Locked in Time – Looking at Afghanistan

Interview with Combat Journalist Michael Yon on the War in Afghanistan


While the political leadership of ISAF members and of Afghanistan recently met in Kabul to negotiate the future of the war-torn country, including a much-discussed pullout deadline, the hardships endured by soldiers and the Afghan population continues at the various military bases and in the scattered remote villages. One of the few independent journalists who regularly sheds light onto their daily lives and the challenges they encounter is combat journalist and author Michael Yon*. Having been embedded with US and British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, Michael offered his readers an in-depth perspective about both wars until he was disembedded in April 2010 and left Afghanistan. His travel to Thailand led him right into the midst of the turmoil during severe riots in Bangkok, which he covered with impressive photographs and noteworthy reports.

As Michael is again preparing for a new embedded tour with the troops in Afghanistan, Nicolas von Kospoth of defpro.com recently talked with him about the developing situation in Afghanistan and his assessment of what can be done under the given conditions on both the military and the civilian side.


NvK: You will be returning to Afghanistan soon after having been disembedded in April. Despite the short time, many things have changed. Do you expect to come upon a different situation and atmosphere among the troops?

Michael Yon: I do expect there will be some changes. The troops’ morale started to go down under General Stanley McChrystal. I don’t know if it has gone up under General David Petraeus, as I haven’t been there since and things take a long time to trickle down. Being down on the ground is like being on Mars while the Generals are on Saturn – these are two different worlds. In particular, the combat soldiers live on a day-to-day basis of life and death. Some of them are fighting seven days a week. And believe it or not, they often don’t know what is going on in the news. Seriously, I would imagine that there are some soldiers who did not realise that a change of command took place until long after it did. Combat soldiers judge actions, not words, as their lives depend on actions and not words. However, when I return, I definitely expect to see some changes.

NvK: The changes include new guidelines recently issued by the US Department of Defense on how to deal with the media. Do you expect to be treated differently by the military and, in particular, by press officers, or doesn’t this new guidance apply to your work as an embedded combat journalist?

Yon: For most correspondents that are travelling with the troops, the contacts are so deep and so wide-ranging that these memos really don’t mean much. We don’t usually go through the front door. I normally use a back door, a window or a personal contact. It may affect people who come from the outside. But regarding those who are already inside, it is probably too late. You have got to keep in mind that British and American – and certainly Canadians, as they disclose a lot of information – often will give you a lot of information. Sometimes it really is serious, personal stuff and sometimes it is operational information which they want to get out and they can’t through official channels. If they trust you to leave out their names, they will give you valuable information. As you can see from my work during the past years, I am often far ahead of the curve; and a lot of this is due to the many personal contacts.

NvK: Do you think counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts are being effectively carried out in Afghanistan or are these efforts going in the wrong direction?

Yon: Expectation management has been crucial and has failed in Afghanistan. In fact, it failed in Iraq as well, but we managed to turn the situation around, which is mostly due to the work of General Petraeus and his staff. But when it comes to Afghanistan, this is different. I’m sure that German soldiers, coming home from Afghanistan, will confirm that this is something like “Jurassic Park”. This is not something that will look much better in ten, twenty or thirty years – it will take a century. Therefore, expectation management is crucial. We’ve recently seen reports about pulling out until 2014 or at least about handing over responsibility to Afghan security forces by this time. In reality this is nonsense. This is not going to happen. Our involvement in making the Afghanistan operation successful is going to be measured in many decades, if not a century.

NvK: COIN is also a media war. Are the insurgents in Afghanistan currently winning the mainstream media war in the US and Europe?

Yon: I would say that, currently, they are rather winning it. In Afghanistan it is more a matter of fatigue. A lot of people in Europe and in North America don’t care about Afghanistan. It is simply not important to them. Why should it be important to them, other than the danger of terrorist attacks? Centuries have passed by without Afghanistan being of much importance to us, until it became important after 11 September 2001. The increasing expense of lives and of treasure is causing fatigue. I wouldn’t say that the Taliban and the associated groups are sophisticated media experts. Rather, we are just ripe to pullout and some of our “media experts” are incompetent.

NvK: To what kind of mindset is the Coalition confronted in Afghanistan?

Yon: The Afghans and many other people in the region consider time very differently than we do. The way we consider time is: “We’re going to be there at 08:00 sharp, not 08:01.” A lot of Afghans do not know when they were born. When the soldiers feed personal information of locals into our database systems, for which they collect fingerprints, iris scans and personal data, and ask how old they are, the Afghans often cannot give a precise age. However, they know what time of the year they were born. They would tell you that they had been born during the harvest time.

The idea of a pullout in 2014 is a Western idea. The Afghans just plant the corn, raise the corn, pick and eat the corn, wait until the winter is gone and repeat the process. A lot of soldiers will tell you that being in Afghanistan is like living in the 13th or 14th century. By the Afghan calendar it is the year 1389; so the pullout will be in 1393. I have travelled through a lot of countries; Afghanistan is certainly one of the most primitive countries that I have seen. It is not primitive in the sense of a lack of culture. They have a very strong culture and are very smart in their own way; they memorise entire books. But most of their knowledge is locked in a certain period of time.

What the soldiers deployed to Afghanistan have experienced is the way these people learn. They don’t learn through experimentation in the same way that we do. When one Taliban leader has done something in a certain way and gets killed, the next one does things a little bit different. They evolve as people die.

NvK: Are these aspects which the military must understand to effectively carry out the training of Afghan forces and is this being considered in the training process?

Yon: Americans have learned a hard lesson in Iraq. We learned lessons a bit slower in Afghanistan, but you learn lessons quickly when you are bleeding. Our troops are always trying new combinations and do realise that culture is crucial. But you have to consider that there are many different cultures in Afghanistan. Therefore, you have to know where you go in Afghanistan before you start to study the local culture.

NvK: In early July, General Petraeus assumed his new command in Afghanistan. Only few journalists know Petraeus as well as you do. Do you think he will be able to apply the lessons he learned from Iraq in his new command and will this contribute to accomplish the mission?

Yon: General Petraeus is a brilliant individual and he realises that this is a completely different war. Certainly, nobody will have to point this out to him; in fact, he will be the first to point it out to others. An important thing about counterinsurgency operations is that they are all very different but also have commonalities. To really operate in this sort of environment you have to be an artistic thinker. One part of your mind has to be willing to kill the enemy in all senses. Yet, there is another side of it where that is what you try to avoid. This side includes many social aspects and tools. You need people who are able to see what is necessary and to carry it out.

