly increasing energy prices, in particular that of oil, are becoming a serious issue for both the Navy and industry. How do you assess the impact of energy prices on the fleet’s future energy alignment and, in consequence, on the shipbuilding industry?
Carnevale: I see energy prices having only a secondary impact on the shipbuilding industry. If prices go up significantly, then fewer funds will be available for construction, maintenance and modernisation. For some there will be opportunities to present energy efficient systems.
NvK: As our last question, could you please share with our readers your personal outlook onto and your wishes for the future of US naval shipbuilding?
Carnevale: All of us at Shipbuilders Council of America strive for a healthy shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base. It is absolutely essential to the national security of our maritime nation. I hope that the American people come to understand how dependant they are as individuals on their Navy, their Coast Guard, their Merchant Marine, and all the ships that fly the American flag.
NvK: Thank you very much, Mr Carnevale.
(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in December 2011. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)
___
* Rear Admiral (retired) Joe Carnevale represents Shipbuilders Council of America before Congress, the US Navy, US Coast Guard and other Federal agencies, applying over thirty years of experience to defence acquisition issues. He focuses on ship maintenance and construction.
Prior to joining SCA in June of 2005, Mr. Carnevale led the professional services division of one of the fastest growing Fortune 500 companies. He served as Director of Fleet Maintenance for the Commander, Fleet Forces Command where he addressed the complete range of fleet maintenance issues as well as the recovery operation for USS Cole (DDG 67). As Program Executive Officer (DD 21) for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition) he led the development of the next generation of US Navy surface combatant. He has directly participated in the construction of six different ship classes.
After graduating from the University of Massachusetts, (B.S. Chemical Engineering, 1971), Mr. Carnevale joined the Navy, participating in combat operations in Vietnam. He attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology earning two postgraduate degrees, (M.S. Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering, Ocean Engineer’s Degree, 1980). He was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral (lower half) in 1998.
Other Navy assignments included Executive Assistant to ASN(RD&A), Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, DASN(SHIPS) Director for Surface Combatants, AEGIS Area Commander, Pascagoula and Test & Trials Officer for FFG 7 Class Ship Construction.
December 19, 2011
October 4, 2011
US Army Modernization – Preparing for Future Success
Interview with LTG Robert Lennox, Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army G-8
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approach their end, each at its individual pace and with very different requirements, the constant efforts of shaping the US Army are subject to new operational, political, and economic impacts. The decade of the war on terror has had an influence on the entire Armed Forces that is unparalleled in modern military history – at the same time, this era has seen a revolutionary increase of technological possibilities, which most prominently became manifest in the upsurge of unmanned systems and networked solutions. The Army is now at a crossroads at which it must determine the challenges and, in consequence, the requirements of the upcoming years, while managing the ongoing transition in operations abroad.
This complex defence-political environment will also influence this year’s AUSA Annual Meeting, which starts today, October 10, 2011, in Washington, D.C. On this occasion, defpro.com asked Lieutenant General Robert Lennox,[1] Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-8,[2] to outline the Army’s current modernisation efforts in light of the challenges that lie ahead.
NvK: Let us try and provide some background to enable our readers to better understand what will follow. How would you assess the current posture of the US Army, in terms of equipment?
LTG Robert Lennox: The Army has made great strides to bring the Army into “materiel balance.” As a result of continued Congressional support, the Army projects an Equipment On Hand (EOH) aggregate level of fill of 92 percent by the end of October 2012 (Active Component – 93 percent; Army National Guard – 92 percent; US Army Reserve – 90 percent). The challenge with Army equipping is that we over-equip units in combat (Theater Sustainment Stocks) and we ensure units going to accomplish non-standard missions (Field Artillery performing as Infantry) have all the appropriate equipment. This creates imbalance.
Today, less than half of all Army units report critical Equipment On Hand (EOH) shortages and we expect Army EOH to continue to improve. To help mitigate equipping challenges and synchronize the delivery of equipment, the Army implemented the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process, which focused intensive equipment management to provide units with the equipment needed for training and deployment as they progress through the ARFORGEN process.
Key lessons learned from the current fight include:
• Constant improvement has been needed in protection, both to vehicles and body armor. The vehicles include High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs). Over nine improvements have been made to body armor.
• The power of the Network has been important to successful operations with our Coalition partners. Pushing the network down to the soldier level for biometrics and situational awareness has empowered our soldiers.
• The Army learned the value of unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters.
• Soldier equipping is critical to lighten the load, increase lethality, and provide better optics.
NvK: What were the main lesson learned, and the resulting changes, since the end of the Cold War and the conflicts of the past decade? Is today’s US Army properly equipped to face the likely challenges of the years ahead or are there some shortcomings?
Lennox: The strategic international and domestic environments of the first half of the 21st century will differ markedly from the last seventy years. Major differences include a lack of certainty of where and against whom we would be required to fight and the availability of resources required to ensure our success.
Until the end of the Cold War, the United States defense establishment had certainty in the strategic and operational environments – we knew our enemy and where we would fight. This certainty provided a degree of predictability in resource availability and force structure. The Army was able to design a force to defend against a large, specific threat – the threat of national destruction fueled relatively large commitments of resources.
Today, we are in an era characterized by persistent conflict highlighted by the lack of a clearly identifiable threat, uncertain operational environments, increased cost of labor and capital and decreased access to resources to pay for them. To confront these new realities and remain the most decisive land force in the world, the Army must achieve a balance between prevailing in current operations and preparing for success in the future, while simultaneously hedging against unexpected contingencies and sustaining the high quality of the all-volunteer Army.
