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Thoughts on the ongoing discussion on the nature of Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan
Are German soldiers in Afghanistan at war, or not? This question has been troubling the current, as well as the previous administration, and has lead to animated discussions within and between the ruling and opposition parties, the special interest group of the Bundeswehr (Bundeswehrverband), and the media. More importantly, the hesitating and hypocritical manner with which this matter has been treated by the Government, and even by the Ministry of Defence, has left German soldiers unsure of what they are placing their lives on the line for.
Unfortunately, the administration links the question of whether it is politically and morally correct to be involved in Afghanistan to the question of whether it actually is involved in a war. From an American, British or other western country’s point of view, this question won’t come up. However, it is a matter, which in Germany, is strongly interconnected with its historical past and with a responsibility, sensible to most Germans, not to forget about the horrid actions of the Nazi regime. It may, therefore, be understandable that no politician of a ruling party would want to be the first in the German post-WWII history to declare, in any way, that the country is actively engaged in a war.
However, it is not the word “war” that will make the cause, itself, wrong or the country involved, an evil one. This has been a self-conception of the United States ever since it has significantly contributed to free Europe. This self-conception has only been slightly dented by the Vietnam War’s national, as well as global impact, on society’s concept of morality. But this particular change in society could never reach the intensity that the heritage of WWII had on German society.
Yet, it becomes almost unbearable as German Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Jung, consequently dismisses even the idea of German soldiers being at war in Afghanistan. In a recent statement to a local newspaper, he stated “in a war you don’t build schools, in a war you don’t build hospitals, in a war you don’t train armed forces” – an interesting perspective which, however, lacks any historical and logical foundation. The reconstruction of devastated areas, the assistance to the population as well as the training of native forces are facets of war which have more than one example in the long history of man-made conflicts. They have also been intentionally employed by armed forces in order to support the military efforts of the war-fighters and of the success of the entire cause (most prominently World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War).
The discussion in Germany reaches as far as the question of whether to say that German soldiers killed in Afghanistan have “died” or have been “killed in action” – the latter (“Gefallener”) being more customary in the German language than the rather specialized term used in English-speaking countries. It is only in October 2008 that the Defence Minister first used this term. Before, Jung used words such as “to perish” or “to be robbed of one’s life” in official speeches and documents. Yesterday, the German Armed Forces Commissioner, Reinhold Robbe, reportedly said there is not enough recognition within the German population for the efforts of the soldiers who often return home traumatised. Perhaps this would change a little if this operation would not be presented to the public as a merry excursion.
Back in 2008, Volker Rühe, a member of the same political party as Mr Jung, correctly stated: “It is delusive if the Government pretends that the Afghanistan operation is a sort of armed development assistance. It is a war of NATO, of the West, of civilisation against the global octopus-like terrorism.” The question begs to be asked whether the Defence Minister ignores that the Bundeswehr is currently carrying out its largest military operation abroad since its founding after WWII. Since the beginning of the ISAF operation Germany has lost 35 soldiers, many of those through IEDs, gunfire and RPG rockets employed by an organised enemy force which has been capable of “keeping the pot boiling” in Afghanistan and western Pakistan for almost eight years now.
Jung added to the above-mentioned interview: “As a matter of fact, soldiers may also be killed in peace-keeping operations.” However, concluding this, it still has to be asserted that it is not a single involved party that decides whether it is in a state of war or not. It is a question of facts, not of political opinion, caution or correctness. Any realistic definition of war that I have encountered fully applies to the state which German soldiers find themselves, again, in Afghanistan fighting against the Taliban.
The wording of the German Federal Parliament’s decision on the extension of the Bundeswehr mandate in the ISAF operation is quite univocal: “The International Security Assistance Force is authorised to take all required actions, including to use military force, in order to implement the mandate according to resolution 1833 (2008).” And as the Taliban considers their fight against “the infidels” as a war, and is acting as if in a war, (painfully experienced by soldiers of every involved nation), it is not because of the German administration saying it is not playing along, that the game is not running.