General McChrystal was not good at this at all; he was completely out of his element. That doesn’t mean that he is not a great warrior. If you are trying to kill bad guys he’s the one for the job. But he doesn’t have this artistic side of his mind that is required for this type of war. That also applies to Brigadier General Daniel Ménard (Canada) who was constantly tripping over his own feet and has recently been fired and now is facing a criminal charge. There is a huge difference between this kind of war and a conventional force-on-force conflict.

One thing we have to learn is not to make the same mistakes over and over again, which includes throwing money at the problems. Money is important – General Petraeus will also tell you that money is ammunition in this fight. But it has to be done intelligently. When the German forces lost several soldiers in the attacks in April, the political leadership announced that they would send more heavy equipment to Afghanistan. But they just don’t seem to get the point. The insurgents will take any armoured vehicle made on this planet and blast it into the clouds.

NvK: Indeed, these attacks and their consequences have been a major issue in Germany, also leading the German Defence Minister to speak of a war-like situation in Afghanistan for the first time.

Yon: We’ve seen the same with Americans in Somalia: the refusal of top political leadership to acknowledge that we are in a serious fight and that our soldiers need adequate equipment. Our soldiers there needed armour and suffered for lack of armour. We’ve seen it with the British in Basra, Iraq, and now we see it in Afghanistan. When I was with the British last year, they kept pointing out to me that we’re not in a war. But I kept saying: “If this is not a war, I don’t know what is! We’re being attacked every single day. We’re fighting seven days a week.” And now we’re seeing the Germans doing the same thing with their armoured vehicles.

When I was with British soldiers in Basra in 2007, one of their tanks was hit very hard and I reported it. The British apparently thought that their tanks were invulnerable or couldn’t be penetrated. Meanwhile, our tanks and armoured vehicles were being blown to pieces. Massive tank parts were laying a hundred meters away after an explosion. There still is this idea that armour is the solution. But it doesn’t matter how much armour you’ve got; they will just make the bombs bigger, which is quite easy. Sometimes you need armour, sometimes just boots.

Another problem are the rules of engagement. When reported in twelve different articles in 2006 that we are losing the Afghan war and that it has every potential to get worse than Iraq, nobody believed me. I received huge flak in the United States for these reports. The fact that we are losing the war is also because of the rules of engagement (ROE). On the one hand, the ROE have to be tightened, as every time we kill civilians we pay for it. At the same time, these ROE should have been changed back in 2004 because it’s hurting the morale of the troops as they don’t feel they can effectively defend themselves.

I was told in 2009 by a very well-connected Afghan that the insurgents were specifically going to target the Germans and to start interdicting routes in the German area of responsibility. That was part of the next iteration of their strategy, which clearly has started to happen. When they lose more and more friends this will increasingly affect the German troops’ morale. I can assure you that these attacks are traumatic. Gunshots are one thing (even if seeing someone being shot is serious stuff), but it’s nothing like bombs. Bomb attacks are incredibly traumatic events. Once they start seeing these things happen to their comrades or are themselves involved in bomb attacks, it will be hard to persuade them to follow these rules of engagement. Only the most disciplined soldiers will do it.

In fact, it is contradictory to immediate survival. What the ROE are telling the soldiers to do is to endanger themselves for soldiers deployed in the future. Meanwhile, the soldiers in Afghanistan today are paying – at least in part – for what soldiers may have done in 2002 or 03 or 04 or... Mistakes have a cumulative effect and especially so in Afghan society where there is a strong culture of revenge. Our soldiers and the British are superbly disciplined and trained but the inevitable mistakes add up.

NvK: That is also something which is difficult to make people at home understand. Do you still see enough support and patience in the population to go all the way, considering the many voices in Europe and North America calling to pull out as soon as possible?

Yon: I think there will only be patience if we start to see progress. If I start to see demonstrable progress, I will be the first to report it. There is no question that there is progress in some areas, including within the Afghan National Army and other Afghan security forces. But when you add everything up and get down to the bottom line, I would say that at this point there is no overall progress.

However, let’s rewind the tapes back to Iraq in 2006. We were losing the war at that time. When Petraeus took over in January 2007 it was looking dicey and I was very worried about the outcome. But we then saw the situation turn around.

NvK: So what about support and patience within the population in Afghanistan?

Yon: In Afghanistan there are indications that it may also turn around. You have got to keep in mind that many or most Afghans still hate the Taliban. I received several private e-mails from Afghanistan about a young man who was recently kidnapped and held hostage by the Taliban. They cut off this kid’s fingers yesterday. These kind of things don’t happen every once in a while; they happen every day. These are things that make the population hate the Taliban.

But just compare it to Iraq: many people there didn’t like Saddam Hussein. But they knew the rules of how to survive within this system. They wanted him dead, but they preferred him to what came with the war. You will find the same thing among Afghans. They want consistency – we are not providing that. In their eyes, we are not providing justice, while the Taliban do. Afghans joke that the Taliban provide justice cheaper and faster. It’s not always what they want, but at least they have a decision and can get back to their normal lives. It’s hard to fight against that.

It’s difficult to say how many villages there are in Afghanistan. I have seen an official figure stating that there are about 40,000 villages. In many of these villages the people have never met any Coalition soldiers. If they met a German soldier tomorrow, they might think he is Russian, although the war has already lasted for more than eight years. So these villagers don’t see that our forces are really effective. Iraq was an urban war with major cities such as Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Fallujah, etc. Afghanistan is mostly “out in the sticks” with only a few big cities and 80 per cent of the people living in small villages.

NvK: In your book “Moment of Truth in Iraq” you described what you call the “Awakening of Anbar.” Considering the current situation and conditions, would this uprising of the population against the insurgents be possible in Afghanistan or is this already happening in some places?

Yon: From an anthropological point of view, despite some similarities, the tribes in Afghanistan are very different from the tribes in Iraq. There already had been an “awakening” by the Afghans against the Taliban when we invaded the country in 2001. They really hated the Taliban and helped us beat them fair and square. They helped us beat the weeds in their garden and then we ran off to fight in the garden in Iraq and stopped paying attention to Afghanistan, allowing the weeds to grow back. In fact, some commanders in Afghanistan say that it is literally like cutting weeds, as the insurgents grow back so fast. And it’s true. We have been in the war since 2001. Kids who were eight years old then are now at the full fighting age of 16 and grew up with fighting around them.