Our strategy to equip the Army takes a balanced approach and features:
• Integrated portfolios that align the modernization community to ensure integration across requirements, acquisition, resourcing and sustainment
• Incremental modernization to deliver improved capabilities as technology matures, resources are available or necessity dictates
• ARFORGEN equipping to improve or maintain core capabilities and provide mission-specific capabilities in support of operational availability cycles
Our strategy to equip the force follows four lines of effort: 1) Modernize to improve and upgrade existing equipment; 2) Sustain our equipment to extend its useful life; 3) Mitigate mission shortfalls by procuring unique equipment for immediate capability needs; and 4) Distribute equipment so that it is in the right place and in the right amounts to enable training, preparation and execution for mission success.
NvK: In broader terms, what are the main goals of the ongoing transformation process? How will the future US Army differ from todays? And, what are the most urgent transformation steps?
Lennox: The goal of Army Equipment Modernization is to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of equipment to allow soldiers and units to succeed in full-spectrum operations today and tomorrow and maintain our decisive advantage over any enemy we face.
Versatile means equipment that is
• adaptable in response to real or anticipated environments change;
• expansible over time as technology and anticipated environments change;
• networked to share information in the quantities, quality, timeliness and security level required for operations.
Affordable means that we will make fiscally informed decisions to get the greatest capability value within projected resources and with acceptable risk.
NvK: The ill-fated FCS programme used to be the cornerstone of the US Army transformation. Could you please elaborate on how the Army has “harvested” technologies from the programme?
Lennox: There are several areas where Future Combat System (FCS) technologies have been harvested, most notably in the development of the network and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). The lessons learned from the efforts of the FCS have been applied to help streamline development efforts. An example of such is the hybrid drives developed for the FCS manned ground vehicles and being considered for the GCV.
Active protection systems from the FCS are likely to be found on the Ground Combat Vehicle and other combat vehicles in the future. Another example is the Network Integration Kit, which has been used at Fort Bliss, Texas, in the Network Integration Evaluation and has some positive feedback.
NvK: The network is arguably the single most important development programme as currently underway for the US Army. Could you please provide an overview of the goals of the programme and its current status?
Lennox: The Army’s network investment reflects a fundamental change in how the Army will field new capabilities to the warfighter. Specifically, the Army will converge parallel network efforts into one coherent network for soldiers, platforms, and command posts linked by an integrated suite of command and control applications and services connected via a common network and fielded to as many formations as possible. The Army’s main effort is to develop and deploy network ‘capability sets’ aligned against ARFORGEN requirements to provide an integrated, seamless network capability – from the Tactical Operation Center to the Commander on the Move, to the dismounted soldier.
A comprehensive review of all network solutions prior to deployment is a critical component of developing ‘capability sets.’ In June 2011, the Army conducted the initial Network Integration exercise (NIE) at Fort Bliss by the Army’s Brigade Modernization Command. The NIE will now serve as the network’s primary venue to evaluate Army network programs, new technologies and network capabilities.
NvK: Beyond the Network, how would you list the next most important programmes?
Lennox: The Army Modernization Plan 2012 strategy-based priorities for modernized equipment are to (1) network the force, (2) deter and defeat hybrid threats, and (3) protect and empower soldiers. Program priorities provide the critical capabilities which give our soldiers and units the decisive edge in full spectrum operations.
Our prioritization efforts strike a balance between current and future needs; provide the basis for an affordable equipping strategy over time; reflect Army and Congressional interests, guidance and priorities and nest with Army Campaign Plan directed capabilities.
The Army has seven systems in its Fiscal Year 2012 request categorized as CRITICAL:
• Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A): Provides integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data to airborne and ground sensor platforms.
• OH-58 Kiowa Warrior Model Upgrade: Enhances and upgrades cockpit sensors.
• Ground Combat Vehicle: The Army’s replacement for the Infantry fighting vehicles in Heavy Brigade Combat Teams.
• Paladin Integrated Management (PIM): Enhances the responsiveness, survivability, and operational readiness of the self-propelled howitzer fleet.
• Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS): Provides advanced joint tactical end to end networking data and voice communications to our soldiers and units.
• Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increments 1, 2 and 3: Provides the warfighter with advanced communications between widely dispersed units with voice, data and video.
• Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P): Enables a widely dispersed command and control capability across all formations and entire spectrum of joint military operations.
NvK: One way or another, it appears highly likely that future defence budgets will decline, and contain less money for RDA. Are you confident the US Army will nonetheless be able to maintain its technological ascendency?
Lennox: During the past five years, the Army has invested over $100 billion dollars in new equipment. Those investments provide our soldiers with the world’s most advanced weaponry, most capable sensors, and most survivable transportation systems. Along with those improvements, we have built a network that provides a common operational view of the battlefield down to troop level. Although other nations have made investments in their ground forces, none have done so to the extent we have because our systems have been delivered across both our active and reserve components. Every Army unit is equipped to be the best in the world. We have also made extensive investments in infrastructure especially training ranges, depots and unit maintenance facilities and have provided our troops with the funding they need to continue training at a high tempo.
Our continuous investment in research, development, test and evaluation, amounting to over $50 billion dollars during the past five years, ensures the Army will retain its technological edge and continue the fielding of advanced technologies.
Currently, we are ramping down from ten years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This period offered us a vast depth of experience on what technology is effective and what is not. We have made huge gains in recognizing and closing capability gaps in our force. The lessons we have learned from this type of warfare has advanced and refocused our research and development efforts to new levels.
The Army’s strategy is to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of equipment to allow soldiers and units to succeed in full-spectrum operations today and tomorrow and to maintain our decisive advantage over any enemy we face.
This strategy takes a balanced and affordable approach by using ARFORGEN equipping to improve or maintain core capabilities, incremental modernization to deliver new and improved capabilities and integrated portfolios to align our equipment modernization communities.