Neither the restrictive rules of engagement nor the positive efforts of reconstruction will hide the fact that German soldiers, just as their allied comrades, are confronted with an organised enemy that should not be underestimated as light-headed. This should be a lesson learned, dramatically proven by the Vietnam War, for every modern army.
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in June 2009)
May 18, 2009
No Guts, No Peace?
Study depicts Israel’s options for an attack against Iran
Last week reminded us once more of how probable an Israeli attack on Iran could become during the next few years (or perhaps even months?), in the event that Iran further approaches the capability of producing a nuclear weapon. After the new Israeli government expressed its commitment to stop Iran’s nuclear programme by every means, one did not have to wait long for a reaction from the United States.
Early last week US President Barack Obama warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, through CIA chief Leon Panetta visiting Israel, not to carry out a military attack against Iran. According to the Los Angeles Times, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered the same message during a speech to Marine Corp cadets in Washington and cautioned Israel about the dangerous consequences of such a military intervention. These demands and warnings are not new and reach back also to the Bush administration, having regularly asked Israel not to attack Iran or at least to coordinate its military actions with Washington.
The Obama administration understandably should be worried, on the one side, about the strategic position of the US when caught off guard by such attacks and, on the other side, about the position Israel will find itself in once Pandora's Box has been opened. Israel’s diplomatic response: it will inform the US early enough (‘inform’, and not ask for permission). Undoubtedly, this matter will be discussed enthusiastically behind closed doors on the occasion of mutual visits during the upcoming weeks. While Obama’s visit to Israel is scheduled for next month, he will be shaking hands with Netanyahu in Washington today. After Netanyahu returns to Israel, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman will make his first visit to Washington.
Even though Israel’s military power is not to be underestimated, being technologically sophisticated, well-trained and very determined, it still is limited in numbers and options. Gates accurately pointed out that a strike against Iran’s installations would only delay Iran’s nuclear programme for a few years. Furthermore, according to Gates and different experts it would strengthen Iran’s commitment in this matter.
Study: A daring enterprise
Conveniently, a detailed study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, published in March 2009*, analysed scenarios and options of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) for an attack against Iran’s key facilities housing its nuclear programme. It is worth to take a peek at this 114 page study presenting in-depth information and nicely outlining every aspect of a military intervention.
The quintessence, nevertheless, is predictable: an attack is possible but very complex and the outcome more than doubtful. And the study is very clear about the position of the US in this matter, especially considering the prevention of a military conflict. Yet, if the United States and the international community do not succeed in convincing Iran to stop its nuclear programme (assuming such a programme actually exists, which US intelligence reports consistently deny, and also while diplomatically navigating around the problem of double standards, considering Israel’s WMD and Ballistic Missile capabilities), an attack becomes very probable.
In this event, the study’s authors suggest, that Israel will employ, from three possible routes into Iran, the one along the Syrian-Turkish border. The aircraft would then cross a small portion of Iraq and finally enter Iranian airspace. Taking into account the required number of aircraft for electronic counter measures (ECM), attack, fighter escort as well as refuelling along the way, makes this a very complex mission. Further, different uncertainties (more than the usual fog of war) about the installations and the Iranian air defence capabilities make it an extremely risky enterprise.
As all facilities involved in the Iranian nuclear programme are dispersed throughout the country, Israel will have to select the most important targets that would significantly affect further production. The authors of the study suggest these are the nuclear research centre in Isfahan, the uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, and the heavy water plant, intended for future plutonium production, in Arak. Israel would have to launch most, if not all of its aircraft, to do the job. According to the study, some 90 combat aircraft, including 25 F-15Es and 65 F-16I/Cs as well as their two Gulfstream G550 aircraft for ECM and 5 KC-130Hs and 4 B-707s for air refuelling, would be required. The latter will have to refuel the fighter aircraft on the way to Iran and back, and this outside of Israeli airspace.