The amount of Coalition troops is too few to show the necessary presence. Some provinces have almost no troops in them, such as the Ghor Province or the Bamiyan Province. The leadership is now talking about turning some of these provinces over to Afghan control in July 2011. That is going to be smoke and mirrors. In reality, places like Bamiyan are already turned over because we’re not there. We’ll only have to pull out the few troops from Ghor Province in central Afghanistan and will be able to say that we pulled out there as well. You will probably hear from politicians in mid 2011 that we pulled out of several provinces. But these will be provinces in which we never have had many troops.

NvK: Karsai recently stated at the Kabul Conference that he wants Afghanistan to look after its security on its own as early as 2014 and received international support for this plan. Is this a realistic deadline considering ongoing problems of corruption, drug issues, lack of training, etc.?

Yon: It is not realistic at all. I don’t know when we will really be able to turn over all Provinces. It may take as long as twenty to thirty years, but certainly not in 2014. That’s like planting an acorn and saying that it will become a fully grown oak tree by 2014 – you simply can’t do it unless you’ve got some kind of science or magic up your sleeve. It will take a hundred years. Just look at the German Army, which today is one of the finest armies in the world. The German Armed Forces were not built in twenty years. It takes generations to build up a non-commissioned officer corps. It takes a very long time to create competence, to train soldiers and to build up institutions – there is so much to running an Army. Also, in Afghanistan we are not rebuilding but, rather, building from scratch. The term “rebuilding” is misused by seemingly every involved country.

Of course the United States and other ISAF members have expeditionary armies which can project force. Afghanistan doesn’t need to worry about having a large air force or assets to protect against ballistic missiles or similar exterior threats. But they are still a long way from being capable of projecting force within Afghanistan. If I’m correct, it took Iraq until 2008 to start to project significant force within its own territory. You also have to keep in mind that the Iraqis were more advanced than the Romanians were fifteen years ago. You couldn’t swing a cat in Iraq without hitting somebody with a master’s degree or a Ph.D. Their education system was very good with many great schools all over the country. I can’t remember having ever seen someone studying the Koran; they studied mathematics or even English. In Afghanistan you sometimes feel like Fred Flintstone will be coming around the corner any moment being chased by a Tyrannosaurus. In most places, the idea of a school is just a dream.

NvK: Recently, a paper by former Harvard professor Robert Blackwill presented the idea of separating Afghanistan into a “safe” Northern Afghanistan and a troublesome Southern Afghanistan. Given the conditions that you described, do you support such an approach or wouldn’t this rather lead to new, perhaps even more complicated problems? Afghanistan is not Central Europe of the 1950s.

Yon: That is something about which I talked quite a lot with Afghans and with foreigners who have lived for a long time in Afghanistan. It is interesting, as in 2005 the same discussion came up in Iraq and the Americans thought about splitting up Iraq into three parts: a Sunni, a Shia and a Kurdish part. People I talked to in Iraq asked me if we were crazy. Most of the Iraqis thought that it was a ridiculous idea.

However, in Afghanistan this is different. There are many Afghans who think that it is probably a good idea to split up. A lot of Afghans and some foreigners who have lived there for longer periods of time believe that Afghanistan is inching towards a civil war. There already have been civil wars in Afghanistan before and after the Soviet invasion, so many people think that this could happen again. I don’t have a personal opinion on the idea of splitting Afghanistan into parts, yet. I think that within the next year I will form one as I travel the country and talk with people. But from what some people, including Afghans say, the idea seems to be more feasible in Afghanistan.

NvK: From what you have seen from the units you have been embedded with in Afghanistan, are the troops adequately equipped to do their job and do you see vital differences within the Coalition in terms of equipment and capabilities?

Yon: There are huge differences. The US troops are typically very well outfitted. Practically the only thing that the soldiers have been complaining about is that the M16 and the 5.56 ammunition are weak – insurgents are hit and keep on running. But that is something practically everybody knows. Except for that, the US soldiers are well equipped and resourced. Naturally, there are many units at remote bases that may run low on ammunition supplies. But that is something normal in a war. The British forces, however, are not as well equipped. It is almost as if they treat the British soldiers like civil servants. I have high respect for British soldiers and so to see them under-equipped upsets me, even though I am American. The lack of helicopters for the British forces in Afghanistan is mind-boggling. When you don’t have enough troops to operate in such a large country and in this kind of environment you need to be able to quickly move around the ones you have and make them virtual troops. The British soldiers are very courageous, very well trained and insufficiently equipped.

NvK: The lack of transport helicopters and adequate fire support, as well as political pressure, force soldiers to patrol in heavily armoured vehicles and, thereby, to lose the direct contact with the population which they had in the early years of the operation. You described in your book that this direct contact has been a very important aspect during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

Yon: It is counterintuitive to think that you are safe behind armour. One thing you will hear American or British soldiers say is that the thicker the armour is, the least likely you are to get out of it. They just hate to have to get out of their tanks quickly. It seems far safer inside the armour than to be on the outside. However, in reality, it can often be much safer to dismount from the armour. The vehicles may be important to help you get somewhere or to get out of somewhere, but often the last place you want to be is inside a vehicle.

The soldiers of a Stryker unit which I was with in Iraq got out of the vehicles and walked, keeping the Strykers behind them. That is something which the Germans learned in World War II, and the Russians more recently, about operating with tanks: let the infantry go in first because they spot things. You can’t see these things from within the armoured vehicle and will get blown up. Furthermore, you have ten soldiers inside one vehicle who may all die when the vehicle hits the big bomb. When they are outside as individuals only two or three are killed. What is very important: you spot bombs far more often. US soldiers learned in Iraq that many of the local people would tell you where to find bombs. They would not jump in front of a tank to stop and tell you that. But when we were walking, people would come and tell us where to find bombs all the time.

Not only that you will not spot bombs, but you also become an irritant when you’re driving through the streets. Just in late July some Americans had another vehicle accident in Kabul and there was yet another riot. You can’t walk everywhere; we’d never get anything done. Often you just have to drive, but it comes with a cumulative cost all the way around.

Direct contact is better than counter-IED technology and techniques. If the local people don’t want you to get blown up, you won’t get blown up. If they want you to get blown up, there is a high chance you are going to die. So the natural idea is to get into the vehicles as soon as people around you start to get blown to pieces. A lot of that comes from political decisions. It is a hard lesson and the German soldiers might go through the same learning curve that the US soldiers have gone through in Iraq and Afghanistan.

NvK: Many talk of merely training the Afghan soldiers and security forces – German politicians often enough present this approach as a universal remedy. Is this approach sufficient or is the example of leadership, courage and reliability in the field required, as you described being a precious lesson from Iraq?