The Army is focused on being a good steward of resources and has implemented numerous process changes to accomplish that goal. These changes include:
• Integrated affordability reviews in the requirements development process to ensure requirements are both feasible and affordable;
• Cost Benefit Analysis to ensure a value-added review of requirements before funding is applied;
• Capability Portfolio Review process where Army senior leadership reviews requirements, acquisition and relative priorities to ensure we are developing the right capabilities to meet emerging threats.
NvK: Thank you very much, General Lennox.
(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in October 2011. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)
____
Notes:
[1] Lieutenant General Robert P. Lennox was appointed the US Army’s fourth Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, on November 2, 2009. He is responsible for integration and programming across the Army to meet the current and future force requirements. LTG Lennox graduated in 1977 from West Point, where he earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Engineering. He also holds a Masters Degree in Business Administration from Stanford University, and a Masters Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the National Defense University. LTG Lennox’s military education includes the Air Defense Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the National War College. LTG Lennox’s last assignment was as the Director, Army Quadrennial Defense Review.
[2] The Army G-8 is responsible for integrating Army funding, fielding, and equipping actions with OSD, Joint, and ARSTAF organizations and processes for the purpose of meeting current and future force requirements of the Joint Force. G-8 is the principal military advisor to ASA(FM&C) and advises VCSA on JROC issues as well. G-8 also serves as a member of JCB, AR2B, AROC, AMCB.
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approach their end, each at its individual pace and with very different requirements, the constant efforts of shaping the US Army are subject to new operational, political, and economic impacts. The decade of the war on terror has had an influence on the entire Armed Forces that is unparalleled in modern military history – at the same time, this era has seen a revolutionary increase of technological possibilities, which most prominently became manifest in the upsurge of unmanned systems and networked solutions. The Army is now at a crossroads at which it must determine the challenges and, in consequence, the requirements of the upcoming years, while managing the ongoing transition in operations abroad.
This complex defence-political environment will also influence this year’s AUSA Annual Meeting, which starts today, October 10, 2011, in Washington, D.C. On this occasion, defpro.com asked Lieutenant General Robert Lennox,[1] Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-8,[2] to outline the Army’s current modernisation efforts in light of the challenges that lie ahead.
NvK: Let us try and provide some background to enable our readers to better understand what will follow. How would you assess the current posture of the US Army, in terms of equipment?
LTG Robert Lennox: The Army has made great strides to bring the Army into “materiel balance.” As a result of continued Congressional support, the Army projects an Equipment On Hand (EOH) aggregate level of fill of 92 percent by the end of October 2012 (Active Component – 93 percent; Army National Guard – 92 percent; US Army Reserve – 90 percent). The challenge with Army equipping is that we over-equip units in combat (Theater Sustainment Stocks) and we ensure units going to accomplish non-standard missions (Field Artillery performing as Infantry) have all the appropriate equipment. This creates imbalance.
Today, less than half of all Army units report critical Equipment On Hand (EOH) shortages and we expect Army EOH to continue to improve. To help mitigate equipping challenges and synchronize the delivery of equipment, the Army implemented the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process, which focused intensive equipment management to provide units with the equipment needed for training and deployment as they progress through the ARFORGEN process.
Key lessons learned from the current fight include:
• Constant improvement has been needed in protection, both to vehicles and body armor. The vehicles include High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs). Over nine improvements have been made to body armor.
• The power of the Network has been important to successful operations with our Coalition partners. Pushing the network down to the soldier level for biometrics and situational awareness has empowered our soldiers.
• The Army learned the value of unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters.
• Soldier equipping is critical to lighten the load, increase lethality, and provide better optics.
NvK: What were the main lesson learned, and the resulting changes, since the end of the Cold War and the conflicts of the past decade? Is today’s US Army properly equipped to face the likely challenges of the years ahead or are there some shortcomings?
Lennox: The strategic international and domestic environments of the first half of the 21st century will differ markedly from the last seventy years. Major differences include a lack of certainty of where and against whom we would be required to fight and the availability of resources required to ensure our success.
Until the end of the Cold War, the United States defense establishment had certainty in the strategic and operational environments – we knew our enemy and where we would fight. This certainty provided a degree of predictability in resource availability and force structure. The Army was able to design a force to defend against a large, specific threat – the threat of national destruction fueled relatively large commitments of resources.
Today, we are in an era characterized by persistent conflict highlighted by the lack of a clearly identifiable threat, uncertain operational environments, increased cost of labor and capital and decreased access to resources to pay for them. To confront these new realities and remain the most decisive land force in the world, the Army must achieve a balance between prevailing in current operations and preparing for success in the future, while simultaneously hedging against unexpected contingencies and sustaining the high quality of the all-volunteer Army.
Our strategy to equip the Army takes a balanced approach and features:
• Integrated portfolios that align the modernization community to ensure integration across requirements, acquisition, resourcing and sustainment
• Incremental modernization to deliver improved capabilities as technology matures, resources are available or necessity dictates
• ARFORGEN equipping to improve or maintain core capabilities and provide mission-specific capabilities in support of operational availability cycles
Our strategy to equip the force follows four lines of effort: 1) Modernize to improve and upgrade existing equipment; 2) Sustain our equipment to extend its useful life; 3) Mitigate mission shortfalls by procuring unique equipment for immediate capability needs; and 4) Distribute equipment so that it is in the right place and in the right amounts to enable training, preparation and execution for mission success.
NvK: In broader terms, what are the main goals of the ongoing transformation process? How will the future US Army differ from todays? And, what are the most urgent transformation steps?
Lennox: The goal of Army Equipment Modernization is to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of equipment to allow soldiers and units to succeed in full-spectrum operations today and tomorrow and maintain our decisive advantage over any enemy we face.
Versatile means equipment that is
• adaptable in response to real or anticipated environments change;
• expansible over time as technology and anticipated environments change;
• networked to share information in the quantities, quality, timeliness and security level required for operations.