The next challenge for the fighter aircraft will be to penetrate Iranian airspace without being detected, and when detected to avoid Iranian air defence batteries. First of all, Iran can deploy Hawk, SA-5 and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles as well as SA-7, SA-15, Rapier, Crotale and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Also, 1,700 anti-aircraft guns are dispersed around its nuclear installations. But, next to a vague number of operational fighter aircraft which Iran could scramble, the greatest threat could arise from the S-300V (SA-12 Giant) anti-aircraft defence system, which Iran may have purchased from Russia. It is not sure whether these have already been integrated into the Iranian air defence, however, Defence Minister Mustafa Najjar claimed in November 2008 that "the S-300 air defense system will be delivered to Iran on the basis of a contract signed with Russia in the past." According to Mark Fitzpatrick, former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, Russia has not yet delivered those systems to Iran: "It seems clear that Russia entered into a contract with Iran for the S-300, but it's also clear that the Russians have not delivered on it and are holding on to it as potential negotiating leverage with the United States over ballistic missile defense and possibly other issues." Should the Iranians employ the SA-12, the authors of the study assume losses of 20 to 30 per cent, meaning some 20 to 24 aircraft would be shot down.
The authors of the study also considered the use of ballistic missiles instead of combat aircraft. As the Iranians do not have the capabilities required to intercept such missiles, Israel could employ its Jericho I, II and III to carry out the strike. The Jericho I has a 500-kilometer range, a 450-kilogram warhead, and can carry a 20-kiloton nuclear weapon. Jericho II has a 1,500-kilometer range and entered service in 1990. It can carry a 1-megaton nuclear warhead. Jericho III is an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 4,800 to 6,500 kilometres, and can carry a multi-megaton nuclear warhead. Yet, the study suggests the use of conventional warheads more probable and say as many as 42 Jericho III missiles would be required to destroy the three Iranian facilities, provided that all hit their target. As the targets have to be hit very precisely, sometimes with a tolerance of only a few meters, this is rather unlikely.
Questionable results
Considering the above mentioned risks, the imponderables of an Iranian retaliation, probably also involving the support of Hezbollah and Hamas as well as the devastating effect it would have on the entire region, it does not seem worthwhile. Yet, it is a question of perspective and of timing. From the Israeli point of view, the window for a possible attack is slowly closing. If the enemy air defences become more sophisticated or, in the worst case, Iran acquires nuclear weapons, an attack would become near to impossible, or rather irresponsible. The study foresees such a situation being possible as early as 2010.
Furthermore, the question remains if an attack would, firstly, effectively stop or at least slow down Iran’s nuclear programme and, secondly, lead to a military and political environment in the Middle East that would provide more security. The latter can be excluded almost with absolute certainty. Any action against Iran would fuel hatred against Israel among neighbouring people. Moreover, Iran would of course leave the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, which until now has enabled the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor its nuclear programme to a certain degree, and so re-acquiring its total freedom to proceed to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons if it wishes so.
For these reasons, the recent tentative moves by the Obama administration for the whole of the Middle East to be brought under strict respect on the NPT – even including Israel – have at least the potential for radically changing the terms of the equation. Far from allowing Israel to attack Iran or even leaning it a hand, the Obama administration is apparently pondering when not forcing Jerusalem to renounce its nuclear weapons, then certainly asking the Israelis to abandon their traditional policy of neither confirming nor denying the possession of such strategic assets, and openly claiming the status of a nuclear power – with all that would imply in diplomatic terms. An interesting assessment of the US-Israeli relationship in this context, published yesterday, can be found on the website of the Israeli Institute of National Security Studies (INSS; www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=2897).
