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Chavez calls on Venezuela’s military leadership to prepare for war with Colombia
Whenever I read about the latest news produced in very regular intervals by Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chavez, somehow there is always an aftertaste of an era that I hoped to be long gone. Not in terms of events but, rather, of mindset and course of action – in simple terms, a political die-hard is at work that plays too inconsiderate with the fate of a continent and of his own people. Chavez’ recent announcement to his Army, calling for an increased preparedness for war with its neighbour Colombia and – what is even worse – for a war that might spread over the entire continent is more than just the usual sabre rattling. It is an irresponsible culmination of a process that has since long left the political level and has become an unbearable personal crusade of a man that misleadingly sees his historical legitimacy and tradition in Simón Bolívar – the latter, ironically enough, a man which had great admiration for the political foundation of the United States.
The growing alliance of socialist-led South American countries, as well as Venezuela’s latest military equipment deals with Russia, provided Chavez with increased confidence. His further support of countries with controversial governments (such as Cuba and Iran) that seem to parallel the international position of Venezuela, aims at emphasising that Chavez will not accept any meddling of third parties (foreign as well as national) into internal issues of his country – although many of these issues influence the regional international economy, political stability and welfare of the people.
There is no question that a strong, stable and modern Venezuela is not only the inherent right of the nation but also a prerequisite for a prosperous development of the north of the continent. Many steps in the external and internal affairs of Venezuela – some being a true thorn in the side of Colombia and the United States – follow a liberal approach, particularly in the field of international economics. However, any confrontation that might lead to an all-out war, whichever side it may originate from, cannot be in the interest of Venezuela or Colombia.
During the past months the rhetoric upward spiral on both sides has particularly increased with the issue of the establishing of US military bases in Colombia that are reportedly required for the fight against drug-traffic, originating from the troubled South American country, as well as to support Colombian forces in their struggle against the FARC. In early November, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Nicolas Maduro, blasted the new military cooperation agreement between Colombia and the US and called it “a shame for the history” of the continent. However, these protests are ridiculous considering the actual extent of this 10-year deal: a total of 800 military personnel and 600 civilian contractors will be deployed at seven military bases in Colombia.
Calling this military presence a “serious threat to stability in the region” either proves poor judgement or the attempt to further agitate the already troubled water. This general assessment of a threat to the stability is even substantiated by Maduro’s further statement that “there is no guarantee that the Colombian territory could not be used against other countries in the region”.
Exceeding the rhetoric exchange of blows, President Hugo Chavez sent 15,000 troops to the volatile border between Venezuela and Colombia, claiming that the US planned to use Colombian bases to mount an invasion of his oil-rich nation. As a result of Chavez’ statements, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe considered to appeal to the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS).
Rather than the stationing of a few US soldiers on Colombian soil, the greater source for the destabilisation of the region has been the shopping tour of the Venezuelan administration amounting to $3 billion in arms purchases from Russia. Allegedly, the procurement push of September 2009 is to improve the country’s ability to defend itself against an invasion. This comprises the establishing of a multi-layered air defence network consisting of Russian-made S-300, Buk-M2 and Pechora air defence systems, financed by a Russian $2.2 billion loan. Furthermore, the deal includes the purchase of 92 T-72 main battle tanks and an undisclosed number of Smerch multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). The tanks will replace the 80 outdated French-built AMX-30 main battle tanks and several dozen AMX-13C light tanks. In late 2008, Venezuela has also received 24 Su-30MK fighter aircraft which by far outclass the current inventory of the Colombian Air Force. Between 2005 and 2007, Moscow and Caracas signed twelve contracts worth more than $4.4 billion to supply arms to Venezuela, including the Sukhoi jets, helicopters and Kalashnikov assault rifles.
Nevertheless, Venezuela did not receive the state-of-the-art weapon systems of the last deal, so far, and the integration as well as the training of the troops will still require some years before the Venezuelan Armed Forces are in the position to use them successfully in combat, be it in a defensive or offensive way. Therefore, we may prepare for further sabre rattling and a rhetoric slugfest for the time being. A war between the two countries, blessedly, is not in sight yet. But the current development is not very healthy for the political, economic and social situation in the north of the continent.
If ever a war with an allied US-Colombian adversary should come to pass, Chavez will have a hard time to find his “battle of Carabobo”. Once more in modern politics it can only be hoped that the involved parties may learn from history and may begin to cherish and build upon their common past. This is what would truly do justice to the legacy of Simón Blolívar.
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in November 2009)
November 11, 2009
October 14, 2009
China’s Leap in Unmanned Aircraft Development
Chinese researchers break through the mysteries of UAVs and UCAVs
Larry Dickerson, senior unmanned systems analyst for Forecast International, recently stated that the international demand for unmanned aircraft is rapidly growing, with the United States continuing to be the key driver of this trend. According to Dickerson, U.S.-based companies will account for more than 60 per cent of the market's value. However, western European countries and Israel are keeping up with the pace and spawning domestic development of such systems, which in some cases could already achieve more or less significant export successes (particularly Israel) with their industrial solutions. With respect to the obvious boom of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development and export programmes in western countries, China, as much as Russia, still lag somewhat behind.
Catching up with world-leading standards
Nevertheless, the gap is quickly closing as the military’s requirement for state-of-the-art reconnaissance UAVs is becoming increasingly important in both countries. However, the activities are principally still focused on analysing (and often enough copying) already existing and fielded systems, such as the United States’ Global Hawk, Predator and Reaper as well as Israel’s Harpy and Heron. Completely domestic and unprecedented solutions emerge in only very few cases, of which many are too ambitious to make it into series production, let alone introduction into service.
In the case of China, the effort to increasingly use unmanned systems, as well as the capability to domestically develop and produce such aircraft, is publicly and proudly demonstrated, as could recently be seen on the occasion of the 60th anniversary celebration of the People's Republic of China. A total of ten short- and mid-range tactical reconnaissance UAVs mounted on their launching rail on the back of a truck, took part in the National Day parade. “The ten UAVs of three different models have been [provided] to the PLA's special forces to carry out various reconnaissance missions,” Wang Baorong, captain of the UAV formation, told the state-run Xinhua press agency on that occasion.
According to the assessment of Professor Tan Kaijia, a weaponry expert with the PLA's National Defense University, this latest display shows that “China has made substantial progress in intelligent control systems, precise measuring-controlling systems and computer information processing for military uses.” Even more far-reaching concepts, such as the “Dark Sword” or the “Xianglong”, prove this assessment to be true, as the focus and the development is quickly going beyond small propeller-driven tactical UAVs towards high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs and unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV). The recent spotting of two probable HALE UAVs in front of their hangars at a Chinese air base suggests that such a system is already (near-to) operational.
Still many challenges ahead
However, as Andrei Chang, a Chinese military analyst with the Kanwa Information Centre in Toronto emphasised, it still is puzzling for what reason “the plethora of UAV models on display at Zhuhai do not go into production.” China is having difficulty mastering the technical complexity of operating UAVs in real time, he recently told Defence News. Chang suggests that many of the companies and institutions do not have an actual prototype and are simply looking for a foreign investor for their concept.
In an interview in early 2007 published by sina.com.cn, Tu Jida, chief designer of the Aviation Industries of China (AVIC), said that UCAVs are still at an early development stage in China and current efforts may lead to a successful aircraft system in approximately ten years. He further emphasised that for any such effort, China will be on its own and will have to “rely on its own strength and self-reliance.” The interview also left the impression that China is still working on the development of more secure and resistant control and communication links for the operation of UAVs to prevent enemies from interfering with the control of UAVs and the transmission of reconnaissance information.
Although the extension of China’s military satellite network allows the use of HALE UAVs over long ranges and in operations abroad, China is fully aware of dangers and the importance of satellite communications in modern UAVs. “Without military satellites, the commanders sitting in the United States could not operate their Predator UAVs, which are thousands of miles away on the other side of the globe,” Prof. Chen Hong of the Chinese Air Force's Command College correctly observed. Further statements published by Xinhua acknowledge that China’s push in all fields of defence technology proves that the country is prepared to show strength in the air as well as in space and will make sure its networks will be working when their antagonists’ resources are down.
Major systems and concepts
Apart from the “Harpy” UAV sold to China by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) in 1994, China has indigenously developed and manufactured a number of unmanned systems during the past 30 to 40 years, often based on western – primarily US-built – UAV and UCAV concepts. A row of transformations of formerly manned aircraft, such as the Ba-5 (based on the J-5, a MiG-17 copy) and the Jian-7 (based on the MiG-21), for use as target drones, as well as the development of smaller target drones such as the Ba-2, Ba-9 (many more types have been produced), provided China with enough experience to develop remotely controlled and later pre-programmed and autonomously flying systems.
China also has a number of man-portable and -launchable mini-UAVs (such as the ASN-15), which are generally propeller-driven models for short-range tactical reconnaissance of ground troops. The following list of systems focuses on larger reconnaissance and combat concepts and – not least due to the lack of reliable information – does not claim to be complete (for instance, you may miss the formerly important ASN-104/105 and ChangKong-1 or a newer concept called “Combat Eagle”, which strongly recalls the X-45 and nEUROn UCAVs). However, it offers a condensed overview on past, present and future Chinese UAV and UCAV concepts, as well as on the often-foreign technological sources.
Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
WuZhen-5 (also ChangHong-1)
The WZ-5, in particular, which has been developed on the basis of the U.S. AQM-34N Firebee, will have provided China with the required technical background to take the next step in UAV technology development. After a number of these jet-powered reconnaissance UAVs had been shot down by the PLA in the 1960s, and at least one could be recovered for reverse-engineering, the Beijing Institute of Aeronautics (BIA; now Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics, BUAA) began the development of a reconnaissance UAV based on the AQM-34N. The concept, consisting of the airframe, the optical camera sensor-suite, the turbojet engine and the ground station, resulted in two prototypes completed by 1972 and two in 1976. After achieving design certification in 1978, nine such systems were fielded by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) as of 1981.
After having been successfully used for reconnaissance missions in the 1980s, the BUAA is believed to have developed an improved version, designated WZ-5A, which provided greater accuracy due to a GPS and inertial navigation system. The WZ-5 was air-launched at altitudes between 4,000 and 5,000 metres and would then climb to its operational altitude of 17,500 metres, where it may fly at up to 800km/h. It was originally launched by a modified Tu-4 Bull bomber, and later by the Y-8E (An-12 Cub copy) turboprop transport aircraft. Due to its lack of a real-time data link, its endurance of merely 3 hours and its limitation to day-time optical reconnaissance, the system can no longer keep up anymore with modern solutions. Without a real-time link and control, it must stay on its pre-programmed flight path, disregarding changing tactical situations or enemy air-defences.