Affordable means that we will make fiscally informed decisions to get the greatest capability value within projected resources and with acceptable risk.
NvK: The ill-fated FCS programme used to be the cornerstone of the US Army transformation. Could you please elaborate on how the Army has “harvested” technologies from the programme?
Lennox: There are several areas where Future Combat System (FCS) technologies have been harvested, most notably in the development of the network and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). The lessons learned from the efforts of the FCS have been applied to help streamline development efforts. An example of such is the hybrid drives developed for the FCS manned ground vehicles and being considered for the GCV.
Active protection systems from the FCS are likely to be found on the Ground Combat Vehicle and other combat vehicles in the future. Another example is the Network Integration Kit, which has been used at Fort Bliss, Texas, in the Network Integration Evaluation and has some positive feedback.
NvK: The network is arguably the single most important development programme as currently underway for the US Army. Could you please provide an overview of the goals of the programme and its current status?
Lennox: The Army’s network investment reflects a fundamental change in how the Army will field new capabilities to the warfighter. Specifically, the Army will converge parallel network efforts into one coherent network for soldiers, platforms, and command posts linked by an integrated suite of command and control applications and services connected via a common network and fielded to as many formations as possible. The Army’s main effort is to develop and deploy network ‘capability sets’ aligned against ARFORGEN requirements to provide an integrated, seamless network capability – from the Tactical Operation Center to the Commander on the Move, to the dismounted soldier.
A comprehensive review of all network solutions prior to deployment is a critical component of developing ‘capability sets.’ In June 2011, the Army conducted the initial Network Integration exercise (NIE) at Fort Bliss by the Army’s Brigade Modernization Command. The NIE will now serve as the network’s primary venue to evaluate Army network programs, new technologies and network capabilities.
NvK: Beyond the Network, how would you list the next most important programmes?
Lennox: The Army Modernization Plan 2012 strategy-based priorities for modernized equipment are to (1) network the force, (2) deter and defeat hybrid threats, and (3) protect and empower soldiers. Program priorities provide the critical capabilities which give our soldiers and units the decisive edge in full spectrum operations.
Our prioritization efforts strike a balance between current and future needs; provide the basis for an affordable equipping strategy over time; reflect Army and Congressional interests, guidance and priorities and nest with Army Campaign Plan directed capabilities.
The Army has seven systems in its Fiscal Year 2012 request categorized as CRITICAL:
• Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A): Provides integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data to airborne and ground sensor platforms.
• OH-58 Kiowa Warrior Model Upgrade: Enhances and upgrades cockpit sensors.
• Ground Combat Vehicle: The Army’s replacement for the Infantry fighting vehicles in Heavy Brigade Combat Teams.
• Paladin Integrated Management (PIM): Enhances the responsiveness, survivability, and operational readiness of the self-propelled howitzer fleet.
• Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS): Provides advanced joint tactical end to end networking data and voice communications to our soldiers and units.
• Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increments 1, 2 and 3: Provides the warfighter with advanced communications between widely dispersed units with voice, data and video.
• Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P): Enables a widely dispersed command and control capability across all formations and entire spectrum of joint military operations.
NvK: One way or another, it appears highly likely that future defence budgets will decline, and contain less money for RDA. Are you confident the US Army will nonetheless be able to maintain its technological ascendency?
Lennox: During the past five years, the Army has invested over $100 billion dollars in new equipment. Those investments provide our soldiers with the world’s most advanced weaponry, most capable sensors, and most survivable transportation systems. Along with those improvements, we have built a network that provides a common operational view of the battlefield down to troop level. Although other nations have made investments in their ground forces, none have done so to the extent we have because our systems have been delivered across both our active and reserve components. Every Army unit is equipped to be the best in the world. We have also made extensive investments in infrastructure especially training ranges, depots and unit maintenance facilities and have provided our troops with the funding they need to continue training at a high tempo.
Our continuous investment in research, development, test and evaluation, amounting to over $50 billion dollars during the past five years, ensures the Army will retain its technological edge and continue the fielding of advanced technologies.
Currently, we are ramping down from ten years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This period offered us a vast depth of experience on what technology is effective and what is not. We have made huge gains in recognizing and closing capability gaps in our force. The lessons we have learned from this type of warfare has advanced and refocused our research and development efforts to new levels.
The Army’s strategy is to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of equipment to allow soldiers and units to succeed in full-spectrum operations today and tomorrow and to maintain our decisive advantage over any enemy we face.
This strategy takes a balanced and affordable approach by using ARFORGEN equipping to improve or maintain core capabilities, incremental modernization to deliver new and improved capabilities and integrated portfolios to align our equipment modernization communities.
The Army is focused on being a good steward of resources and has implemented numerous process changes to accomplish that goal. These changes include:
• Integrated affordability reviews in the requirements development process to ensure requirements are both feasible and affordable;
• Cost Benefit Analysis to ensure a value-added review of requirements before funding is applied;
• Capability Portfolio Review process where Army senior leadership reviews requirements, acquisition and relative priorities to ensure we are developing the right capabilities to meet emerging threats.
NvK: Thank you very much, General Lennox.
(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in October 2011. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)
____
Notes:
[1] Lieutenant General Robert P. Lennox was appointed the US Army’s fourth Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, on November 2, 2009. He is responsible for integration and programming across the Army to meet the current and future force requirements. LTG Lennox graduated in 1977 from West Point, where he earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Engineering. He also holds a Masters Degree in Business Administration from Stanford University, and a Masters Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the National Defense University. LTG Lennox’s military education includes the Air Defense Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the National War College. LTG Lennox’s last assignment was as the Director, Army Quadrennial Defense Review.