In the light of the above, and in addition to the considerations as expressed by the authors, several other independent analysts have suggested that the real strategic purpose of a conceivable Israeli attack against Iran would not be to decapitate the country’s nuclear programme, but rather to count on the unavoidable Iranian reaction to drag the US into the conflict.
(This entry is an article I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in May 2009)
_____
* The study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman can be downloaded here:
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf
Last week reminded us once more of how probable an Israeli attack on Iran could become during the next few years (or perhaps even months?), in the event that Iran further approaches the capability of producing a nuclear weapon. After the new Israeli government expressed its commitment to stop Iran’s nuclear programme by every means, one did not have to wait long for a reaction from the United States.
Early last week US President Barack Obama warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, through CIA chief Leon Panetta visiting Israel, not to carry out a military attack against Iran. According to the Los Angeles Times, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered the same message during a speech to Marine Corp cadets in Washington and cautioned Israel about the dangerous consequences of such a military intervention. These demands and warnings are not new and reach back also to the Bush administration, having regularly asked Israel not to attack Iran or at least to coordinate its military actions with Washington.
The Obama administration understandably should be worried, on the one side, about the strategic position of the US when caught off guard by such attacks and, on the other side, about the position Israel will find itself in once Pandora's Box has been opened. Israel’s diplomatic response: it will inform the US early enough (‘inform’, and not ask for permission). Undoubtedly, this matter will be discussed enthusiastically behind closed doors on the occasion of mutual visits during the upcoming weeks. While Obama’s visit to Israel is scheduled for next month, he will be shaking hands with Netanyahu in Washington today. After Netanyahu returns to Israel, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman will make his first visit to Washington.
Even though Israel’s military power is not to be underestimated, being technologically sophisticated, well-trained and very determined, it still is limited in numbers and options. Gates accurately pointed out that a strike against Iran’s installations would only delay Iran’s nuclear programme for a few years. Furthermore, according to Gates and different experts it would strengthen Iran’s commitment in this matter.
Study: A daring enterprise
Conveniently, a detailed study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, published in March 2009*, analysed scenarios and options of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) for an attack against Iran’s key facilities housing its nuclear programme. It is worth to take a peek at this 114 page study presenting in-depth information and nicely outlining every aspect of a military intervention.
The quintessence, nevertheless, is predictable: an attack is possible but very complex and the outcome more than doubtful. And the study is very clear about the position of the US in this matter, especially considering the prevention of a military conflict. Yet, if the United States and the international community do not succeed in convincing Iran to stop its nuclear programme (assuming such a programme actually exists, which US intelligence reports consistently deny, and also while diplomatically navigating around the problem of double standards, considering Israel’s WMD and Ballistic Missile capabilities), an attack becomes very probable.
In this event, the study’s authors suggest, that Israel will employ, from three possible routes into Iran, the one along the Syrian-Turkish border. The aircraft would then cross a small portion of Iraq and finally enter Iranian airspace. Taking into account the required number of aircraft for electronic counter measures (ECM), attack, fighter escort as well as refuelling along the way, makes this a very complex mission. Further, different uncertainties (more than the usual fog of war) about the installations and the Iranian air defence capabilities make it an extremely risky enterprise.
As all facilities involved in the Iranian nuclear programme are dispersed throughout the country, Israel will have to select the most important targets that would significantly affect further production. The authors of the study suggest these are the nuclear research centre in Isfahan, the uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, and the heavy water plant, intended for future plutonium production, in Arak. Israel would have to launch most, if not all of its aircraft, to do the job. According to the study, some 90 combat aircraft, including 25 F-15Es and 65 F-16I/Cs as well as their two Gulfstream G550 aircraft for ECM and 5 KC-130Hs and 4 B-707s for air refuelling, would be required. The latter will have to refuel the fighter aircraft on the way to Iran and back, and this outside of Israeli airspace.