Yon: Building the Afghan government is our only ticket out that includes success as an end-state. Insofar as building the army, teaching combat skills is often focused on technical skills. Anybody who is physically fit, is motivated, and has a sufficient amount of brains and courage can be trained to become a combat soldier.

But there is more to forming a capable combat soldier than just training. Our soldiers have to go into combat with them, also because we need to know what they need to know. We have to see if our training is effective. And in many cases you have to drop your whip on them and discipline them. That is something that we experienced with the Iraqis in the beginning and it is the same with the Afghans: You can do all this great training and then, when they go out on a mission and you stop watching them, they start to be sloppy. During some of the last missions I went on with Afghan forces they were doing crazy things. The very first thing Iraqis and Afghans did every time we came to a road was to walk down this road. So we had to teach them again and again that walking down the road is how you are most likely to be blown to pieces. Therefore, you have to be out on the missions with them to see if they learn important things like that.

NvK: Often, it is by asking the simplest questions that you come the closest to solving a problem. From what you have experienced in your contact with the Afghan population, which are the questions that the Allies should ask Afghans to effectively help them in solving their problems?

Yon: “How can we help you and how can you help us to help you?” Iraqis and Afghans are just like many other people: when you give them something, they want more. You give them a desk and they ask for a chair, you give them a chair and they ask for a lamp, you give them a lamp and they want a computer. Therefore, it has to be a mutual process and it has to be done at grassroots level.

The large projects, such as the third turbine for the hydro-electric Kajakai Dam in the north of Helmand Province – an operation led by British troops – let Afghan people believe that things would change quickly. They thought they would receive electricity soon, but many people nearby still don’t have any electricity. Problems with these large projects make expectation management difficult, whereas smaller projects around the individual villages are very important too. That is where you need to dig in and ask people what can be done at the village level. We are not going to solve all the problems of Afghanistan at once. We have to start to realise that even fifty years from now many people out there will probably never have had electricity in their homes. That is just the way it is going to be.

So when it comes to the questions to be asked, it should be: “What can we do with the resources that are available on the local level in your village in order to help you and how can you help us? Because we’re not going to make it for you, you have to contribute.”

NvK: Thank you very much, Michael and good luck on your next trip to Afghanistan.

(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in July 2010. A German translation of the interview can be read in the German edition of Propylon. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)

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* Michael Yon is a former Green Beret and a native of Winter Haven, Fl. who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael’s dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work has been featured on “Good Morning America,” The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets around the world. Michael is also the author of the book “Moment of Truth in Iraq” which is packed with exciting and heart-rending tales from the battlefields. His dispatches, complemented by scores of great photographs from his trips, can be followed at www.michaelyon-online.com.

Laser Power Beaming – Creating the “Eternal UAV”

Interview with Tom Nugent, President and Co-founder of LaserMotive


Since the demonstration of the first functional laser in May 1960, laser science and use of laser beams in everyday life has made gigantic leaps. Despite the progress of the past 50 years, much remains to be discovered in this field of technology. Defence applications traditionally use lasers to guide weapons or to mark, damage, or even destroy targets. Seattle-based LaserMotive has demonstrated a further ability of the red beam of light: transmitting power. Nicolas von Kospoth of defpro.com talked to Tom Nugent [1], President and Co-founder of LaserMotive, about the company’s recent advancements in using laser technology to power different mobile platforms, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and the LaserMotive’s plans to move on in this pioneering field of technology.


NvK: First, could you please give our readers a short overview of LaserMotive?

Tom Nugent: LaserMotive is a start-up company based outside Seattle, Washington. We are commercializing laser power beaming, which is the transmission of energy without wires. LaserMotive was founded in 2007 because component technologies had advanced to the point where the power, efficiency, and cost had all advanced to the point where we believed that laser power beaming was finally practical and economical for niche applications. Our first project was to pursue the NASA-sponsored Power Beaming competition, in order to demonstrate the technology and raise start-up capital from the prize. We won that competition in November 2009, and are now pursuing commercial opportunities, with the unmanned aerial systems (UAS) market being the most promising one to start.

NvK: The thought of laser transmitting power, at first, is a little abstract. Could you please explain the technical principle as well as the possibilities and challenges?

Nugent: In a manner very similar to the way that sunlight is used to generate electricity from solar cells, we use lasers to act as a very bright light on specialized solar cells. The laser beam can be directed in a very controlled manner to a receiver, and the power densities (along with low divergence) available in lasers enables us to deploy these “invisible extension cords” through narrow corridors in the air (in many cases, the beam is less than 1 meter in diameter).

One challenge is that inclement weather, such as fog or heavy rain, can block transmission. We operate in the near-optical region, so we are roughly limited by how far you could see with binoculars or a telescope. Interruptions of power would be managed with on-board energy storage. Another challenge involves eye safety. The optical power densities for power beaming are not immediately harmful to skin or other materials, but the most efficient wavelengths for power beaming lie inside the range of wavelengths which your eye can focus, thereby presenting a hazard to the retina. We deal with this issue with a combination of layered safety systems, including beam shut-off if anything comes close to interrupting the beam.

The possibilities for power beaming extend well beyond UAVs, and are what excite us so much about finally being able to bring this technology to market. Our white paper [2] describes various scenarios for UAV use, both short and long range.

We also see many possibilities in point-to-point power beaming, whether it is for remote sensors around a military encampment or base, or for remote communication relays (e.g., on mountaintops). Disaster relief is another application that could benefit greatly from power beaming. Imagine being able to immediately power cell towers or even an emergency field hospital in a city that has been devastated by an earthquake or hurricane.

Looking further down the road, we are excited by the idea of launching rockets via laser. LaserMotive co-founder Dr. Jordin Kare’s Laser Launch concept propels a rocket by means of a rocket-based heat exchanger heat up inert gas, leaving the more expensive power system on the ground.

NvK: What is the current development status of this technology and what have been the recent achievements in your efforts to further develop laser power beaming?

Nugent: We have developed laser power beaming for ground-based applications to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 [System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment – Ed.] as part of our winning entry in the NASA-sponsored Power Beaming competition. We are further developing it and expect to bring it to TRL 7 [System prototype demonstration in an operational environment – Ed.] in the near future. To date, our system has demonstrated power beaming up to 1 kilometre away, with the receiver creating up to 1 kilowatt of power. Power levels are easy to scale up, and distances can also be increased with different optics.