[2] The Army G-8 is responsible for integrating Army funding, fielding, and equipping actions with OSD, Joint, and ARSTAF organizations and processes for the purpose of meeting current and future force requirements of the Joint Force. G-8 is the principal military advisor to ASA(FM&C) and advises VCSA on JROC issues as well. G-8 also serves as a member of JCB, AR2B, AROC, AMCB.
May 30, 2011
She did it again!
Angela Merkel's limited imagination
The question was not “if” but, rather, “when” – German Chancellor Angela Merkel did it again! This time it regarded today’s government announcement of the plan to phase out all nuclear plants by 2022. I will neither begin a fact check nor a political or ethical analysis of the German decision to abandon nuclear energy within a little more than one decade – generally, the decision is correct, but the path towards a 100% renewable energy supply may be questioned.
This post is rather about Merkel once again underlining the limit of her imagination and, thus, of her competence as a decision-maker. Once more she used the expression “not imaginable” to explain (or rather excuse) her political wavering. Today, she explained the government’s decision to make a 180° turn in its energy policy with the shocking events of Fukushima.
In her statement during a press conference, together with several ministers, Merkel explained that the “personally unimaginable disaster” of the Japanese nuclear plant prompted her to generally reassess the role of nuclear energy. Indeed, these events are shocking and they will have an unquestionable effect on future energy policies around the world. However, it is unacceptable for a Chancellor, or any other key political decision-maker (and in this case even a graduated physicist), to say that a disaster at a nuclear plant, which has been built on the pacific coast in the vicinity of a high-risk fault line and in a country that has been battered by earthquakes, volcano eruptions and tsunami waves since its origin, is unimaginable. This is simply mind-boggling in every sense of the word.
Even if the plant had not been built in this particularly disaster-prone area, incidents such as in Chernobyl or Three Mile Island should have been proof enough that a disaster in a nuclear plant does not need earthquakes and tsunamis to jerk more shit at the fan than any energy company or government could tackle without risking the lives in the thousands.
Each time a politician uses this expression, I can feel my head almost explode from anger. Human mind has very few limits to its imagination and, in particular, someone who bears the responsibility over an entire country should be able to push these limits as far as possible – even if it is only with the help a staff of experts. We pay our Chancellor a lot of money to do exactly that.
Please don’t misunderstand me. I accept that a person is shocked by disasters in a way that his or her mind could not anticipate. However, such persons should perhaps not be assigned to run a country. What if this disaster would have not happened in Japan but, rather, in Germany? What if an urban area such as the Ruhr area with a population of more than 5 million would be hit by the fallout from a damaged French or Belgian nuclear plant? How would Merkel call that? Would this also be “unimaginable”?
Wrong, it is not unimaginable! I just imagined it – and with me many people who live at the Franco-German border or anyplace near a nuclear plant. And believe me: it is a ghastly thought. And it is not that absurd, considering that Belgium operates the oldest nuclear plants in Western Europe and that France operates 59 (!) nuclear plants, which generate some 80 per cent of its overall energy supply.
So perhaps Merkel should give her imagination just a little impulse and start to give her voters (and the citizen of the country she governs, while we're at it) at least the slightest impression that she is prepared for the greater challenges of her office.
The question was not “if” but, rather, “when” – German Chancellor Angela Merkel did it again! This time it regarded today’s government announcement of the plan to phase out all nuclear plants by 2022. I will neither begin a fact check nor a political or ethical analysis of the German decision to abandon nuclear energy within a little more than one decade – generally, the decision is correct, but the path towards a 100% renewable energy supply may be questioned.
This post is rather about Merkel once again underlining the limit of her imagination and, thus, of her competence as a decision-maker. Once more she used the expression “not imaginable” to explain (or rather excuse) her political wavering. Today, she explained the government’s decision to make a 180° turn in its energy policy with the shocking events of Fukushima.
In her statement during a press conference, together with several ministers, Merkel explained that the “personally unimaginable disaster” of the Japanese nuclear plant prompted her to generally reassess the role of nuclear energy. Indeed, these events are shocking and they will have an unquestionable effect on future energy policies around the world. However, it is unacceptable for a Chancellor, or any other key political decision-maker (and in this case even a graduated physicist), to say that a disaster at a nuclear plant, which has been built on the pacific coast in the vicinity of a high-risk fault line and in a country that has been battered by earthquakes, volcano eruptions and tsunami waves since its origin, is unimaginable. This is simply mind-boggling in every sense of the word.
Even if the plant had not been built in this particularly disaster-prone area, incidents such as in Chernobyl or Three Mile Island should have been proof enough that a disaster in a nuclear plant does not need earthquakes and tsunamis to jerk more shit at the fan than any energy company or government could tackle without risking the lives in the thousands.
Each time a politician uses this expression, I can feel my head almost explode from anger. Human mind has very few limits to its imagination and, in particular, someone who bears the responsibility over an entire country should be able to push these limits as far as possible – even if it is only with the help a staff of experts. We pay our Chancellor a lot of money to do exactly that.
Please don’t misunderstand me. I accept that a person is shocked by disasters in a way that his or her mind could not anticipate. However, such persons should perhaps not be assigned to run a country. What if this disaster would have not happened in Japan but, rather, in Germany? What if an urban area such as the Ruhr area with a population of more than 5 million would be hit by the fallout from a damaged French or Belgian nuclear plant? How would Merkel call that? Would this also be “unimaginable”?
Wrong, it is not unimaginable! I just imagined it – and with me many people who live at the Franco-German border or anyplace near a nuclear plant. And believe me: it is a ghastly thought. And it is not that absurd, considering that Belgium operates the oldest nuclear plants in Western Europe and that France operates 59 (!) nuclear plants, which generate some 80 per cent of its overall energy supply.
So perhaps Merkel should give her imagination just a little impulse and start to give her voters (and the citizen of the country she governs, while we're at it) at least the slightest impression that she is prepared for the greater challenges of her office.