The next challenge for the fighter aircraft will be to penetrate Iranian airspace without being detected, and when detected to avoid Iranian air defence batteries. First of all, Iran can deploy Hawk, SA-5 and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles as well as SA-7, SA-15, Rapier, Crotale and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Also, 1,700 anti-aircraft guns are dispersed around its nuclear installations. But, next to a vague number of operational fighter aircraft which Iran could scramble, the greatest threat could arise from the S-300V (SA-12 Giant) anti-aircraft defence system, which Iran may have purchased from Russia. It is not sure whether these have already been integrated into the Iranian air defence, however, Defence Minister Mustafa Najjar claimed in November 2008 that "the S-300 air defense system will be delivered to Iran on the basis of a contract signed with Russia in the past." According to Mark Fitzpatrick, former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, Russia has not yet delivered those systems to Iran: "It seems clear that Russia entered into a contract with Iran for the S-300, but it's also clear that the Russians have not delivered on it and are holding on to it as potential negotiating leverage with the United States over ballistic missile defense and possibly other issues." Should the Iranians employ the SA-12, the authors of the study assume losses of 20 to 30 per cent, meaning some 20 to 24 aircraft would be shot down.
The authors of the study also considered the use of ballistic missiles instead of combat aircraft. As the Iranians do not have the capabilities required to intercept such missiles, Israel could employ its Jericho I, II and III to carry out the strike. The Jericho I has a 500-kilometer range, a 450-kilogram warhead, and can carry a 20-kiloton nuclear weapon. Jericho II has a 1,500-kilometer range and entered service in 1990. It can carry a 1-megaton nuclear warhead. Jericho III is an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 4,800 to 6,500 kilometres, and can carry a multi-megaton nuclear warhead. Yet, the study suggests the use of conventional warheads more probable and say as many as 42 Jericho III missiles would be required to destroy the three Iranian facilities, provided that all hit their target. As the targets have to be hit very precisely, sometimes with a tolerance of only a few meters, this is rather unlikely.
Questionable results
Considering the above mentioned risks, the imponderables of an Iranian retaliation, probably also involving the support of Hezbollah and Hamas as well as the devastating effect it would have on the entire region, it does not seem worthwhile. Yet, it is a question of perspective and of timing. From the Israeli point of view, the window for a possible attack is slowly closing. If the enemy air defences become more sophisticated or, in the worst case, Iran acquires nuclear weapons, an attack would become near to impossible, or rather irresponsible. The study foresees such a situation being possible as early as 2010.
Furthermore, the question remains if an attack would, firstly, effectively stop or at least slow down Iran’s nuclear programme and, secondly, lead to a military and political environment in the Middle East that would provide more security. The latter can be excluded almost with absolute certainty. Any action against Iran would fuel hatred against Israel among neighbouring people. Moreover, Iran would of course leave the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, which until now has enabled the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor its nuclear programme to a certain degree, and so re-acquiring its total freedom to proceed to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons if it wishes so.
For these reasons, the recent tentative moves by the Obama administration for the whole of the Middle East to be brought under strict respect on the NPT – even including Israel – have at least the potential for radically changing the terms of the equation. Far from allowing Israel to attack Iran or even leaning it a hand, the Obama administration is apparently pondering when not forcing Jerusalem to renounce its nuclear weapons, then certainly asking the Israelis to abandon their traditional policy of neither confirming nor denying the possession of such strategic assets, and openly claiming the status of a nuclear power – with all that would imply in diplomatic terms. An interesting assessment of the US-Israeli relationship in this context, published yesterday, can be found on the website of the Israeli Institute of National Security Studies (INSS; www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=2897).
In the light of the above, and in addition to the considerations as expressed by the authors, several other independent analysts have suggested that the real strategic purpose of a conceivable Israeli attack against Iran would not be to decapitate the country’s nuclear programme, but rather to count on the unavoidable Iranian reaction to drag the US into the conflict.
(This entry is an article I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in May 2009)
_____
* The study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman can be downloaded here:
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf
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