The last component to be finished and integrated (as part of our TRL 7 effort) is the safety system to make it suitable for use by non-experts. As mentioned in our UAV power beaming white paper, we are also creating an internally-funded demonstration of extended UAV operations with lasers.

NvK: LaserMotive has recently published a white paper on supporting UAVs. Which types of UAVs or other aircraft can use this technology and are there technical limits (e.g. due to weight/capacity of receiver and battery)?

Nugent: We see the first application of power beaming as enhancing the endurance of small UAVs that are already electrically powered, replacing part or all of the batteries on board. However, there are no inherent limits to the power we can deliver, and we can easily match the power-to-weight ratios of small combustion engines with our receivers plus high-performance electric motors. The advantages of electric motors in terms of reliability, efficiency, and noise are well known, so we would hope to work with manufacturers of larger UAVs to develop laser-electric versions in the future.

One square meter of receiver area can provide several kilowatts of electric power, and receivers can be integrated into wings or body surfaces or (subject to aerodynamic and mechanical limits) carried as external panels. For some applications, all power could be provided by the laser, with little or no on-board power storage. For others, where the vehicle needs to fly out of range of the laser or to stay on station for some time despite interruptions in the laser beam, batteries or fuel cells can supply power when needed, and then be recharged in flight when laser power is available. But as long as the vehicle has laser power available for more than a few minutes per flight, we can reduce the overall vehicle weight by replacing batteries with our receivers.

NvK: At which range can laser power beaming support UAVs and which weather conditions and flight patterns are required to transfer power? Is it possible to simultaneously transfer power to multiple UAVs?

Nugent: Our current power beaming system has been demonstrated to work over 1 km, and we expect to be able to reach 10 km or more using the same high-efficiency technologies. We also have conceptual designs for systems which would work over almost any range - even from the Earth to the Moon! - but right now those would be significantly more costly per watt delivered. Clouds, fog, and heavy precipitation will block our lasers, but those are generally unfavorable conditions for flying small UAV’s in any case. Flight patterns can be very flexible; as long as a vehicle is within line of sight of a laser, it can receive power. However, we can trade off some of that flexibility for system cost and complexity; it’s easier to build a beam director that only has to track a plane circling overhead than one that has to aim anywhere in the sky.

We’re currently working on the most straightforward power links: one laser system and beam director powering one UAV at a time. That can include charging several UAVs, but sequentially, with the charged UAVs flying on batteries until their next turn in the beam. But nothing prevents several such links operating at the same time; they would not interfere with each other.

NvK: Many UAV manufacturers come from abroad, including a score of Israeli and Western European companies. Are you looking at these markets and do you see opportunities for co-operation in the short to mid term?

Nugent: We’re certainly interested in the possibility of working with manufacturers and users of UAVs worldwide. For a small company introducing new and potentially revolutionary technology, the complexities of export regulations and the logistical requirements of global collaborations are a bit daunting, so our immediate focus is on domestic opportunities. But we would certainly encourage anyone interested in our power beaming systems to contact us, and we’ll see what we can do.

NvK: In your white paper you describe different scenarios which give the impression that, indeed, there are few limits and a score of possibilities to discover and develop. This includes relay mirrors on airborne platforms or flying power beaming systems that could be consider as “laser power tankers.” How far from reality are such solutions so far?

Nugent: Relay systems are currently only in the conceptual stage for us. There have been technical demonstrations of high-altitude (low power) laser relays, but developing that capability for power transmission still needs to be done. Similarly, there have been demonstrations of high power lasers beamed from aircraft for directed energy purposes (e.g., the Airborne Laser), but for power transfer the requirements are different and would need to be developed.

The time required until such systems could be deployed depends primarily on interest. We are taking a staged approach to technology development. We are starting commercialization at the lower power levels (e.g., hundreds of watts up to a few kilowatts) and shorter distances (e.g., up to 1 kilometer) and will expand to higher power levels and longer ranges once we’ve demonstrated commercial success at the smaller-scale systems. By growing organically in this manner, we not only gain experience in many technical and operational issues needed for the bigger systems, but we also can work with regulators to understand how power beaming is different from other uses of lasers.

NvK: Which other possibilities to use this technology in military applications beyond aerial platforms can you imagine? Are there projects to apply laser power beaming to defence areas beyond the field of UAVs?

Nugent: There are many applications of ground-based point-to-point power beaming for both military and civilian use. Remote sensors (especially for perimeter use at smaller bases) and remote communications relays (e.g., microwave relay towers on mountain tops) are two areas we think could benefit greatly from power beaming. In both cases, electrical power is delivered either by swapping out batteries or by running power lines over long distances, oftentimes through areas where it is expensive and/or undesirable to run lines.

We also think there are applications in disaster relief. Imagine being able to rapidly re-establish cell phone towers or even power a field hospital in a city where the power grid is down and roads are too damaged to easily allow moving generators into the city. We’ve spoken with personnel in the US military about their disaster relief efforts in Haiti, and there is definite interest in this application.

NvK: Sponsors such as Boeing may give you a head-start on your competition. How do you assess the current (international) competition in this field of technology?

Nugent: As far as I know, we are the first company with proven hardware to be selling laser power beaming systems, certainly at these power levels and distances. We are deeply appreciative of The Boeing Company’s sponsorship, and we look forward to partnering with them in future power beaming applications if possible. Down the road, once we prove that money can be made in this new market of power beaming, we expect direct competitors will arise but they will be facing the learning curve that we’ve already climbed. In the meantime, we’re competing against existing products which are substitutes, i.e., batteries, fuel cells, etc.

NvK: What are the next steps for laser power beaming at LaserMotive, including industrial co-operation? Which are the next key milestones of your projects?

Nugent: We are going to be demonstrating an extended endurance helicopter using internal funds in the next few months. We’re looking broadly at UAV companies right now to find the right partner for creating the first “eternal UAV” - an electric UAV powered by laser. We’ve also been contacted by many companies interested in other specific uses that we can’t divulge yet.

NvK: Thank you very much, Mr Nugent.