January 10, 2011
Navies Can’t Defeat Piracy ... You Savvy?
An (old) approach to fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia
Experts in the years before the 1970s were convinced that something such as piracy could not experience a renaissance after its zenith in the 18th century was ended by the technological progress of nations and their growing control of the world’s oceans and sea lanes, supported by the increasing effects of globalisation. Safe havens for pirates became rare and a noteworthy presence of piracy only sparked into life in very limited and politically unstable areas. With the collapse of all state authority in Somalia and the increasing local power of terrorist and fundamentalist Islamic groups, the coastal areas of the Horn of Africa became a perfect breeding ground for piracy.
The ultimate goal of piracy is to carry out raids that are particularly profitable. In this light, Somalia was naturally predisposed for pirate activities due to its explosive combination of political instability and its proximity to one of the world’s economically most important sea areas. The waters off the Horn of Africa represent a significant junction of international sea lanes, being the node for all maritime traffic coming from and going to the Eastern coast of Africa, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, as well as the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.
Not being able to solve the political problems of war-ravaged Somalia, the international community of states confines itself to protecting the vital sea lanes by naval task forces. NATO, the EU and United States-led operations, as well as smaller (multi-)national efforts, attempt to protect ships, repel pirate attacks and show their determination and military force with the hope of discouraging Somali pirates from continuing their dangerous business. However, despite regular announcements of successful interventions and of convoys of the UN World Food Program which safely reach their destination, the multi-national forces have so far not found any solution to effectively curtail piracy on the Horn of Africa.
According to the regularly updated information of Ecoterra Interational (6 January), at least 44 vessels and one barge are currently kept in the pirates’ hands, with at least 781 hostages or captives waiting for their release (EU NAVFOR confirms the existence of 650 hostages). With only few exceptions, the nations and ship owners generally have to resort to paying high ransoms to free their ships, crews and other hostages, thereby affirming the pirates in the success of their actions. In addition to the hundreds of million dollars that have already been paid to criminal Somali syndicates, the deployment of naval vessels and reconnaissance aircraft to the regions costs even more, not to mention the billions of dollars in development aid for the weak Somali government.
The latter is the international community’s only hope for a diplomatic ending of anarchy and further radicalisation in the region, as the author has already pointed out in an earlier article. However, the increasing power of radical Islamic groups, such as Al-Shabaab, Hezb al-Islamiya and others, and the generally unpromising socio-political situation, make a diplomatic solution within the foreseeable future very unlikely.
Lessons of History
It has never been wasted time to look at history to find answers for today’s problems. Therefore, if piracy off the coast of Somalia cannot be tackled by conventional means, the political leadership should take a look at two historical examples of very similar and successful actions against piracy.
The preferred example of today’s analysts, politicians and military leaders has been the concerted naval action of local countries against piracy along the Strait of Malacca. However, neither the geographical nor the political and social conditions can be compared to the situation on the Horn of Africa. There are two more suitable parallels in history: the efforts of ancient Rome’s Pompey against piracy in the Mediterranean Sea and those of Woodes Rogers in the West Indies of the early 18th century.
Pompey
During the 1st century B.C. the aspiring Roman Republic (soon to become the Roman Empire) saw its trade with the Middle East and, in particular, with Egypt threatened by pirate fleets. For centuries these pirates found safe havens in Anatolia and the extensive North African coast and had freely attacked and sacked coastal cities in Greece, Asia and Italy. Furthermore, vital corn supplies from Egypt and Pontus were required to nourish the Roman population. Therefore, any military operations against pirates in the Mediterranean Sea were extremely popular and brought fame and fortune for those who ventured to fight the pirates. However, these individual actions never succeeded in solving the problem.
Having been a Consul of Rome, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (today also known as Pompey) was asked to finally disrupt the Mediterranean piracy and to secure the important trade routes. Pompey knew that this task could not be accomplished exclusively by military power, although he established a naval force, reportedly consisting of up to five hundred ships, and started to push back the pirates bit by bit towards Cilicia, the ancient centre of piracy.
However, despite these initial military achievements, which began to produce panic among the pirates, Pompey also started to negotiate with his enemies. The key element of his strategy was to offer the pirates an alternative to their current life. They could choose between imminent destruction and a peaceful life as farmers or fishermen. Many accepted to be resettled by Pompey and, in the course of only a few months, all noteworthy pirate activity in the Mediterranean Sea came to an abrupt ending. Thus, by understanding and responding to the pirates’ nature, by offering an alternative and talking to his enemies, Pompey accomplished this incredibly challenging task.
Woodes Rogers
More than seventeen hundred years after Pompey rid the Mediterranean Sea of the threat of large pirate fleets (at least for a decade) the colonial powers were burdened by pirates who intercepted ships, laden with resources exploited in the new world, on their routes to large colonial ports and to Europe. They also increasingly often attacked colonial towns in which they expected to find further riches, generally acting with unspeakable brutality. Many notorious pirate leaders achieved questionable fame and created the historical background for the romantic view that novels and movies created of piracy in the Caribbean.
Supported by wars between colonial powers, piracy temporarily even received a semi-legal character due to the Letters of Marque issued to disrupt the West Indies trade of the respective country’s enemies. However, it was a fallacy that piracy could be controlled.
After piracy had flourished in the West Indies for two hundred years, having produced a long series of uncountable crimes, suffering and economic losses, England decided to bring law and order to the Caribbean islands. Woodes Rogers, a former privateer and old acquaintance of many pirates who roamed the area at that time, was named Governor of the Bahamas in 1718, a young British colony and, at that time, the most significant hub for piracy (as Tortuga and Jamaica had been in the past). He immediately began to implement his carrot-and-stick policy. Personally knowing his adversaries and their way of life, he issued an ultimatum which divided the pirates. The better and more experienced pirates chose to accept Roger’s proposal and sailed to Madagascar or other distant places in the world, while mavericks and those who saw no way out preferred to pick up the fight. The latter could be easily tracked down and captured or killed by the Royal Navy, which had generally expanded its efforts against piracy in the Caribbean Sea during the past decades. With only few exceptions, piracy did not burden the Bahamas after Roger’s skilful intervention.