Xianglong (“Sour Dragon”, Chengdu)
As one of the more recent concepts, the “Xianglong” of the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) was first unveiled at the 2006 Zhuhai air show. Its dimensions, jet engine and intake arrangement and wing shape very much recall the US RQ-4 Global Hawk and suggest that this UAV will also be used for high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) reconnaissance missions. In fact, it is reported to fly at altitudes of up to 18,000 metres (approx. 59,000 ft), which is slightly less than the ceiling of the Global Hawk. According to unnamed sources, the aircraft already completed high-speed taxiing tests in late 2008 and was scheduled to have its maiden flight in early 2009.
The intake and engine, located on top of the fuselage at the rear between the V-shaped tail wings, are much smaller than those of the Global Hawk. However, according to Chinese media reports, it is believed to fly slightly faster than the RQ-4, reaching speeds of about 750km/h and ranges up to 7.000 kilometres. With a reported take-off weight of 7,500kg and a mission payload of 650kg, it is lighter than the RQ-4 and can carry less weight (RQ-4B max. weight: 14.640kg; payload: 1.360kg). Due to its comparably limited range, it is supposed to exclusively operate in the Asia and Pacific region.
WuZhen-2000 (also WZ-9, Guizhou Aviation Industry Group)
Just as the Xianglong, the WZ-2000’s design seems to have been taken from the U.S. Global Hawk, with V-shaped tail wings and a single WS-11 turbofan on top of the rear fuselage. However, the WZ-2000 is smaller (length 7.5m, wingspan 9.8m) and has slightly aft swept wings, as well as obvious radar cross-section reduction features, including a flat bottom surface. Being an older – but nevertheless stealthy – reconnaissance UAV concept (1999) than the Xianglong, the WZ-2000 is reported to having accomplished its maiden flight in December 2003 and an onboard remote sensing system test in August 2004.
Although the aircraft has smaller dimensions, it is intended to fly at a service ceiling of 18,000 metres with a reported maximum speed of 800km/h for a total endurance of only 3 hours. The 80 kg mission payload reportedly contains a thermal imaging camera and a synthetic aperture radar. Reconnaissance data is transmitted via a satellite communications antenna in the nose bulge.
ASN-206 / ASN-207 (Xi'an ASN Technology Group Company)
The ASN-206 is one of the earlier advanced tactical UAV programmes and one of the few that has been successfully introduced into service with the PLA. It is a lightweight, short-range, tactical multi-purpose UAV developed by Xi'an ASN Technology Group Company in 1994 and produced in series starting in 1996. According to unconfirmed sources, the Israeli company Tadiran Spectralink Ltd. has been involved in the development process. It carries various mission payloads and can, therefore, be used in a multitude of operations including day/night aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare and countermeasures (EW/ECM), battlefield surveillance, border patrols and nuclear radiation sampling.
Powered by a HS-700 piston engine, the ASN-206 is a twin-tail braced UAV which is launched with the help of an accessory rocket from a 6x6 truck and is operated by a digital flight control and management system. The aircraft marks an important step in China’s UAV development as it provides real-time reconnaissance information, while older UAV models had to be recovered in order to access the collected data.
The ASN-207, of which four systems headed the UAV formation at the National Day Parade in early October, is an improved version of the ASN-206. It significantly surpasses the AN-206’s capabilities, reportedly providing double the endurance time and mission payload with a maximum range of 600km. It can easily be distinguished due to its mushroom-shape antenna mounted at the front of the aircraft, which receives flight control commands from the ground station.
Attack Drones / Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV)
Harpy (IAI)
The Harpy, built by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), was another technology source for China’s own development efforts. The procurement of an unknown number of these attack UAVs in 1994 created quite a stir in U.S.-Israeli diplomatic relations, leading to a crisis of confidence between the two countries. This only happened in 2004 when the Chinese Harpy’s were sent back to Israel for an upgrade and after it was discovered that the PLA used Harpies during a military exercise. The Bush administration subsequently urged Israel to halt all arms-transfers to China.
The Harpy is not a typical UAV but, rather, a weapons system called “loitering munition”. The propeller-driven aircraft is launched from a ground vehicle or surface warship and can loiter for some time above the mission area to locate and identify a suitable high-value target. Its sensor collects valuable information until the Harpy attacks and destroys its target by crashing into it and detonating its 32 kg (70 lb) high-explosive warhead. It was specifically developed to detect, track and destroy radar emitters, such as enemy radar and SAM emplacements, in all weather conditions during day or night.
Yi-long (Chengdu)
Another design by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation appears to be a copy of the U.S. MQ-1 Predator, yet without inverted but, rather, upright V-shaped tail wings. The aircraft is driven by a small tail propeller. It carries a small pivotable sensor suit almost beneath the centre of the slender fuselage. The model displayed at the 2008 Zhuhai air show did not feature pylons to carry weapons, however, design concepts of this aircraft were presented with one pylon on each wing, arranged in the same fashion as on the Predator, to carry light missiles.
CH-3 (China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp.)
The CH-3 is a medium-range long-endurance (MALE) UCAV model presented at the 2008 Zhuhai show which, due to its complexity, still appears to be far from becoming a reality. The aircraft has a canard airframe design with the tailplane ahead of the main wing. Still propeller-driven, the aircraft carries a large sensor suite underneath the fuselage at the level of the main wings’ root. According to the model, the aircraft is designed to carry two air-to-ground missiles, such as the AR-1 air-surface missile.
Anjian (“Dark Sword”, Shenyang)
The “Dark Sword” is an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) concept which was displayed as a model at the 2006 Zhuhai air show. It is obviously designed for high manoeuvrability at supersonic speeds, having a flat, triangular shape with an additional large wing area and swing canards, hinting at China’s J-10 multi-role combat aircraft (which itself strongly resembles jets such as the Eurofighter, Rafale and Gripen). Its large intake underneath the fuselage implies high speed, agility and angle-of-attack, further suggesting that the aircraft will be powered by a turbofan.
At the Zhuhai air show, a staff member called the aircraft the “future of Chinese unmanned combat aviation”, emphasising its projected ability to evade enemy radar and to engage in air-to-air combat.
(This entry is an article that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in October 2009)
Larry Dickerson, senior unmanned systems analyst for Forecast International, recently stated that the international demand for unmanned aircraft is rapidly growing, with the United States continuing to be the key driver of this trend. According to Dickerson, U.S.-based companies will account for more than 60 per cent of the market's value. However, western European countries and Israel are keeping up with the pace and spawning domestic development of such systems, which in some cases could already achieve more or less significant export successes (particularly Israel) with their industrial solutions. With respect to the obvious boom of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development and export programmes in western countries, China, as much as Russia, still lag somewhat behind.
Catching up with world-leading standards
Nevertheless, the gap is quickly closing as the military’s requirement for state-of-the-art reconnaissance UAVs is becoming increasingly important in both countries. However, the activities are principally still focused on analysing (and often enough copying) already existing and fielded systems, such as the United States’ Global Hawk, Predator and Reaper as well as Israel’s Harpy and Heron. Completely domestic and unprecedented solutions emerge in only very few cases, of which many are too ambitious to make it into series production, let alone introduction into service.
In the case of China, the effort to increasingly use unmanned systems, as well as the capability to domestically develop and produce such aircraft, is publicly and proudly demonstrated, as could recently be seen on the occasion of the 60th anniversary celebration of the People's Republic of China. A total of ten short- and mid-range tactical reconnaissance UAVs mounted on their launching rail on the back of a truck, took part in the National Day parade. “The ten UAVs of three different models have been [provided] to the PLA's special forces to carry out various reconnaissance missions,” Wang Baorong, captain of the UAV formation, told the state-run Xinhua press agency on that occasion.
According to the assessment of Professor Tan Kaijia, a weaponry expert with the PLA's National Defense University, this latest display shows that “China has made substantial progress in intelligent control systems, precise measuring-controlling systems and computer information processing for military uses.” Even more far-reaching concepts, such as the “Dark Sword” or the “Xianglong”, prove this assessment to be true, as the focus and the development is quickly going beyond small propeller-driven tactical UAVs towards high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs and unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV). The recent spotting of two probable HALE UAVs in front of their hangars at a Chinese air base suggests that such a system is already (near-to) operational.
Still many challenges ahead
However, as Andrei Chang, a Chinese military analyst with the Kanwa Information Centre in Toronto emphasised, it still is puzzling for what reason “the plethora of UAV models on display at Zhuhai do not go into production.” China is having difficulty mastering the technical complexity of operating UAVs in real time, he recently told Defence News. Chang suggests that many of the companies and institutions do not have an actual prototype and are simply looking for a foreign investor for their concept.
In an interview in early 2007 published by sina.com.cn, Tu Jida, chief designer of the Aviation Industries of China (AVIC), said that UCAVs are still at an early development stage in China and current efforts may lead to a successful aircraft system in approximately ten years. He further emphasised that for any such effort, China will be on its own and will have to “rely on its own strength and self-reliance.” The interview also left the impression that China is still working on the development of more secure and resistant control and communication links for the operation of UAVs to prevent enemies from interfering with the control of UAVs and the transmission of reconnaissance information.
Although the extension of China’s military satellite network allows the use of HALE UAVs over long ranges and in operations abroad, China is fully aware of dangers and the importance of satellite communications in modern UAVs. “Without military satellites, the commanders sitting in the United States could not operate their Predator UAVs, which are thousands of miles away on the other side of the globe,” Prof. Chen Hong of the Chinese Air Force's Command College correctly observed. Further statements published by Xinhua acknowledge that China’s push in all fields of defence technology proves that the country is prepared to show strength in the air as well as in space and will make sure its networks will be working when their antagonists’ resources are down.
Major systems and concepts
Apart from the “Harpy” UAV sold to China by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) in 1994, China has indigenously developed and manufactured a number of unmanned systems during the past 30 to 40 years, often based on western – primarily US-built – UAV and UCAV concepts. A row of transformations of formerly manned aircraft, such as the Ba-5 (based on the J-5, a MiG-17 copy) and the Jian-7 (based on the MiG-21), for use as target drones, as well as the development of smaller target drones such as the Ba-2, Ba-9 (many more types have been produced), provided China with enough experience to develop remotely controlled and later pre-programmed and autonomously flying systems.
China also has a number of man-portable and -launchable mini-UAVs (such as the ASN-15), which are generally propeller-driven models for short-range tactical reconnaissance of ground troops. The following list of systems focuses on larger reconnaissance and combat concepts and – not least due to the lack of reliable information – does not claim to be complete (for instance, you may miss the formerly important ASN-104/105 and ChangKong-1 or a newer concept called “Combat Eagle”, which strongly recalls the X-45 and nEUROn UCAVs). However, it offers a condensed overview on past, present and future Chinese UAV and UCAV concepts, as well as on the often-foreign technological sources.
Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
WuZhen-5 (also ChangHong-1)
The WZ-5, in particular, which has been developed on the basis of the U.S. AQM-34N Firebee, will have provided China with the required technical background to take the next step in UAV technology development. After a number of these jet-powered reconnaissance UAVs had been shot down by the PLA in the 1960s, and at least one could be recovered for reverse-engineering, the Beijing Institute of Aeronautics (BIA; now Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics, BUAA) began the development of a reconnaissance UAV based on the AQM-34N. The concept, consisting of the airframe, the optical camera sensor-suite, the turbojet engine and the ground station, resulted in two prototypes completed by 1972 and two in 1976. After achieving design certification in 1978, nine such systems were fielded by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) as of 1981.
After having been successfully used for reconnaissance missions in the 1980s, the BUAA is believed to have developed an improved version, designated WZ-5A, which provided greater accuracy due to a GPS and inertial navigation system. The WZ-5 was air-launched at altitudes between 4,000 and 5,000 metres and would then climb to its operational altitude of 17,500 metres, where it may fly at up to 800km/h. It was originally launched by a modified Tu-4 Bull bomber, and later by the Y-8E (An-12 Cub copy) turboprop transport aircraft. Due to its lack of a real-time data link, its endurance of merely 3 hours and its limitation to day-time optical reconnaissance, the system can no longer keep up anymore with modern solutions. Without a real-time link and control, it must stay on its pre-programmed flight path, disregarding changing tactical situations or enemy air-defences.
Xianglong (“Sour Dragon”, Chengdu)
As one of the more recent concepts, the “Xianglong” of the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) was first unveiled at the 2006 Zhuhai air show. Its dimensions, jet engine and intake arrangement and wing shape very much recall the US RQ-4 Global Hawk and suggest that this UAV will also be used for high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) reconnaissance missions. In fact, it is reported to fly at altitudes of up to 18,000 metres (approx. 59,000 ft), which is slightly less than the ceiling of the Global Hawk. According to unnamed sources, the aircraft already completed high-speed taxiing tests in late 2008 and was scheduled to have its maiden flight in early 2009.
The intake and engine, located on top of the fuselage at the rear between the V-shaped tail wings, are much smaller than those of the Global Hawk. However, according to Chinese media reports, it is believed to fly slightly faster than the RQ-4, reaching speeds of about 750km/h and ranges up to 7.000 kilometres. With a reported take-off weight of 7,500kg and a mission payload of 650kg, it is lighter than the RQ-4 and can carry less weight (RQ-4B max. weight: 14.640kg; payload: 1.360kg). Due to its comparably limited range, it is supposed to exclusively operate in the Asia and Pacific region.
WuZhen-2000 (also WZ-9, Guizhou Aviation Industry Group)
Just as the Xianglong, the WZ-2000’s design seems to have been taken from the U.S. Global Hawk, with V-shaped tail wings and a single WS-11 turbofan on top of the rear fuselage. However, the WZ-2000 is smaller (length 7.5m, wingspan 9.8m) and has slightly aft swept wings, as well as obvious radar cross-section reduction features, including a flat bottom surface. Being an older – but nevertheless stealthy – reconnaissance UAV concept (1999) than the Xianglong, the WZ-2000 is reported to having accomplished its maiden flight in December 2003 and an onboard remote sensing system test in August 2004.
Although the aircraft has smaller dimensions, it is intended to fly at a service ceiling of 18,000 metres with a reported maximum speed of 800km/h for a total endurance of only 3 hours. The 80 kg mission payload reportedly contains a thermal imaging camera and a synthetic aperture radar. Reconnaissance data is transmitted via a satellite communications antenna in the nose bulge.
ASN-206 / ASN-207 (Xi'an ASN Technology Group Company)
The ASN-206 is one of the earlier advanced tactical UAV programmes and one of the few that has been successfully introduced into service with the PLA. It is a lightweight, short-range, tactical multi-purpose UAV developed by Xi'an ASN Technology Group Company in 1994 and produced in series starting in 1996. According to unconfirmed sources, the Israeli company Tadiran Spectralink Ltd. has been involved in the development process. It carries various mission payloads and can, therefore, be used in a multitude of operations including day/night aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare and countermeasures (EW/ECM), battlefield surveillance, border patrols and nuclear radiation sampling.
Powered by a HS-700 piston engine, the ASN-206 is a twin-tail braced UAV which is launched with the help of an accessory rocket from a 6x6 truck and is operated by a digital flight control and management system. The aircraft marks an important step in China’s UAV development as it provides real-time reconnaissance information, while older UAV models had to be recovered in order to access the collected data.
The ASN-207, of which four systems headed the UAV formation at the National Day Parade in early October, is an improved version of the ASN-206. It significantly surpasses the AN-206’s capabilities, reportedly providing double the endurance time and mission payload with a maximum range of 600km. It can easily be distinguished due to its mushroom-shape antenna mounted at the front of the aircraft, which receives flight control commands from the ground station.
Attack Drones / Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV)
Harpy (IAI)
The Harpy, built by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), was another technology source for China’s own development efforts. The procurement of an unknown number of these attack UAVs in 1994 created quite a stir in U.S.-Israeli diplomatic relations, leading to a crisis of confidence between the two countries. This only happened in 2004 when the Chinese Harpy’s were sent back to Israel for an upgrade and after it was discovered that the PLA used Harpies during a military exercise. The Bush administration subsequently urged Israel to halt all arms-transfers to China.
The Harpy is not a typical UAV but, rather, a weapons system called “loitering munition”. The propeller-driven aircraft is launched from a ground vehicle or surface warship and can loiter for some time above the mission area to locate and identify a suitable high-value target. Its sensor collects valuable information until the Harpy attacks and destroys its target by crashing into it and detonating its 32 kg (70 lb) high-explosive warhead. It was specifically developed to detect, track and destroy radar emitters, such as enemy radar and SAM emplacements, in all weather conditions during day or night.
Yi-long (Chengdu)
Another design by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation appears to be a copy of the U.S. MQ-1 Predator, yet without inverted but, rather, upright V-shaped tail wings. The aircraft is driven by a small tail propeller. It carries a small pivotable sensor suit almost beneath the centre of the slender fuselage. The model displayed at the 2008 Zhuhai air show did not feature pylons to carry weapons, however, design concepts of this aircraft were presented with one pylon on each wing, arranged in the same fashion as on the Predator, to carry light missiles.
CH-3 (China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp.)
The CH-3 is a medium-range long-endurance (MALE) UCAV model presented at the 2008 Zhuhai show which, due to its complexity, still appears to be far from becoming a reality. The aircraft has a canard airframe design with the tailplane ahead of the main wing. Still propeller-driven, the aircraft carries a large sensor suite underneath the fuselage at the level of the main wings’ root. According to the model, the aircraft is designed to carry two air-to-ground missiles, such as the AR-1 air-surface missile.
Anjian (“Dark Sword”, Shenyang)
The “Dark Sword” is an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) concept which was displayed as a model at the 2006 Zhuhai air show. It is obviously designed for high manoeuvrability at supersonic speeds, having a flat, triangular shape with an additional large wing area and swing canards, hinting at China’s J-10 multi-role combat aircraft (which itself strongly resembles jets such as the Eurofighter, Rafale and Gripen). Its large intake underneath the fuselage implies high speed, agility and angle-of-attack, further suggesting that the aircraft will be powered by a turbofan.
At the Zhuhai air show, a staff member called the aircraft the “future of Chinese unmanned combat aviation”, emphasising its projected ability to evade enemy radar and to engage in air-to-air combat.
(This entry is an article that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in October 2009)
August 26, 2009
History Repeating – But Who Sees it First?
Admiral Mike Mullen: “We Cannot Win From the Pentagon”
Better late than never! Even though critical and well-founded voices were heard in the early stages in the United States and NATO countries concerning the political and military leaderships’ approach in Iraq and Afghanistan, those voices did not receive enough attention. It is history repeating itself, and everybody knowing very little about the past in Afghanistan and about the cultural and religious environment will know that efforts to truly interact with the people of the country have only scratched the surface of what is possible and necessary.
It is not only a matter of understanding the regional history and culture, but also of accepting it. Even though it may afford a little more time, the greatest progress in Afghanistan generally has been made when the Allied nations approached the leadership and the people of the country with tolerance and in accord with the regional traditions and basic cultural rules. The stigma of the western colonial past is still very much present in the reluctance of many countries of the region to follow another country’s examples and regulations or even to accept its help if this would unsettle the traditional structures. And it is well-known that in Muslim countries this reluctance reaches as far back as to mediaeval times, respectively to the crusades – in fact the local press willingly picks up this motive to express the people’s anger about any more or less comparable appearance of western countries.
One of history’s best and most enigmatic examples of the clash of cultures in a conflict, as well as for the various problems and opportunities of co-operation, has been Tomas Edward Lawrence’s account of his involvement in the Arab uprising against the Ottoman rule in his formidable “Seven Pillars of Wisdom.” And though Afghanistan cannot be compared to the Hejaz region of 1917, it is the principle of and the requirements for effective inter-cultural co-operation and understanding that make those experiences most important for today’s challenges in the Middle East.
Mullen: “We are still learning about the various cultures”
It is to this great person of history, known to most as “Lawrence of Arabia,” that the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, made reference to in a speech at The American Legion on Tuesday. And it is by correctly applying this unique example that Mullen outlined how trust and a partnership borne of understanding – not simply military might – is what is needed to quell conflicts and establish rules of law in troubled regions of the Middle East.
“Despite all that's been done to bring stability to that region, really since the end of World War I,” said Admiral Mike Mullen, “we are still learning about the various cultures that shape the region's landscape. Because understanding takes time and without consistent engagement - a willingness to see things from another's perspective - there will always be a trust deficit. And where trust is lacking, partnerships falter.”
Mullen cited the example of British officer Lawrence as one of enlightened leadership during the so-called Arab Revolt. “During World War I, (he) and a few others committed themselves to learning the customs, the languages and the cultures of the people of the Middle East. They fought beside them; earned their friendship. But, most importantly, they won their trust.”
“We cannot win from the Pentagon” – or from anywhere else outside the region
This principle of combining a strong military force with cultural sensitivity applies equally to today's conflicts centred on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mullen said. In his words, “We cannot win from the Pentagon.” He further explained, “You have to be there, you have to see and hear firsthand what the issues are. You can't hope to see problems through someone else's eyes if you aren't looking into those eyes.”
But what is more important for any future strategy adopted to bring peace and stability to the region is that the fact has to be accepted that the cultural and political ‘comforts’ of western countries must not necessarily be the best solution for Middle East countries. It is not a matter of progress, as progress in large historical dimensions is not always something that has been brought to humanity deliberately. The recent presidential elections in Afghanistan clearly show that, first, the country is not yet ready for democracy and, second, that the path to anything near stability in Afghanistan is still longer than anyone may anticipate at the moment.