(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in June 2010. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)

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Notes:
[1] Before assuming the presidency of LaserMotive, Thomas Nugent was a project scientist at Intellectual Ventures Labs, a multidisciplinary early-stage R&D laboratory in Bellevue, WA. Mr. Nugent has also served as Research Director for LiftPort Inc., a pioneer in the development of the modern space elevator concept. While at LiftPort, he led the research team that outlined a realistic path to space elevator development, as well as working on a variety of milestone tests of robotic lifters. He has been involved in liquid‐fuelled rocket engine development and testing through the MIT Rocket Team, and advanced fusion propulsion research at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Mr. Nugent holds a B.S. in Physics from University of Illinois at Urbana‐Champaign, and M.S. in Materials Science and Engineering from MIT.
[2] LaserMotive’s recently published White Paper on Power Beaming for UAVs can be viewed here: http://tinyurl.com/2wjlczx (PDF 3.33 MB, 9 pages)

Namibia - Developing a Small, Highly Mobile and Professional Force

Interview with the Namibian Defence Minister, Maj.Gen. (rtd) Namoloh


As the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) approaches its 20th anniversary in 2010, the country still faces many challenges resulting from a range of complex issues, including the process of integrating former opponents, a general lack of resources and the demanding ongoing task of maintaining and improving defence capabilities. Last year, the Namibian Ministry of Defence (MoD) launched a five-year Strategic Plan to effectively meet current and future challenges. Nicolas von Kospoth of defpro.com talked to the Namibian Defence Minister, the Honourable Maj. Gen. (rtd) Charles DNP Namoloh[1], about the ongoing development of the NDF’s capabilities and the Defence Force’s prospects.


NvK: The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) is comparably young, celebrating its 20th anniversary in 2010. What have been the main challenges during these first years in creating a unified and capable Defence Force in terms of personnel and equipment?

Namoloh: The main challenges were to mold and unify young men and women who were trained to hate and kill each other into a national defence force which the Namibian people can be proud of. The other issue was to depoliticise them by banning displays of political party colours (flags), songs and active participation in political party rallies. What they were not prevented to do was to vote or belong to a political party of their choice.

NvK: How do you assess the progress of the past years in consolidating the armed forces and in meeting the country’s defence requirements?

Namoloh: Progress can be measured in that, despite our background, no blood was shed between the erstwhile enemies. NDF members have reconciled very well and set an example for the whole nation. Loyalty to the government of the day in accordance with democratic norms was fostered. Training institutions were established, although the country still relies on training from partner countries. I can say that a lot still remains to be done, such as establishing our own staff college and other training institutions.

NvK: With the Strategic Plan for the period of 2009-2013 you have created a document in line with the Government’s “Vision 2030” plan. What are the key pillars of this strategic plan to further support the positive development of the NDF?

Namoloh: The MoD Strategic Plan’s pillars are essentially four strategic themes upon which the plan is built. They are as follows:

(1) Governance and Service;
(2) Operational Excellence;
(3) Capacity Building;
(4) Resource Mobilization and Management.

Good governance determines the quality of life of citizens and corporations, as well as the quality of relations between ethnic groups, communities, regions and within the nation as a whole. It plays an important role in attaining the goals of the Vision 2030.

Operation Excellence is a result of the efficient business processes of the MoD. The main objective of this category is to ensure the sustained capability and readiness of the Namibian Defence Force and equipment for efficient deployment against any perceived or actual threat.

Capability Building means that efficient defence requires four basic elements: (i) human resources, (ii) infrastructure and facilities, (iii) military hardware and supplies, and (iv) intelligence and information support. The main objective of this category is to operate a strategic human resources plan that maintains relevant staff capacity at all levels of the MoD operations linked to its resource.

With regard to Resource Mobilisation and Management, one must consider that the MoD has been operating within the parameters of resource constraints. While the Institution has had consistent annual budgets, given current realities and trends, the resource level is not sufficient to effectively position the organisation at the cutting edge of its mission. There is inadequacy in a number of areas including a broadly qualified work force, working conditions, key military hardware, and infrastructure and support facilities.

The main objective of Resource Mobilisation and Management is to correct the mismatch between MoD budget and strategies to ensure adequate resource levels, priorities, linkages and controls.

NvK: Namibia is a country with a huge variety of landscapes and climatic conditions and has long borders which are difficult to watch and control. How does the NDF cope with these challenges and in what way can you benefit from being part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in this regard?

Namoloh: Indeed, Namibia’s landscape is manifold and presents challenges for defence. In addition to this, it is a relatively vast country with a small population. We have plans to respond to these challenges. With regard to what benefit we can get being part of SADC, I can say that being a member of the SADC mutual Defence Pact minimises the possibility of an inter-regional armed conflict since we have mechanisms to address defence and security issues affecting the region and the world. However, I should add that being a member of SADC does not absolve us from addressing our national security as well as to defend our region as the price of collective defence. Most importantly, it provides instruments for confidence building measures between member states.

NvK: One of the most important assets of the Air Force is the Chinese-built FT-7 fighter aircraft. How did you tackle the integration process of a supersonic fighter into the Air Force and how is the military co-operation of the NDF with China proceeding in general?

Namoloh: The NDF is in the process of modernising its equipments. The Namibia Air Force was preceded by the NDF Air Wing, which was equipped with the US-donated Cessna aircraft and some helicopters purchased from other countries [2]. As a sovereign state we buy from countries which meet our requirements and are ready to do business with us in an honourable manner and with mutual respect. [The Minister would not further comment on matters of military co-operation with China. – Ed.]

NvK: Obviously the Namibian Navy significantly benefits from the co-operation with Brazil. Does this bilateral friendship extend to other services of the NDF and can you give any details on future steps and prospects regarding this particular co-operation?

Namoloh: Indeed, we have an agreement with Brazil which was signed in the mid 1990’s and includes, among others, development of the Maritime Wing to a fully fledged Navy. This was achieved through training of commanders at various levels as well as naval staff officers. The process of implementation is still in full swing. With regard to whether the bilateral agreement is extended to other services, my answer is no. I should, however, add that there is nothing that prevents us from buying assets for other services from Brazil, and when you buy new assets you will need training to operate those assets.

NvK: Some of the military equipment of the NDF is ageing and may not be enough in terms of quantity to meet the requirements of such a large country. Are you considering any further procurement or modernisation of equipment during the next five years?

Namoloh: The Namibian Defence Force, like other militaries, is facing the future with ageing equipments. Most of the equipment in the NDF’s arsenal was donated by the SWAPO [3] and was rather suited for non-conventional warfare. The procurement is dictated by need but constrained by limited resources. Namibia, like other countries, was affected by the global economic downturn. Besides this, national defence is competing for financial resources with other government programmes such as education, health and many others. The will to modernise, therefore, will be affected by the priority to address other national programmes by the government.

NvK: Do you see any opportunities of establishing military co-operation with European countries? Would you wish for an increased co-operation and exchange of experience with Western armed forces?