Conclusion
Both the Mediterranean Sea during the time of the Roman Republic, as well as the West Indies during the 17th century, were only controlled to a limited extent by the then leading powers and represented a perfect breeding ground for local warlords and ambitious adventurers. Similar to the current situation in Somalia, the result of these political, social and geographical conditions in both regions offered profitable prospects for large-scale piracy. Although it is unlikely that Rogers studied and followed the example of Pompey, both had a very similar approach. Both either new their adversaries very well (even personally, in some cases) or entered into a dialogue with the pirates. The show of force was an important element; however, more important, both divided the pirates and, thereby, reduced their strength and effectiveness.
The resulting question is, whether a similar approach could be adopted against the Somalia piracy. There is already a significant naval presence that evidently influenced and continues to influence the way and the area in which the pirates operate. However, as yet, it did not achieve the ending of piracy on the Horn of Africa. On the contrary, the pirates expanded their area of operations to the south and east, and the number and value of captured ships obviously still makes their undertakings worthwhile.
In April 2009, US Congressman Ron Paul suggested the reintroduction of “Letters of Marque” in support of the fight against piracy. However, this approach would have created a questionable legal and ethical situation. In particular, it would further increase the divide between the Muslim world and the western world, as it could be used for propaganda and for the recruitment of young fundamentalists.
Rather, the western community should seek suitable partners in Somalia and start a dialogue. So far, this is exclusively limited to the internationally accepted Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu. The change must come from within Somalia, but naturally with strong and targeted financial support and guidance by western powers. It is unlikely, that such an approach can be officially adopted by a western government or multi-national organisation. As it requires a significant amount of money, influence and logistics, there are only few countries that could stem such an enterprise.
Independent of the specific means, which would be used to accomplish these aims, the two above outlined historical examples suggest that any successful approach should be based on:
• finding a suitable partner in Somalia, who is familiar with the pirate and militant networks;
• creating a rift within the pirate community by providing social and economic alternatives;
• continuing to show considerable force in international waters;
• using former pirates to locate, persuade or fight the remaining pirates.
It is self-evident that this is an extremely challenging approach in a country such as Somalia, which has not seen peace and stability for the past two decades. However, first, it would significantly reduce the burden for the deployed naval forces and, second, it would provide a worthwhile opportunity to increase the international community’s influence in Somalia.
In any case, the present situation is not acceptable. Whether the above approach is reasonable or even realistic may be questioned. However, the first step for any effective and sustainable solution will always be to seek a dialogue and to provide alternatives.
(This entry is an article I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in January 2011)
Experts in the years before the 1970s were convinced that something such as piracy could not experience a renaissance after its zenith in the 18th century was ended by the technological progress of nations and their growing control of the world’s oceans and sea lanes, supported by the increasing effects of globalisation. Safe havens for pirates became rare and a noteworthy presence of piracy only sparked into life in very limited and politically unstable areas. With the collapse of all state authority in Somalia and the increasing local power of terrorist and fundamentalist Islamic groups, the coastal areas of the Horn of Africa became a perfect breeding ground for piracy.
The ultimate goal of piracy is to carry out raids that are particularly profitable. In this light, Somalia was naturally predisposed for pirate activities due to its explosive combination of political instability and its proximity to one of the world’s economically most important sea areas. The waters off the Horn of Africa represent a significant junction of international sea lanes, being the node for all maritime traffic coming from and going to the Eastern coast of Africa, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, as well as the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.
Not being able to solve the political problems of war-ravaged Somalia, the international community of states confines itself to protecting the vital sea lanes by naval task forces. NATO, the EU and United States-led operations, as well as smaller (multi-)national efforts, attempt to protect ships, repel pirate attacks and show their determination and military force with the hope of discouraging Somali pirates from continuing their dangerous business. However, despite regular announcements of successful interventions and of convoys of the UN World Food Program which safely reach their destination, the multi-national forces have so far not found any solution to effectively curtail piracy on the Horn of Africa.
According to the regularly updated information of Ecoterra Interational (6 January), at least 44 vessels and one barge are currently kept in the pirates’ hands, with at least 781 hostages or captives waiting for their release (EU NAVFOR confirms the existence of 650 hostages). With only few exceptions, the nations and ship owners generally have to resort to paying high ransoms to free their ships, crews and other hostages, thereby affirming the pirates in the success of their actions. In addition to the hundreds of million dollars that have already been paid to criminal Somali syndicates, the deployment of naval vessels and reconnaissance aircraft to the regions costs even more, not to mention the billions of dollars in development aid for the weak Somali government.
The latter is the international community’s only hope for a diplomatic ending of anarchy and further radicalisation in the region, as the author has already pointed out in an earlier article. However, the increasing power of radical Islamic groups, such as Al-Shabaab, Hezb al-Islamiya and others, and the generally unpromising socio-political situation, make a diplomatic solution within the foreseeable future very unlikely.
Lessons of History
It has never been wasted time to look at history to find answers for today’s problems. Therefore, if piracy off the coast of Somalia cannot be tackled by conventional means, the political leadership should take a look at two historical examples of very similar and successful actions against piracy.
The preferred example of today’s analysts, politicians and military leaders has been the concerted naval action of local countries against piracy along the Strait of Malacca. However, neither the geographical nor the political and social conditions can be compared to the situation on the Horn of Africa. There are two more suitable parallels in history: the efforts of ancient Rome’s Pompey against piracy in the Mediterranean Sea and those of Woodes Rogers in the West Indies of the early 18th century.