Let’s hope that the few voices of today will be heard by the political leadership to finally establish an elaborate long-term strategy for what Afghanistan should really look like in the future and by what means this is to be achieved. I, for my part, have not seen any strategy paper which really addresses the current problems of Afghanistan with the acceptance of actual historical, cultural and religious facts that need to be dealt with unconditionally. Should anyone have one ready in his drawer, please let me know.
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in August 2009)
Better late than never! Even though critical and well-founded voices were heard in the early stages in the United States and NATO countries concerning the political and military leaderships’ approach in Iraq and Afghanistan, those voices did not receive enough attention. It is history repeating itself, and everybody knowing very little about the past in Afghanistan and about the cultural and religious environment will know that efforts to truly interact with the people of the country have only scratched the surface of what is possible and necessary.
It is not only a matter of understanding the regional history and culture, but also of accepting it. Even though it may afford a little more time, the greatest progress in Afghanistan generally has been made when the Allied nations approached the leadership and the people of the country with tolerance and in accord with the regional traditions and basic cultural rules. The stigma of the western colonial past is still very much present in the reluctance of many countries of the region to follow another country’s examples and regulations or even to accept its help if this would unsettle the traditional structures. And it is well-known that in Muslim countries this reluctance reaches as far back as to mediaeval times, respectively to the crusades – in fact the local press willingly picks up this motive to express the people’s anger about any more or less comparable appearance of western countries.
One of history’s best and most enigmatic examples of the clash of cultures in a conflict, as well as for the various problems and opportunities of co-operation, has been Tomas Edward Lawrence’s account of his involvement in the Arab uprising against the Ottoman rule in his formidable “Seven Pillars of Wisdom.” And though Afghanistan cannot be compared to the Hejaz region of 1917, it is the principle of and the requirements for effective inter-cultural co-operation and understanding that make those experiences most important for today’s challenges in the Middle East.
Mullen: “We are still learning about the various cultures”
It is to this great person of history, known to most as “Lawrence of Arabia,” that the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, made reference to in a speech at The American Legion on Tuesday. And it is by correctly applying this unique example that Mullen outlined how trust and a partnership borne of understanding – not simply military might – is what is needed to quell conflicts and establish rules of law in troubled regions of the Middle East.
“Despite all that's been done to bring stability to that region, really since the end of World War I,” said Admiral Mike Mullen, “we are still learning about the various cultures that shape the region's landscape. Because understanding takes time and without consistent engagement - a willingness to see things from another's perspective - there will always be a trust deficit. And where trust is lacking, partnerships falter.”
Mullen cited the example of British officer Lawrence as one of enlightened leadership during the so-called Arab Revolt. “During World War I, (he) and a few others committed themselves to learning the customs, the languages and the cultures of the people of the Middle East. They fought beside them; earned their friendship. But, most importantly, they won their trust.”
“We cannot win from the Pentagon” – or from anywhere else outside the region
This principle of combining a strong military force with cultural sensitivity applies equally to today's conflicts centred on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mullen said. In his words, “We cannot win from the Pentagon.” He further explained, “You have to be there, you have to see and hear firsthand what the issues are. You can't hope to see problems through someone else's eyes if you aren't looking into those eyes.”
But what is more important for any future strategy adopted to bring peace and stability to the region is that the fact has to be accepted that the cultural and political ‘comforts’ of western countries must not necessarily be the best solution for Middle East countries. It is not a matter of progress, as progress in large historical dimensions is not always something that has been brought to humanity deliberately. The recent presidential elections in Afghanistan clearly show that, first, the country is not yet ready for democracy and, second, that the path to anything near stability in Afghanistan is still longer than anyone may anticipate at the moment.
Let’s hope that the few voices of today will be heard by the political leadership to finally establish an elaborate long-term strategy for what Afghanistan should really look like in the future and by what means this is to be achieved. I, for my part, have not seen any strategy paper which really addresses the current problems of Afghanistan with the acceptance of actual historical, cultural and religious facts that need to be dealt with unconditionally. Should anyone have one ready in his drawer, please let me know.
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in August 2009)
August 11, 2009
Sisyphus and the Unresting Tunnel Diggers
Israeli Defence Forces do not come to an end in fight against tunnels in Gaza
Tunnels in conflict areas have already reached appalling fame in the past: from the sapping of fortified structures in medieval times to the tunnel system of Iwo Jima and the so-called tunnel rats in Vietnam. Even Afghanistan has seen a similar phenomenon, which led the Russians to train their own tunnel rats in the 1980s. However, the most recent use of ingenious underground engineering is being found on the southern border of the small but densely populated Gaza strip. Whether it is for supporting combatants and terrorists within the isolated territory or just to provide the civilian population with cheap goods, medicine and a possibility to flee the area, the Palestinians have dug hundreds of more or less sophisticated tunnels.
Connecting the Palestinian refugee camp of Rafah with the Egyptian town of Rafah, the tunnels pass under the barrier that was erected in compliance with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed in 1979 in Washington. This relatively fortified buffer zone, also called the Philadelphi corridor, has not been comprehensively controlled by Israel since 2005, when it handed over control to the Palestinian National Authority. The more severe demarcation is, however, being sustained by Egypt, which is afraid of letting Palestinian refugees (along with possible terrorists) cross into their territory. The corridor especially aroused public interest in early 2008 when Palestinian militants tore down several parts of the wall, allowing temporary uncontrolled border traffic.
However, since the border generally remains hermetically sealed and, particularly, terrorists and smugglers in the Gaza strip foster illegal border traffic, the construction of tunnels flourished during past years. That it is a key Israeli interest to stop weapons smuggling was clearly demonstrated in its three-week offensive launched in December 2008, during which hundreds of houses were demolished and suspected tunnels bombed by fighter aircraft. Due to the dense population around Rafah, it has been easy for the Palestinians to connect houses on both sides with tunnels, effectively hiding the entrances and storage rooms.
More than just a military target
The tunnels are generally dug at depths of approximately 15 to 25 meters (49 to 82 feet) and reach lengths of up to 800 meters (2,640 feet). Regardless of the well-concealed underground connections, the tunnel diggers and operators have a tough life as the general location is not difficult to guess (Rafah stretches along some four kilometres of the border) and the Israeli Air Force is not at all hesitant to strike at suspected tunnels. The Israeli Defence Forces claim to have discovered and destroyed some ninety tunnels, an estimated 95 per cent, in southern Gaza between late 2000 and mid 2004. As recent as the 9th of August, IAF fighter aircraft bombed a tunnel, allegedly used for weapons smuggling, in response to continuous firing of Qassam rockets and mortar shells at Israeli southern communities from the Gaza strip.
Nevertheless, the tunnels are apparently not just used to provide terrorists with weapons and munitions. As a British newspaper reported, the tunnels have been advertised as opportunities for doubling and trebling money. It has become a more or less successful business throughout the years, but has also led to unimaginable losses for ordinary residents who have lost their homes after Israeli raids and house demolition. The true money-makers, believed to either be powerful businessmen in Gaza and, reportedly, senior officials in Hamas, have not been seriously affected by these measures and continue to foster this questionable source of wealth or collect taxes from the operators. According to economics minister, Ziad al-Zaza, whose office is investigating the issue, some $100 million have been taken fraudulently from would-be entrepreneurs. Other suggested figures reach as high as $500 million.
As Al Jazeera reported shortly after the Israeli offensive earlier this year, some residents invest large sums of money to participate in this business. The owners of the tunnel, which was visited by reporters, had spent about $90,000 for its construction and were smuggling everything from generators and computers to rice, chocolate and powdered milk into Gaza. Issa El Nashar, major of Rafah and co-founder of Hamas, told a German newspaper that, meanwhile, there are more tunnels than before the Israeli military operation. He stated: “We now have an entire border crossing in Rafah – all beneath the surface.” Some are supposed to be as large as 20 meters and allow easy smuggling of goats, cows and large vehicle parts.
Science against persistence
As present, measures which the IDF can resort to are confined to reacting, rather than themselves taking the initiative, it is now looking for a decisive technology that would provide the determining advantage. A rather unconventional attempt has recently been reported by the Jerusalem Post. In conjunction with the Defence Ministry's Research and Development Directorate (MAFAT), the OC Ground Forces Commander, Major General Avi Mizrahi, and the head of the Technology and Logistics Department, Brigadier General Shahar Kadishai, decided to send an officer to the US to conduct research on a system to detect and locate tunnels. Named only as Captain Asher, the officer will be working on possible solutions in a leading laboratory that specialises in discovering underground oil reserves.
After different approaches, including specially designed seismic sensors developed by a Rafael Advanced Defense Systems subsidiary, and the use of controlled random explosions underground and along the border to thwart the tunnel diggers (a method used by the US Army along the Mexican border), the newest effort might provide a more precise insight into the underground landscape of southern Gaza. The former solutions proved to be rather difficult to use in urban areas: detonations large enough to affect nearby tunnels may also damage or destroy the weakly built houses and acoustic and seismic sensors tend to pick up false readings due to water pipes and sewer systems.
Nevertheless, any technological solution will not end the Palestinians’ persistence in getting what they need in goods or weapons from abroad. The IDF may perhaps make it more costly and risky, but they will most likely not prevent the smugglers from somehow achieving their goal. As in many other conflict areas, it remains a question whether to fight the means or the origin. Just as piracy on the Horn of Africa will not be eliminated by sending warships, as long as the conflict in Somalia does not come to rest, this particular phenomenon in Gaza won’t end by means of air raids and house demolitions. Not the IDF, but only the involved parties can make the decisive change, which will have to be much more comprehensive than ending the construction of tunnels in southern Gaza. It is especially an opportunity for the international community to excell in a major peace-keeping and humanitarian effort. But, for the time being, any such efforts have almost vanished into inconsequential obscurity.
(This entry is an article I ogirinally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in August 2009)
Tunnels in conflict areas have already reached appalling fame in the past: from the sapping of fortified structures in medieval times to the tunnel system of Iwo Jima and the so-called tunnel rats in Vietnam. Even Afghanistan has seen a similar phenomenon, which led the Russians to train their own tunnel rats in the 1980s. However, the most recent use of ingenious underground engineering is being found on the southern border of the small but densely populated Gaza strip. Whether it is for supporting combatants and terrorists within the isolated territory or just to provide the civilian population with cheap goods, medicine and a possibility to flee the area, the Palestinians have dug hundreds of more or less sophisticated tunnels.