Namoloh: Namibia is ready to co-operate with any country, European countries included. As an example, the integration and training of members of the Namibian Defence Force was carried out with the help of the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic of Germany is also providing the NDF with material and training through the German Advisory Team based in Windhoek. NDF members continue to receive training from many Western countries, including the US, the United Kingdom, Germany and Greece. However, we maintain that cooperation should be without strings attached and with respect to Namibia’s sovereignty.

NvK: As a member of the African Union you contribute to peace-keeping missions such as the United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). How important are such multinational operations for Namibia and will Namibia be able to extend its contributions to peace-keeping and stabilisation missions of the African Union in the future?

Namoloh: Namibia was partly a product of the international community. During the Liberation Struggle the international community gave us material, political and moral support and the UN played a midwife role when the United Nation Transitional Group (UNTAG) was deployed in Namibia. As citizens of the world, we feel that we have to contribute to international peace and security. Participating in peace support mission is the means for our country to contribute to international peace.

The Constitution of Namibia Article 96 (b) – (c) states: “The state shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it: (a) promotes international cooperation, peace and security; (b) creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among nations.” Our participation in peace missions is not limited to the UN and the African Union. The SADC region is in the process of building the capacity of the SADC Standby Force which will be able to participate in peace support missions as part of the African Union Standby Force or on its own.

NvK: As our last question, we would like to ask what your personal visions and aims are for the future of the Namibian Defence Force.

Namoloh: The Vision of the NDF, as stated in the Defence Policy which was tabled in parliament early this year (2010), is “develop and maintain a small, highly mobile and professional force which excels in service through discipline, vigorous training and possession of modern armament”. My personal vision is to realise this dream.

NvK: Thank you very much, Mr Namoloh.

(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in March 2010. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)


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Notes:
[1] Maj.Gen. (rtd) Charles Namoloh (Ho-Chi-Minh) has been appointed Minister of Defence of the Republic of Namibia in 2005. Mr Namoloh’s military career began after going into exile to Zambia in 1974, where he quickly rose through SWAPO’s military ranks, becoming Plan Chief of Staff under General Dimo Hamaambo in 1979. He headed the SWAPO military team working with UNTAG and SADF/SWATF to form a new defence force during the transition to independence. In 1990 he was head of the defence force team that worked with the British Military Advisory Team to set up NDF structures. He served as Chief of Staff in the NDF under Army Commander Major General Solomon Hawala until 1995, when he was switched to a diplomatic post in warring Angola. After eight years in Luanda, during which Namibia sent soldiers into Angola to flush out Unita (1999-2000) forces, he was transferred to New Delhi and subsequently assumed his current office.
[2] Namibia today operates Russian Mi-35 Hind-Es (2), French SA 319 Alouette III’s (2), as well as Indian HAL Chetak (2) and one HAL Cheetah.
[3] The SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) is the governing political party in Namibia, evolving from the former liberation movement. It has been the governing party in Namibia since independence in 1990.

Towards a New European Security Pact – A Russian Perspective

Interview with Mr Agakishiev, associate professor at the historical faculty of the MSU

Following the announcement of an initiative in mid 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev presented a draft treaty on European security in November 2009. According to the President, it is aimed at creating a new security structure that will legally seal the principle of indivisible security in international law and prevent any state or organisation from strengthening their security at the expense of others. It is also to provide mutual military assistance for all European nations. The Russian initiative has been welcomed by Medvedev’s counterparts in Western Europe as well as by the heads of NATO, the EU and the OSCE. However, the willingness of Western countries and organisations to openly endorse the Russian push towards a new pan-European security pact can so far be summarised as being rather reluctant and cautious.

In order to shed some light onto the Russian initiative, which seems to have temporarily stalled with the freezing temperatures of hibernal Europe, Nicolas von Kospoth of defpro.com talked to Ismail Aliyevich Agakishiev*, deputy director of the Information Analysis Centre of Post-Soviet States studies and associate professor in the historical faculty of the Moscow State University (MSU).

NvK: Mr Agakishiev, is the Russian plan for a new security pact “just another document”, or could it have a positive influence on the security of possible member countries and their neighbours?

Agakishiev: The Russian project undoubtedly deserves consideration as an attempt to build a new greater European model. However, the motivation for Russia’s aspirations lies not only in its attempt to totally reorganise the European security system, which was formally shaped by the 1990 Paris peace treaty. It is being initiated as a response to events in Georgia and the acknowledgement of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as by the Balkan Wars, the division of Yugoslavia and the separation of Kosovo from Serbia.

The Russian side is convinced that an entirely new situation has arisen, one that the existing international legal norms should have prevented. However, that’s not how things turned out in practice. It has become fashionable to manipulate different parts of treaties, their weaknesses, in as much as they were concluded before the split-up of the USSR and the final disintegration of Yugoslavia. It wasn’t possible to avoid war in Europe, and that’s why Russia considers it necessary to change the stipulations of the treaty.

As for the strengthening of their neighbours’ security, there are certainly a number of points in the Russian draft regarding the direct defence of sovereignty, the prevention of aggressive actions and other infringements on territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the general European attitude is very cautious. They need their own model, not one based on Russian convictions and postulates. It is here where the level of trust becomes apparent and the continental split can be ascertained. In the present state of confrontation between Russia and Georgia, as well as Moscow’s disapproval of the “Kosovo precedent”, it would seem to be extremely difficult to listen to the Russians and use their model for a future European system. Russia does not have any leverage with which to impose its values, and, indeed, Russia itself is demonstrating a greater and greater resistance to attempts to impose on it other patterns of behaviour and responses.

However, in my opinion, a policy of confrontation with modern Russia is absurd and it is necessary to find common approaches to solving topical problems. Modern Russia is not a country with a totalitarian ideology, but a country which has chosen the path of constructing a democratic state. It is a priori not a menace for the democratic countries of Europe. It is high time to understand this and treat the Russian Federation as a real ally. The president’s proposal can be seen as a real step towards bringing closer together the positions of Russia and the Old World.

NvK: From your point of view, is the Russian project the right approach? Wouldn’t it be better for Russia’s strategic interests, as well as for the modernisation of its industry and military, to become a member of NATO?

Agakishiev: Strategically, proposing one’s own project for discussion is a very skilful diplomatic geopolitical move. However, real allies who would be able not only to say some sympathetic words and express an interest after their examination of the document are rare. Without a base of friends – Russia’s allies – it will be very difficult to promote the new version of the document. There are very few stalwart friends of Russia in the EU. From our point of view, the EU should try to do more than produce their own patterns of security, for example eastward expansion (in the form of the programme of the Eastern Partnership or proposals concerning association with the South Caucasus countries) and the eventual absorption of the Balkans. It is also necessary to consider the opinion of the governing body of Russia and work out joint mutually beneficial and constructive projects in favour of the maintenance of peace and development of co-operation.