Pompey
During the 1st century B.C. the aspiring Roman Republic (soon to become the Roman Empire) saw its trade with the Middle East and, in particular, with Egypt threatened by pirate fleets. For centuries these pirates found safe havens in Anatolia and the extensive North African coast and had freely attacked and sacked coastal cities in Greece, Asia and Italy. Furthermore, vital corn supplies from Egypt and Pontus were required to nourish the Roman population. Therefore, any military operations against pirates in the Mediterranean Sea were extremely popular and brought fame and fortune for those who ventured to fight the pirates. However, these individual actions never succeeded in solving the problem.
Having been a Consul of Rome, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (today also known as Pompey) was asked to finally disrupt the Mediterranean piracy and to secure the important trade routes. Pompey knew that this task could not be accomplished exclusively by military power, although he established a naval force, reportedly consisting of up to five hundred ships, and started to push back the pirates bit by bit towards Cilicia, the ancient centre of piracy.
However, despite these initial military achievements, which began to produce panic among the pirates, Pompey also started to negotiate with his enemies. The key element of his strategy was to offer the pirates an alternative to their current life. They could choose between imminent destruction and a peaceful life as farmers or fishermen. Many accepted to be resettled by Pompey and, in the course of only a few months, all noteworthy pirate activity in the Mediterranean Sea came to an abrupt ending. Thus, by understanding and responding to the pirates’ nature, by offering an alternative and talking to his enemies, Pompey accomplished this incredibly challenging task.
Woodes Rogers
More than seventeen hundred years after Pompey rid the Mediterranean Sea of the threat of large pirate fleets (at least for a decade) the colonial powers were burdened by pirates who intercepted ships, laden with resources exploited in the new world, on their routes to large colonial ports and to Europe. They also increasingly often attacked colonial towns in which they expected to find further riches, generally acting with unspeakable brutality. Many notorious pirate leaders achieved questionable fame and created the historical background for the romantic view that novels and movies created of piracy in the Caribbean.
Supported by wars between colonial powers, piracy temporarily even received a semi-legal character due to the Letters of Marque issued to disrupt the West Indies trade of the respective country’s enemies. However, it was a fallacy that piracy could be controlled.
After piracy had flourished in the West Indies for two hundred years, having produced a long series of uncountable crimes, suffering and economic losses, England decided to bring law and order to the Caribbean islands. Woodes Rogers, a former privateer and old acquaintance of many pirates who roamed the area at that time, was named Governor of the Bahamas in 1718, a young British colony and, at that time, the most significant hub for piracy (as Tortuga and Jamaica had been in the past). He immediately began to implement his carrot-and-stick policy. Personally knowing his adversaries and their way of life, he issued an ultimatum which divided the pirates. The better and more experienced pirates chose to accept Roger’s proposal and sailed to Madagascar or other distant places in the world, while mavericks and those who saw no way out preferred to pick up the fight. The latter could be easily tracked down and captured or killed by the Royal Navy, which had generally expanded its efforts against piracy in the Caribbean Sea during the past decades. With only few exceptions, piracy did not burden the Bahamas after Roger’s skilful intervention.
Conclusion
Both the Mediterranean Sea during the time of the Roman Republic, as well as the West Indies during the 17th century, were only controlled to a limited extent by the then leading powers and represented a perfect breeding ground for local warlords and ambitious adventurers. Similar to the current situation in Somalia, the result of these political, social and geographical conditions in both regions offered profitable prospects for large-scale piracy. Although it is unlikely that Rogers studied and followed the example of Pompey, both had a very similar approach. Both either new their adversaries very well (even personally, in some cases) or entered into a dialogue with the pirates. The show of force was an important element; however, more important, both divided the pirates and, thereby, reduced their strength and effectiveness.
The resulting question is, whether a similar approach could be adopted against the Somalia piracy. There is already a significant naval presence that evidently influenced and continues to influence the way and the area in which the pirates operate. However, as yet, it did not achieve the ending of piracy on the Horn of Africa. On the contrary, the pirates expanded their area of operations to the south and east, and the number and value of captured ships obviously still makes their undertakings worthwhile.
In April 2009, US Congressman Ron Paul suggested the reintroduction of “Letters of Marque” in support of the fight against piracy. However, this approach would have created a questionable legal and ethical situation. In particular, it would further increase the divide between the Muslim world and the western world, as it could be used for propaganda and for the recruitment of young fundamentalists.
Rather, the western community should seek suitable partners in Somalia and start a dialogue. So far, this is exclusively limited to the internationally accepted Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu. The change must come from within Somalia, but naturally with strong and targeted financial support and guidance by western powers. It is unlikely, that such an approach can be officially adopted by a western government or multi-national organisation. As it requires a significant amount of money, influence and logistics, there are only few countries that could stem such an enterprise.
Independent of the specific means, which would be used to accomplish these aims, the two above outlined historical examples suggest that any successful approach should be based on:
• finding a suitable partner in Somalia, who is familiar with the pirate and militant networks;
• creating a rift within the pirate community by providing social and economic alternatives;
• continuing to show considerable force in international waters;
• using former pirates to locate, persuade or fight the remaining pirates.
It is self-evident that this is an extremely challenging approach in a country such as Somalia, which has not seen peace and stability for the past two decades. However, first, it would significantly reduce the burden for the deployed naval forces and, second, it would provide a worthwhile opportunity to increase the international community’s influence in Somalia.
In any case, the present situation is not acceptable. Whether the above approach is reasonable or even realistic may be questioned. However, the first step for any effective and sustainable solution will always be to seek a dialogue and to provide alternatives.
(This entry is an article I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in January 2011)
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