Connecting the Palestinian refugee camp of Rafah with the Egyptian town of Rafah, the tunnels pass under the barrier that was erected in compliance with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed in 1979 in Washington. This relatively fortified buffer zone, also called the Philadelphi corridor, has not been comprehensively controlled by Israel since 2005, when it handed over control to the Palestinian National Authority. The more severe demarcation is, however, being sustained by Egypt, which is afraid of letting Palestinian refugees (along with possible terrorists) cross into their territory. The corridor especially aroused public interest in early 2008 when Palestinian militants tore down several parts of the wall, allowing temporary uncontrolled border traffic.
However, since the border generally remains hermetically sealed and, particularly, terrorists and smugglers in the Gaza strip foster illegal border traffic, the construction of tunnels flourished during past years. That it is a key Israeli interest to stop weapons smuggling was clearly demonstrated in its three-week offensive launched in December 2008, during which hundreds of houses were demolished and suspected tunnels bombed by fighter aircraft. Due to the dense population around Rafah, it has been easy for the Palestinians to connect houses on both sides with tunnels, effectively hiding the entrances and storage rooms.
More than just a military target
The tunnels are generally dug at depths of approximately 15 to 25 meters (49 to 82 feet) and reach lengths of up to 800 meters (2,640 feet). Regardless of the well-concealed underground connections, the tunnel diggers and operators have a tough life as the general location is not difficult to guess (Rafah stretches along some four kilometres of the border) and the Israeli Air Force is not at all hesitant to strike at suspected tunnels. The Israeli Defence Forces claim to have discovered and destroyed some ninety tunnels, an estimated 95 per cent, in southern Gaza between late 2000 and mid 2004. As recent as the 9th of August, IAF fighter aircraft bombed a tunnel, allegedly used for weapons smuggling, in response to continuous firing of Qassam rockets and mortar shells at Israeli southern communities from the Gaza strip.
Nevertheless, the tunnels are apparently not just used to provide terrorists with weapons and munitions. As a British newspaper reported, the tunnels have been advertised as opportunities for doubling and trebling money. It has become a more or less successful business throughout the years, but has also led to unimaginable losses for ordinary residents who have lost their homes after Israeli raids and house demolition. The true money-makers, believed to either be powerful businessmen in Gaza and, reportedly, senior officials in Hamas, have not been seriously affected by these measures and continue to foster this questionable source of wealth or collect taxes from the operators. According to economics minister, Ziad al-Zaza, whose office is investigating the issue, some $100 million have been taken fraudulently from would-be entrepreneurs. Other suggested figures reach as high as $500 million.
As Al Jazeera reported shortly after the Israeli offensive earlier this year, some residents invest large sums of money to participate in this business. The owners of the tunnel, which was visited by reporters, had spent about $90,000 for its construction and were smuggling everything from generators and computers to rice, chocolate and powdered milk into Gaza. Issa El Nashar, major of Rafah and co-founder of Hamas, told a German newspaper that, meanwhile, there are more tunnels than before the Israeli military operation. He stated: “We now have an entire border crossing in Rafah – all beneath the surface.” Some are supposed to be as large as 20 meters and allow easy smuggling of goats, cows and large vehicle parts.
Science against persistence
As present, measures which the IDF can resort to are confined to reacting, rather than themselves taking the initiative, it is now looking for a decisive technology that would provide the determining advantage. A rather unconventional attempt has recently been reported by the Jerusalem Post. In conjunction with the Defence Ministry's Research and Development Directorate (MAFAT), the OC Ground Forces Commander, Major General Avi Mizrahi, and the head of the Technology and Logistics Department, Brigadier General Shahar Kadishai, decided to send an officer to the US to conduct research on a system to detect and locate tunnels. Named only as Captain Asher, the officer will be working on possible solutions in a leading laboratory that specialises in discovering underground oil reserves.
After different approaches, including specially designed seismic sensors developed by a Rafael Advanced Defense Systems subsidiary, and the use of controlled random explosions underground and along the border to thwart the tunnel diggers (a method used by the US Army along the Mexican border), the newest effort might provide a more precise insight into the underground landscape of southern Gaza. The former solutions proved to be rather difficult to use in urban areas: detonations large enough to affect nearby tunnels may also damage or destroy the weakly built houses and acoustic and seismic sensors tend to pick up false readings due to water pipes and sewer systems.
Nevertheless, any technological solution will not end the Palestinians’ persistence in getting what they need in goods or weapons from abroad. The IDF may perhaps make it more costly and risky, but they will most likely not prevent the smugglers from somehow achieving their goal. As in many other conflict areas, it remains a question whether to fight the means or the origin. Just as piracy on the Horn of Africa will not be eliminated by sending warships, as long as the conflict in Somalia does not come to rest, this particular phenomenon in Gaza won’t end by means of air raids and house demolitions. Not the IDF, but only the involved parties can make the decisive change, which will have to be much more comprehensive than ending the construction of tunnels in southern Gaza. It is especially an opportunity for the international community to excell in a major peace-keeping and humanitarian effort. But, for the time being, any such efforts have almost vanished into inconsequential obscurity.
(This entry is an article I ogirinally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in August 2009)
June 26, 2009
Political Hypocrisy in a Matter of Facts and Nomenclature
Thoughts on the ongoing discussion on the nature of Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan
Are German soldiers in Afghanistan at war, or not? This question has been troubling the current, as well as the previous administration, and has lead to animated discussions within and between the ruling and opposition parties, the special interest group of the Bundeswehr (Bundeswehrverband), and the media. More importantly, the hesitating and hypocritical manner with which this matter has been treated by the Government, and even by the Ministry of Defence, has left German soldiers unsure of what they are placing their lives on the line for.
Unfortunately, the administration links the question of whether it is politically and morally correct to be involved in Afghanistan to the question of whether it actually is involved in a war. From an American, British or other western country’s point of view, this question won’t come up. However, it is a matter, which in Germany, is strongly interconnected with its historical past and with a responsibility, sensible to most Germans, not to forget about the horrid actions of the Nazi regime. It may, therefore, be understandable that no politician of a ruling party would want to be the first in the German post-WWII history to declare, in any way, that the country is actively engaged in a war.
However, it is not the word “war” that will make the cause, itself, wrong or the country involved, an evil one. This has been a self-conception of the United States ever since it has significantly contributed to free Europe. This self-conception has only been slightly dented by the Vietnam War’s national, as well as global impact, on society’s concept of morality. But this particular change in society could never reach the intensity that the heritage of WWII had on German society.
Yet, it becomes almost unbearable as German Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Jung, consequently dismisses even the idea of German soldiers being at war in Afghanistan. In a recent statement to a local newspaper, he stated “in a war you don’t build schools, in a war you don’t build hospitals, in a war you don’t train armed forces” – an interesting perspective which, however, lacks any historical and logical foundation. The reconstruction of devastated areas, the assistance to the population as well as the training of native forces are facets of war which have more than one example in the long history of man-made conflicts. They have also been intentionally employed by armed forces in order to support the military efforts of the war-fighters and of the success of the entire cause (most prominently World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War).
The discussion in Germany reaches as far as the question of whether to say that German soldiers killed in Afghanistan have “died” or have been “killed in action” – the latter (“Gefallener”) being more customary in the German language than the rather specialized term used in English-speaking countries. It is only in October 2008 that the Defence Minister first used this term. Before, Jung used words such as “to perish” or “to be robbed of one’s life” in official speeches and documents. Yesterday, the German Armed Forces Commissioner, Reinhold Robbe, reportedly said there is not enough recognition within the German population for the efforts of the soldiers who often return home traumatised. Perhaps this would change a little if this operation would not be presented to the public as a merry excursion.
Back in 2008, Volker Rühe, a member of the same political party as Mr Jung, correctly stated: “It is delusive if the Government pretends that the Afghanistan operation is a sort of armed development assistance. It is a war of NATO, of the West, of civilisation against the global octopus-like terrorism.” The question begs to be asked whether the Defence Minister ignores that the Bundeswehr is currently carrying out its largest military operation abroad since its founding after WWII. Since the beginning of the ISAF operation Germany has lost 35 soldiers, many of those through IEDs, gunfire and RPG rockets employed by an organised enemy force which has been capable of “keeping the pot boiling” in Afghanistan and western Pakistan for almost eight years now.
Jung added to the above-mentioned interview: “As a matter of fact, soldiers may also be killed in peace-keeping operations.” However, concluding this, it still has to be asserted that it is not a single involved party that decides whether it is in a state of war or not. It is a question of facts, not of political opinion, caution or correctness. Any realistic definition of war that I have encountered fully applies to the state which German soldiers find themselves, again, in Afghanistan fighting against the Taliban.
The wording of the German Federal Parliament’s decision on the extension of the Bundeswehr mandate in the ISAF operation is quite univocal: “The International Security Assistance Force is authorised to take all required actions, including to use military force, in order to implement the mandate according to resolution 1833 (2008).” And as the Taliban considers their fight against “the infidels” as a war, and is acting as if in a war, (painfully experienced by soldiers of every involved nation), it is not because of the German administration saying it is not playing along, that the game is not running.
Neither the restrictive rules of engagement nor the positive efforts of reconstruction will hide the fact that German soldiers, just as their allied comrades, are confronted with an organised enemy that should not be underestimated as light-headed. This should be a lesson learned, dramatically proven by the Vietnam War, for every modern army.
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in June 2009)
Are German soldiers in Afghanistan at war, or not? This question has been troubling the current, as well as the previous administration, and has lead to animated discussions within and between the ruling and opposition parties, the special interest group of the Bundeswehr (Bundeswehrverband), and the media. More importantly, the hesitating and hypocritical manner with which this matter has been treated by the Government, and even by the Ministry of Defence, has left German soldiers unsure of what they are placing their lives on the line for.
Unfortunately, the administration links the question of whether it is politically and morally correct to be involved in Afghanistan to the question of whether it actually is involved in a war. From an American, British or other western country’s point of view, this question won’t come up. However, it is a matter, which in Germany, is strongly interconnected with its historical past and with a responsibility, sensible to most Germans, not to forget about the horrid actions of the Nazi regime. It may, therefore, be understandable that no politician of a ruling party would want to be the first in the German post-WWII history to declare, in any way, that the country is actively engaged in a war.
However, it is not the word “war” that will make the cause, itself, wrong or the country involved, an evil one. This has been a self-conception of the United States ever since it has significantly contributed to free Europe. This self-conception has only been slightly dented by the Vietnam War’s national, as well as global impact, on society’s concept of morality. But this particular change in society could never reach the intensity that the heritage of WWII had on German society.
Yet, it becomes almost unbearable as German Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Jung, consequently dismisses even the idea of German soldiers being at war in Afghanistan. In a recent statement to a local newspaper, he stated “in a war you don’t build schools, in a war you don’t build hospitals, in a war you don’t train armed forces” – an interesting perspective which, however, lacks any historical and logical foundation. The reconstruction of devastated areas, the assistance to the population as well as the training of native forces are facets of war which have more than one example in the long history of man-made conflicts. They have also been intentionally employed by armed forces in order to support the military efforts of the war-fighters and of the success of the entire cause (most prominently World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War).