Russia joining NATO still seems totally unrealistic in the present geopolitical situation. Co-operation and peaceful co-existence are possible, but the joining of NATO and incorporation into its military system are at the moment virtually impossible for Russia. Yet that does not mean that Russia has always been against joining NATO or that the state should be always opposed to this alliance.

For Russia, economic association with the EU and constructing common economic models would be more attractive. This is the sort of scheme that can lead to the necessity of ensuring common security hereafter.

I suppose that any extreme push to join NATO by Russia, if indeed such a thing ever came about, would really frighten Brussels. Russia interests Europe as an additional market and as a base from which to draw energy supplies, but only if the game is played by the rules of the transatlantic axis. If we draw parallels with the World Trade Organisation, Russia is not being admitted there because of its demands to maintain sovereignty over the banking sphere and other economic sectors. The same sort of schemes is applicable to NATO. If Russia joins NATO, where the consensus vote is applied, Russia will eliminate the system of decision making, which is in any case not entirely a harmonious one (after active eastward expansion).

NvK: What do you think NATO’s reaction to this political move by Russia will be?

Agakishiev: After their expansion, NATO and the EU began paying much more attention to issues of European security, extending their zones of influence. Therefore, for NATO, the prospects for European security are far from a trivial matter. However, the first reaction to the Russian initiative turned out to be quite a cool one. It was voiced by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen himself. Having come to Moscow, he showed an interest in examining the issue, but expressed reservations beforehand, saying that he did not consider it necessary to change anything conceptually in the approaches to European security.

If the EU can be considered to be the essence of European policy and diplomacy, then NATO is substantially full of American influence. This is where the greater coldness to such initiatives in Russia comes from. For the US, the new treaty could become another element in the diplomatic bargaining with Russia on the multidimensional aspects of their relationship. In the present political situation, it is not at all a priority for NATO to change the current correlations of security.

NvK: What are the political challenges of establishing such a security pact? Where are the greatest stumbling blocks on the way to implementing it?

Agakishiev: As has been already mentioned, transatlantic Europe is not interested in a treaty originating in the East. The present security system, judging by the declarations of the leaders of the EU and NATO, needs no change. It allows the possibility of expansion – in particular, the absorption of the Balkans. As a matter of fact, the Kosovo story tangibly spoils the saintly image of universal safety and security. As for Russia, it put forward its argument in the form of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, having made use of the irresponsible actions of the Georgian authorities. Against this background, the advancement of a project dealing with a new agreement on European security by Russia or any other country will be suspected of looking to strengthen the status quo in one form or another. The secession of Kosovo from Serbia and the acknowledgement of its sovereignty are unacceptable for Russia. Also, Europe and the US do not accept the independence of the former Georgian territories. Imagining a situation in which history can be wound back like a cinema reel is very difficult and even stupid. When established principles and stereotypes are introduced into diplomacy in place of legal norms and even common sense, it is impossible to reverse the situation.

NvK: Regarding the current security political challenges of the EU and Russia, who would gain the most from such a security pact? Or would there be mutual and, in particular, equal benefits?

Agakishiev: I think that if the EU doesn’t reject the Russian initiative right away, and enters into a dialogue and introduces its remarks and suggestions, and, in short, give a well-reasoned answer, containing the points of the text that it likes and doesn’t like, this would be a lot more productive and significant for a common understanding of this issue. On the other hand, when the UN Secretary General, during his stay in Moscow says that they are interested in the Russian proposals, but don’t need them, this is unconstructive and wrong. In my opinion, the West should certainly give a detailed answer to the Russians concerning what they like and what they dislike. This wouldn’t impose any additional obligations leading to the unavoidable acceptance of a new treaty on European security. If the EU calls itself Russia’s partner, it would be worth having an explanation. This would be mutually advantageous. If one only thinks about one’s own security, drawing new lines of partition in Europe, this will doom the continent to new conflicts and disputes.

NvK: How would the creation of a pan-European security pact influence the Russian-Chinese relationship? Could it create an increased polarisation between these two giants in the Far East?

Agakishiev: A new pan-European security treaty in this sense of this concept is about a new just system of relations in Europe after two hot world wars and one cold one, as well as the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and would certainly prove advantageous for Russian-Chinese relations. It would make the territory to its east more predictable for China. The new European pact would be by no means anti-Chinese or indeed aimed against anybody else. It would be more likely to regulate international relations in Europe, without touching on external boundaries. Russia as a European and simultaneously Asian power is obliged to build common spaces to its east, as well as to its west and south.

This is the meaning of security agreements – to prevent the continuation of conflict and to introduce a system to resolve disputes in a civilised way.

NvK: If the security pact had already been in force at the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008, what would have been the likely reactions of the members?

Agakishiev: If the new treaty system suggested by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had been functioning during the run-up to the well-known events, the war in South Ossetia could have been avoided. Georgia wouldn’t have taken the risk of restoring its territorial integrity in this way and it cannot be ruled out that this integrity could have been ensured in another way. Nevertheless, any treaty is just a model and real European conflicts have their own specific characters, and sometimes they don’t fit into a common scheme. The actions of participant countries are in practice very difficult to predict, because it is necessary to take into account geopolitical realities and the system of relations.

NvK: What is the estimated timetable for the implementation of such a security pact? When might we see it to come into effect?

Agakishiev: It is a long process, if only because it is still in a draft form. The discussion on reforms in the OSCE and then on the new treaty on a European security system initiated by Russia will last for a long time. It would be naïve to suppose that the Europeans will consent to the Russian suggestions. But Russia should continue diplomatic talks so that its national interests are taken into consideration in Europe’s new configuration.

NvK: Thank you very much, Mr Agakishiev.

(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in January 2010. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)

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* Mr Ismail Aliyevich Agakishiev is deputy director of the Information Analysis Centre of Post-Soviet States studies and associate professor in the historical faculty of the Moscow State University (MSU). Furthermore, he is deputy head of the sub-department of foreign affairs at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH), head of the Scientific Information Centre for Caucasus Studies, RSUH, and general director of the Information Analysis Centre “The Herald of the Caucasus”. Mr Agakishiev is an expert in the field of economic and political problems, particularly in the field of energy security of Russia, the South Caucasus countries and the Caspian region. His doctoral thesis was titled “Energy security of the Caspian region countries.”