The discussion in Germany reaches as far as the question of whether to say that German soldiers killed in Afghanistan have “died” or have been “killed in action” – the latter (“Gefallener”) being more customary in the German language than the rather specialized term used in English-speaking countries. It is only in October 2008 that the Defence Minister first used this term. Before, Jung used words such as “to perish” or “to be robbed of one’s life” in official speeches and documents. Yesterday, the German Armed Forces Commissioner, Reinhold Robbe, reportedly said there is not enough recognition within the German population for the efforts of the soldiers who often return home traumatised. Perhaps this would change a little if this operation would not be presented to the public as a merry excursion.
Back in 2008, Volker Rühe, a member of the same political party as Mr Jung, correctly stated: “It is delusive if the Government pretends that the Afghanistan operation is a sort of armed development assistance. It is a war of NATO, of the West, of civilisation against the global octopus-like terrorism.” The question begs to be asked whether the Defence Minister ignores that the Bundeswehr is currently carrying out its largest military operation abroad since its founding after WWII. Since the beginning of the ISAF operation Germany has lost 35 soldiers, many of those through IEDs, gunfire and RPG rockets employed by an organised enemy force which has been capable of “keeping the pot boiling” in Afghanistan and western Pakistan for almost eight years now.
Jung added to the above-mentioned interview: “As a matter of fact, soldiers may also be killed in peace-keeping operations.” However, concluding this, it still has to be asserted that it is not a single involved party that decides whether it is in a state of war or not. It is a question of facts, not of political opinion, caution or correctness. Any realistic definition of war that I have encountered fully applies to the state which German soldiers find themselves, again, in Afghanistan fighting against the Taliban.
The wording of the German Federal Parliament’s decision on the extension of the Bundeswehr mandate in the ISAF operation is quite univocal: “The International Security Assistance Force is authorised to take all required actions, including to use military force, in order to implement the mandate according to resolution 1833 (2008).” And as the Taliban considers their fight against “the infidels” as a war, and is acting as if in a war, (painfully experienced by soldiers of every involved nation), it is not because of the German administration saying it is not playing along, that the game is not running.
Neither the restrictive rules of engagement nor the positive efforts of reconstruction will hide the fact that German soldiers, just as their allied comrades, are confronted with an organised enemy that should not be underestimated as light-headed. This should be a lesson learned, dramatically proven by the Vietnam War, for every modern army.
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in June 2009)
May 18, 2009
No Guts, No Peace?
Study depicts Israel’s options for an attack against Iran
Last week reminded us once more of how probable an Israeli attack on Iran could become during the next few years (or perhaps even months?), in the event that Iran further approaches the capability of producing a nuclear weapon. After the new Israeli government expressed its commitment to stop Iran’s nuclear programme by every means, one did not have to wait long for a reaction from the United States.
Early last week US President Barack Obama warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, through CIA chief Leon Panetta visiting Israel, not to carry out a military attack against Iran. According to the Los Angeles Times, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered the same message during a speech to Marine Corp cadets in Washington and cautioned Israel about the dangerous consequences of such a military intervention. These demands and warnings are not new and reach back also to the Bush administration, having regularly asked Israel not to attack Iran or at least to coordinate its military actions with Washington.
The Obama administration understandably should be worried, on the one side, about the strategic position of the US when caught off guard by such attacks and, on the other side, about the position Israel will find itself in once Pandora's Box has been opened. Israel’s diplomatic response: it will inform the US early enough (‘inform’, and not ask for permission). Undoubtedly, this matter will be discussed enthusiastically behind closed doors on the occasion of mutual visits during the upcoming weeks. While Obama’s visit to Israel is scheduled for next month, he will be shaking hands with Netanyahu in Washington today. After Netanyahu returns to Israel, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman will make his first visit to Washington.
Even though Israel’s military power is not to be underestimated, being technologically sophisticated, well-trained and very determined, it still is limited in numbers and options. Gates accurately pointed out that a strike against Iran’s installations would only delay Iran’s nuclear programme for a few years. Furthermore, according to Gates and different experts it would strengthen Iran’s commitment in this matter.
Study: A daring enterprise
Conveniently, a detailed study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, published in March 2009*, analysed scenarios and options of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) for an attack against Iran’s key facilities housing its nuclear programme. It is worth to take a peek at this 114 page study presenting in-depth information and nicely outlining every aspect of a military intervention.
The quintessence, nevertheless, is predictable: an attack is possible but very complex and the outcome more than doubtful. And the study is very clear about the position of the US in this matter, especially considering the prevention of a military conflict. Yet, if the United States and the international community do not succeed in convincing Iran to stop its nuclear programme (assuming such a programme actually exists, which US intelligence reports consistently deny, and also while diplomatically navigating around the problem of double standards, considering Israel’s WMD and Ballistic Missile capabilities), an attack becomes very probable.
In this event, the study’s authors suggest, that Israel will employ, from three possible routes into Iran, the one along the Syrian-Turkish border. The aircraft would then cross a small portion of Iraq and finally enter Iranian airspace. Taking into account the required number of aircraft for electronic counter measures (ECM), attack, fighter escort as well as refuelling along the way, makes this a very complex mission. Further, different uncertainties (more than the usual fog of war) about the installations and the Iranian air defence capabilities make it an extremely risky enterprise.
As all facilities involved in the Iranian nuclear programme are dispersed throughout the country, Israel will have to select the most important targets that would significantly affect further production. The authors of the study suggest these are the nuclear research centre in Isfahan, the uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, and the heavy water plant, intended for future plutonium production, in Arak. Israel would have to launch most, if not all of its aircraft, to do the job. According to the study, some 90 combat aircraft, including 25 F-15Es and 65 F-16I/Cs as well as their two Gulfstream G550 aircraft for ECM and 5 KC-130Hs and 4 B-707s for air refuelling, would be required. The latter will have to refuel the fighter aircraft on the way to Iran and back, and this outside of Israeli airspace.
The next challenge for the fighter aircraft will be to penetrate Iranian airspace without being detected, and when detected to avoid Iranian air defence batteries. First of all, Iran can deploy Hawk, SA-5 and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles as well as SA-7, SA-15, Rapier, Crotale and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Also, 1,700 anti-aircraft guns are dispersed around its nuclear installations. But, next to a vague number of operational fighter aircraft which Iran could scramble, the greatest threat could arise from the S-300V (SA-12 Giant) anti-aircraft defence system, which Iran may have purchased from Russia. It is not sure whether these have already been integrated into the Iranian air defence, however, Defence Minister Mustafa Najjar claimed in November 2008 that "the S-300 air defense system will be delivered to Iran on the basis of a contract signed with Russia in the past." According to Mark Fitzpatrick, former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, Russia has not yet delivered those systems to Iran: "It seems clear that Russia entered into a contract with Iran for the S-300, but it's also clear that the Russians have not delivered on it and are holding on to it as potential negotiating leverage with the United States over ballistic missile defense and possibly other issues." Should the Iranians employ the SA-12, the authors of the study assume losses of 20 to 30 per cent, meaning some 20 to 24 aircraft would be shot down.
The authors of the study also considered the use of ballistic missiles instead of combat aircraft. As the Iranians do not have the capabilities required to intercept such missiles, Israel could employ its Jericho I, II and III to carry out the strike. The Jericho I has a 500-kilometer range, a 450-kilogram warhead, and can carry a 20-kiloton nuclear weapon. Jericho II has a 1,500-kilometer range and entered service in 1990. It can carry a 1-megaton nuclear warhead. Jericho III is an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 4,800 to 6,500 kilometres, and can carry a multi-megaton nuclear warhead. Yet, the study suggests the use of conventional warheads more probable and say as many as 42 Jericho III missiles would be required to destroy the three Iranian facilities, provided that all hit their target. As the targets have to be hit very precisely, sometimes with a tolerance of only a few meters, this is rather unlikely.
Questionable results
Considering the above mentioned risks, the imponderables of an Iranian retaliation, probably also involving the support of Hezbollah and Hamas as well as the devastating effect it would have on the entire region, it does not seem worthwhile. Yet, it is a question of perspective and of timing. From the Israeli point of view, the window for a possible attack is slowly closing. If the enemy air defences become more sophisticated or, in the worst case, Iran acquires nuclear weapons, an attack would become near to impossible, or rather irresponsible. The study foresees such a situation being possible as early as 2010.
Furthermore, the question remains if an attack would, firstly, effectively stop or at least slow down Iran’s nuclear programme and, secondly, lead to a military and political environment in the Middle East that would provide more security. The latter can be excluded almost with absolute certainty. Any action against Iran would fuel hatred against Israel among neighbouring people. Moreover, Iran would of course leave the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, which until now has enabled the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor its nuclear programme to a certain degree, and so re-acquiring its total freedom to proceed to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons if it wishes so.
For these reasons, the recent tentative moves by the Obama administration for the whole of the Middle East to be brought under strict respect on the NPT – even including Israel – have at least the potential for radically changing the terms of the equation. Far from allowing Israel to attack Iran or even leaning it a hand, the Obama administration is apparently pondering when not forcing Jerusalem to renounce its nuclear weapons, then certainly asking the Israelis to abandon their traditional policy of neither confirming nor denying the possession of such strategic assets, and openly claiming the status of a nuclear power – with all that would imply in diplomatic terms. An interesting assessment of the US-Israeli relationship in this context, published yesterday, can be found on the website of the Israeli Institute of National Security Studies (INSS; www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=2897).
In the light of the above, and in addition to the considerations as expressed by the authors, several other independent analysts have suggested that the real strategic purpose of a conceivable Israeli attack against Iran would not be to decapitate the country’s nuclear programme, but rather to count on the unavoidable Iranian reaction to drag the US into the conflict.
(This entry is an article I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in May 2009)
_____
* The study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman can be downloaded here:
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf
Last week reminded us once more of how probable an Israeli attack on Iran could become during the next few years (or perhaps even months?), in the event that Iran further approaches the capability of producing a nuclear weapon. After the new Israeli government expressed its commitment to stop Iran’s nuclear programme by every means, one did not have to wait long for a reaction from the United States.
Early last week US President Barack Obama warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, through CIA chief Leon Panetta visiting Israel, not to carry out a military attack against Iran. According to the Los Angeles Times, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered the same message during a speech to Marine Corp cadets in Washington and cautioned Israel about the dangerous consequences of such a military intervention. These demands and warnings are not new and reach back also to the Bush administration, having regularly asked Israel not to attack Iran or at least to coordinate its military actions with Washington.
The Obama administration understandably should be worried, on the one side, about the strategic position of the US when caught off guard by such attacks and, on the other side, about the position Israel will find itself in once Pandora's Box has been opened. Israel’s diplomatic response: it will inform the US early enough (‘inform’, and not ask for permission). Undoubtedly, this matter will be discussed enthusiastically behind closed doors on the occasion of mutual visits during the upcoming weeks. While Obama’s visit to Israel is scheduled for next month, he will be shaking hands with Netanyahu in Washington today. After Netanyahu returns to Israel, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman will make his first visit to Washington.
Even though Israel’s military power is not to be underestimated, being technologically sophisticated, well-trained and very determined, it still is limited in numbers and options. Gates accurately pointed out that a strike against Iran’s installations would only delay Iran’s nuclear programme for a few years. Furthermore, according to Gates and different experts it would strengthen Iran’s commitment in this matter.
Study: A daring enterprise
Conveniently, a detailed study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, published in March 2009*, analysed scenarios and options of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) for an attack against Iran’s key facilities housing its nuclear programme. It is worth to take a peek at this 114 page study presenting in-depth information and nicely outlining every aspect of a military intervention.
The quintessence, nevertheless, is predictable: an attack is possible but very complex and the outcome more than doubtful. And the study is very clear about the position of the US in this matter, especially considering the prevention of a military conflict. Yet, if the United States and the international community do not succeed in convincing Iran to stop its nuclear programme (assuming such a programme actually exists, which US intelligence reports consistently deny, and also while diplomatically navigating around the problem of double standards, considering Israel’s WMD and Ballistic Missile capabilities), an attack becomes very probable.
In this event, the study’s authors suggest, that Israel will employ, from three possible routes into Iran, the one along the Syrian-Turkish border. The aircraft would then cross a small portion of Iraq and finally enter Iranian airspace. Taking into account the required number of aircraft for electronic counter measures (ECM), attack, fighter escort as well as refuelling along the way, makes this a very complex mission. Further, different uncertainties (more than the usual fog of war) about the installations and the Iranian air defence capabilities make it an extremely risky enterprise.
As all facilities involved in the Iranian nuclear programme are dispersed throughout the country, Israel will have to select the most important targets that would significantly affect further production. The authors of the study suggest these are the nuclear research centre in Isfahan, the uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, and the heavy water plant, intended for future plutonium production, in Arak. Israel would have to launch most, if not all of its aircraft, to do the job. According to the study, some 90 combat aircraft, including 25 F-15Es and 65 F-16I/Cs as well as their two Gulfstream G550 aircraft for ECM and 5 KC-130Hs and 4 B-707s for air refuelling, would be required. The latter will have to refuel the fighter aircraft on the way to Iran and back, and this outside of Israeli airspace.
The next challenge for the fighter aircraft will be to penetrate Iranian airspace without being detected, and when detected to avoid Iranian air defence batteries. First of all, Iran can deploy Hawk, SA-5 and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles as well as SA-7, SA-15, Rapier, Crotale and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Also, 1,700 anti-aircraft guns are dispersed around its nuclear installations. But, next to a vague number of operational fighter aircraft which Iran could scramble, the greatest threat could arise from the S-300V (SA-12 Giant) anti-aircraft defence system, which Iran may have purchased from Russia. It is not sure whether these have already been integrated into the Iranian air defence, however, Defence Minister Mustafa Najjar claimed in November 2008 that "the S-300 air defense system will be delivered to Iran on the basis of a contract signed with Russia in the past." According to Mark Fitzpatrick, former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, Russia has not yet delivered those systems to Iran: "It seems clear that Russia entered into a contract with Iran for the S-300, but it's also clear that the Russians have not delivered on it and are holding on to it as potential negotiating leverage with the United States over ballistic missile defense and possibly other issues." Should the Iranians employ the SA-12, the authors of the study assume losses of 20 to 30 per cent, meaning some 20 to 24 aircraft would be shot down.
The authors of the study also considered the use of ballistic missiles instead of combat aircraft. As the Iranians do not have the capabilities required to intercept such missiles, Israel could employ its Jericho I, II and III to carry out the strike. The Jericho I has a 500-kilometer range, a 450-kilogram warhead, and can carry a 20-kiloton nuclear weapon. Jericho II has a 1,500-kilometer range and entered service in 1990. It can carry a 1-megaton nuclear warhead. Jericho III is an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 4,800 to 6,500 kilometres, and can carry a multi-megaton nuclear warhead. Yet, the study suggests the use of conventional warheads more probable and say as many as 42 Jericho III missiles would be required to destroy the three Iranian facilities, provided that all hit their target. As the targets have to be hit very precisely, sometimes with a tolerance of only a few meters, this is rather unlikely.
Questionable results
Considering the above mentioned risks, the imponderables of an Iranian retaliation, probably also involving the support of Hezbollah and Hamas as well as the devastating effect it would have on the entire region, it does not seem worthwhile. Yet, it is a question of perspective and of timing. From the Israeli point of view, the window for a possible attack is slowly closing. If the enemy air defences become more sophisticated or, in the worst case, Iran acquires nuclear weapons, an attack would become near to impossible, or rather irresponsible. The study foresees such a situation being possible as early as 2010.
Furthermore, the question remains if an attack would, firstly, effectively stop or at least slow down Iran’s nuclear programme and, secondly, lead to a military and political environment in the Middle East that would provide more security. The latter can be excluded almost with absolute certainty. Any action against Iran would fuel hatred against Israel among neighbouring people. Moreover, Iran would of course leave the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, which until now has enabled the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor its nuclear programme to a certain degree, and so re-acquiring its total freedom to proceed to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons if it wishes so.
For these reasons, the recent tentative moves by the Obama administration for the whole of the Middle East to be brought under strict respect on the NPT – even including Israel – have at least the potential for radically changing the terms of the equation. Far from allowing Israel to attack Iran or even leaning it a hand, the Obama administration is apparently pondering when not forcing Jerusalem to renounce its nuclear weapons, then certainly asking the Israelis to abandon their traditional policy of neither confirming nor denying the possession of such strategic assets, and openly claiming the status of a nuclear power – with all that would imply in diplomatic terms. An interesting assessment of the US-Israeli relationship in this context, published yesterday, can be found on the website of the Israeli Institute of National Security Studies (INSS; www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=2897).
In the light of the above, and in addition to the considerations as expressed by the authors, several other independent analysts have suggested that the real strategic purpose of a conceivable Israeli attack against Iran would not be to decapitate the country’s nuclear programme, but rather to count on the unavoidable Iranian reaction to drag the US into the conflict.
(This entry is an article I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in May 2009)
_____
* The study by Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman can be downloaded here:
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf
May 12, 2009
A Gordian Knot That Cannot be Cut by the Sword
Can the origins of piracy at the Horn of Africa be solved with battleships?
It is more than the traditional picture of a clash of civilizations and it cannot easily be compared to earlier scenarios, be it of the 17th century or the more recent incidents in the Strait of Malacca. The effects of globalisation and the ruptured history of an African state make is a unique situation: Even though piracy still is only a symptom of greater evils, in this case it has a different character and can therefore not be fought as it has been in the past.
The multinational Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) has been underway in the Horn of Africa since 2002 to ensure stability in the region and support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), the latter part of activities referred to as Maritime Security Operations (MSO).
Yet, since early 2006 its focus has almost entirely shifted to the prevention and elimination of piracy. By now the mission unites vessels of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States in this common cause. Also, Combined Task Force 151 as well as an international command are exclusively involved in fighting piracy (see list below). But what have been the results so far?
Where to begin?
The shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia have become the most dangerous waters in the world. The chaotic situation of the African state, resulting from the collapse of its government and the following era of crime, radicalism and terrorism, fostered and maintained by warlords and clan militias, cries for spin-off effects such as piracy. In a country in which poverty reigns, and mischief and lawlessness to the point that everyone is at one’s own, who would wonder about such implications?
18 years have passed since the downfall of the former head of state, Siad Barre. Since then, a culture of survival-of-the-fittest has taken power within this population. An illicit arms trade, fostered by clan militias and radical groups such as “Al Shabaab” or “Hisb Al Islam”, made it possible that even the simplest fisherman can be armed to the teeth. Never-ending, violent interior conflicts between parties obsessed with power have made Somalia a bonanza, yet only for the few ruthless players who pulls the strings.
How are a small number of warships going to tackle such a wasp’s nest? The few swimming satellites orbiting the Horn of Africa in order to protect merchant ships are overstrained by the vastness of their operational area and the swiftness of the pirate actions. More than fifty captured pirates have been transferred to prison in Mombasa, Kenya, while a dozen are being held in pre-trial custody in the US, France and Spain. But the support of fresh, young men is inexhaustible and the attacks on merchant ships – more or less successful – won’t stop.
The so-called pirates’ nests in the Somali harbours of Harardere, Hobyo, Eyl or Bosasso are flourishing: Impressive mansions are being built with expensive off-road vehicles parked at the front porch. A downright service industry has established itself around the down-and-dirty core business. Some of the young men armed with Kalashnikovs even consider banditry as a sort of poetic justice.
As published in an exclusive interview in defpro.com with a Somali pirate in February, the pirates see themselves as Somalia’s coast guard or navy fighting for the right of undisturbed fishing in Somali waters. And beyond that, they do not even seem to be frightened of the flexing of modern Navies’ muscles. “This has absolutely not scared us. We know they have well armed forces on the ships and they stay in the waters off Somalia protecting ships from what they call pirates,” stated the interview’s pirate, “as I told you, I am not a pirate, we are the special guards of the Somali coast. Until there is an effective government, I will perform my duty for my people and my country.” Some may see it as less elevated and have simply found a more lucrative job than fishing.
Scratching the surface
Roughly more than two dozen ships from NATO, the EU operation “Atalanta”, frigates and destroyers from Russia, China, India and South Korea try to oversee a maritime area larger than the Mediterranean, reaching from the Gulf of Aden to the Seychelles in the West and down south to the coast of Tanzania.
While the Navies report of the successful defence of individual attacks and of the capture of pirates, the International Maritime Bureau presents a much different perspective: Compared to last year, the number of pirate attacks has increased tenfold. Generally, the attackers use one or two swift speed boats, supported by a larger mother ship and attack ships with automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers. Often, the battleships’ only possibility to catch up is to send a helicopter, in order to stop the speed boats and then to approach at their much slower speed. In a few cases, suspect boats can be identified by maritime surveillance aircraft such as the P-3C Orion. Yet it usually takes a lot of time, until a warship can intercept the suspected boat. By the time they arrive, either the boat is gone or the arms and other suspicious objects have been thrown overboard.
The international community’s struggle only scratches the surface. Keeping a few speed boats from attacking merchant vessels won’t solve the problem. But what is the next step? Sinking mother ships? Bombing pirate nests? Or do you have to go as far as bringing peace and stability to Somalia?
The Kenyan, Andrew Mwangura, programme coordinator for the Seafarers' Assistance Programme, is convinced that influential clan militias support and organise the attacks. “The men pulling the strings are big fish. They operate from Europe, America or from the Arabian Peninsula. They have networks with international contacts and are very wealthy people.”
Ransom negotiations are being carried out by telephone and sometimes the proverbial suitcases full of money change hands in the lobbies of hotels in European capitals. According to experts, approximately $ 100 million have been pressed by syndicates during past years. Piracy has become a regional economic factor.
The suspicion that this may be used or perhaps even initiated by larger terrorist organisations is manifest. Intelligence services have identified this threat over many years. The CIA’s evaluation on this matter is very clear: terror groups have launched a crucial seafront against western nations. The terrorists want to cut off vital trade connections. But even this knowledge and distant operations in Iraq and Afghanistan against terror networks will not eliminate the breeding ground of piracy.
Now, one of the bearers of hope is the moderate Islamist, Sheik Scharif Achmed, Somalia’s President since the beginning of the year. Ironically, he had been considered to be part of the Al-quaida network by the US and was temporarily arrested by US troops. In April 2009 the UN agreed to support the country’s new government with $ 200 million, seeing the problem’s roots in the anarchy and insecurity on shore, rather than at sea.
List of operations and participating nations
• “Atalanta“ (EU):
Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy
(6 frigates, 2 support vessels, Orion P-3A and P-3C, Breguet-Atlantique)
• “Allied Protector” (NATO, from SNMG1):
Portugal, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, US (associated under national command)
(5 frigates)
• “Combined Task Force 150” (Operation Enduring Freedom, anti-terror):
France, US, United Kingdom, Pakistan
(1 command ship, 3 frigates, 2 support vessels)
• “Combined Task Force 151” (anti-piracy):
US, Turkey, Singapore, South Korea (associated)
(1 destroyer, 1 frigate, 1 cruiser, 3 support vessels)
• Operation under international command (incl. support of the Coast Guard of the Seychelles):
India, China, Malaysia, Japan, Russia, France
(3 destroyers, 3 frigates, 1 patrol boat, 5 support vessels; France’s contribution unknown)
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in May 2009)
It is more than the traditional picture of a clash of civilizations and it cannot easily be compared to earlier scenarios, be it of the 17th century or the more recent incidents in the Strait of Malacca. The effects of globalisation and the ruptured history of an African state make is a unique situation: Even though piracy still is only a symptom of greater evils, in this case it has a different character and can therefore not be fought as it has been in the past.
The multinational Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) has been underway in the Horn of Africa since 2002 to ensure stability in the region and support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), the latter part of activities referred to as Maritime Security Operations (MSO).
Yet, since early 2006 its focus has almost entirely shifted to the prevention and elimination of piracy. By now the mission unites vessels of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States in this common cause. Also, Combined Task Force 151 as well as an international command are exclusively involved in fighting piracy (see list below). But what have been the results so far?
Where to begin?
The shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia have become the most dangerous waters in the world. The chaotic situation of the African state, resulting from the collapse of its government and the following era of crime, radicalism and terrorism, fostered and maintained by warlords and clan militias, cries for spin-off effects such as piracy. In a country in which poverty reigns, and mischief and lawlessness to the point that everyone is at one’s own, who would wonder about such implications?
18 years have passed since the downfall of the former head of state, Siad Barre. Since then, a culture of survival-of-the-fittest has taken power within this population. An illicit arms trade, fostered by clan militias and radical groups such as “Al Shabaab” or “Hisb Al Islam”, made it possible that even the simplest fisherman can be armed to the teeth. Never-ending, violent interior conflicts between parties obsessed with power have made Somalia a bonanza, yet only for the few ruthless players who pulls the strings.
How are a small number of warships going to tackle such a wasp’s nest? The few swimming satellites orbiting the Horn of Africa in order to protect merchant ships are overstrained by the vastness of their operational area and the swiftness of the pirate actions. More than fifty captured pirates have been transferred to prison in Mombasa, Kenya, while a dozen are being held in pre-trial custody in the US, France and Spain. But the support of fresh, young men is inexhaustible and the attacks on merchant ships – more or less successful – won’t stop.
The so-called pirates’ nests in the Somali harbours of Harardere, Hobyo, Eyl or Bosasso are flourishing: Impressive mansions are being built with expensive off-road vehicles parked at the front porch. A downright service industry has established itself around the down-and-dirty core business. Some of the young men armed with Kalashnikovs even consider banditry as a sort of poetic justice.
As published in an exclusive interview in defpro.com with a Somali pirate in February, the pirates see themselves as Somalia’s coast guard or navy fighting for the right of undisturbed fishing in Somali waters. And beyond that, they do not even seem to be frightened of the flexing of modern Navies’ muscles. “This has absolutely not scared us. We know they have well armed forces on the ships and they stay in the waters off Somalia protecting ships from what they call pirates,” stated the interview’s pirate, “as I told you, I am not a pirate, we are the special guards of the Somali coast. Until there is an effective government, I will perform my duty for my people and my country.” Some may see it as less elevated and have simply found a more lucrative job than fishing.
Scratching the surface
Roughly more than two dozen ships from NATO, the EU operation “Atalanta”, frigates and destroyers from Russia, China, India and South Korea try to oversee a maritime area larger than the Mediterranean, reaching from the Gulf of Aden to the Seychelles in the West and down south to the coast of Tanzania.
While the Navies report of the successful defence of individual attacks and of the capture of pirates, the International Maritime Bureau presents a much different perspective: Compared to last year, the number of pirate attacks has increased tenfold. Generally, the attackers use one or two swift speed boats, supported by a larger mother ship and attack ships with automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers. Often, the battleships’ only possibility to catch up is to send a helicopter, in order to stop the speed boats and then to approach at their much slower speed. In a few cases, suspect boats can be identified by maritime surveillance aircraft such as the P-3C Orion. Yet it usually takes a lot of time, until a warship can intercept the suspected boat. By the time they arrive, either the boat is gone or the arms and other suspicious objects have been thrown overboard.
The international community’s struggle only scratches the surface. Keeping a few speed boats from attacking merchant vessels won’t solve the problem. But what is the next step? Sinking mother ships? Bombing pirate nests? Or do you have to go as far as bringing peace and stability to Somalia?
The Kenyan, Andrew Mwangura, programme coordinator for the Seafarers' Assistance Programme, is convinced that influential clan militias support and organise the attacks. “The men pulling the strings are big fish. They operate from Europe, America or from the Arabian Peninsula. They have networks with international contacts and are very wealthy people.”
Ransom negotiations are being carried out by telephone and sometimes the proverbial suitcases full of money change hands in the lobbies of hotels in European capitals. According to experts, approximately $ 100 million have been pressed by syndicates during past years. Piracy has become a regional economic factor.
The suspicion that this may be used or perhaps even initiated by larger terrorist organisations is manifest. Intelligence services have identified this threat over many years. The CIA’s evaluation on this matter is very clear: terror groups have launched a crucial seafront against western nations. The terrorists want to cut off vital trade connections. But even this knowledge and distant operations in Iraq and Afghanistan against terror networks will not eliminate the breeding ground of piracy.
Now, one of the bearers of hope is the moderate Islamist, Sheik Scharif Achmed, Somalia’s President since the beginning of the year. Ironically, he had been considered to be part of the Al-quaida network by the US and was temporarily arrested by US troops. In April 2009 the UN agreed to support the country’s new government with $ 200 million, seeing the problem’s roots in the anarchy and insecurity on shore, rather than at sea.
List of operations and participating nations
• “Atalanta“ (EU):
Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy
(6 frigates, 2 support vessels, Orion P-3A and P-3C, Breguet-Atlantique)
• “Allied Protector” (NATO, from SNMG1):
Portugal, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, US (associated under national command)
(5 frigates)
• “Combined Task Force 150” (Operation Enduring Freedom, anti-terror):
France, US, United Kingdom, Pakistan
(1 command ship, 3 frigates, 2 support vessels)
• “Combined Task Force 151” (anti-piracy):
US, Turkey, Singapore, South Korea (associated)
(1 destroyer, 1 frigate, 1 cruiser, 3 support vessels)
• Operation under international command (incl. support of the Coast Guard of the Seychelles):
India, China, Malaysia, Japan, Russia, France
(3 destroyers, 3 frigates, 1 patrol boat, 5 support vessels; France’s contribution unknown)
(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in May 2009)
January 1, 2009
Introductory Statement
(Originally published for the launch of the English edition of the Proplyon blog on February 3, 2010, 22:32 CEST)
Before this young blog begins to make its first steps, I would like to say a few words in addition to the short profile on the left, regarding my intentions with this blog.
As already mentioned in summary, I will publish my thoughts on topics and events of my personal as well as professional fields of interest. I will, in particular, try to cover topics which I find interesting to an extent that I want to provide my personal opinion and that they may be worth absorbing the precious time of those that take the trouble to read them.
The topics will probably comprise good ol’ politics, history, defence, religion and philosophy as well as general matters - as far as one can predict what may be of interest to oneself.
Provided that I have the required time, I will publish entries in German and English. However, I want to emphasise that I do not intend to submit to the necessity of a fixed deadline or regularity. Therefore, I ask for the understanding of the reader, should more time elapse until the next entry is published than the reader expects.
I wish all visitors to this site an interesting reading and hope that he or she will treat possible mistakes in terms of spelling, grammar or expressions with clemency, as English is not my native language. Notices, suggestions and opinions are most welcome. However, I reserve the humble right to chose which comments remain on this site.
Before this young blog begins to make its first steps, I would like to say a few words in addition to the short profile on the left, regarding my intentions with this blog.
As already mentioned in summary, I will publish my thoughts on topics and events of my personal as well as professional fields of interest. I will, in particular, try to cover topics which I find interesting to an extent that I want to provide my personal opinion and that they may be worth absorbing the precious time of those that take the trouble to read them.
The topics will probably comprise good ol’ politics, history, defence, religion and philosophy as well as general matters - as far as one can predict what may be of interest to oneself.
Provided that I have the required time, I will publish entries in German and English. However, I want to emphasise that I do not intend to submit to the necessity of a fixed deadline or regularity. Therefore, I ask for the understanding of the reader, should more time elapse until the next entry is published than the reader expects.
I wish all visitors to this site an interesting reading and hope that he or she will treat possible mistakes in terms of spelling, grammar or expressions with clemency, as English is not my native language. Notices, suggestions and opinions are most welcome. However, I reserve the humble right to chose which comments remain on this site.
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