Namibia - Developing a Small, Highly Mobile and Professional Force

Interview with the Namibian Defence Minister, Maj.Gen. (rtd) Namoloh


As the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) approaches its 20th anniversary in 2010, the country still faces many challenges resulting from a range of complex issues, including the process of integrating former opponents, a general lack of resources and the demanding ongoing task of maintaining and improving defence capabilities. Last year, the Namibian Ministry of Defence (MoD) launched a five-year Strategic Plan to effectively meet current and future challenges. Nicolas von Kospoth of defpro.com talked to the Namibian Defence Minister, the Honourable Maj. Gen. (rtd) Charles DNP Namoloh[1], about the ongoing development of the NDF’s capabilities and the Defence Force’s prospects.


NvK: The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) is comparably young, celebrating its 20th anniversary in 2010. What have been the main challenges during these first years in creating a unified and capable Defence Force in terms of personnel and equipment?

Namoloh: The main challenges were to mold and unify young men and women who were trained to hate and kill each other into a national defence force which the Namibian people can be proud of. The other issue was to depoliticise them by banning displays of political party colours (flags), songs and active participation in political party rallies. What they were not prevented to do was to vote or belong to a political party of their choice.

NvK: How do you assess the progress of the past years in consolidating the armed forces and in meeting the country’s defence requirements?

Namoloh: Progress can be measured in that, despite our background, no blood was shed between the erstwhile enemies. NDF members have reconciled very well and set an example for the whole nation. Loyalty to the government of the day in accordance with democratic norms was fostered. Training institutions were established, although the country still relies on training from partner countries. I can say that a lot still remains to be done, such as establishing our own staff college and other training institutions.

NvK: With the Strategic Plan for the period of 2009-2013 you have created a document in line with the Government’s “Vision 2030” plan. What are the key pillars of this strategic plan to further support the positive development of the NDF?

Namoloh: The MoD Strategic Plan’s pillars are essentially four strategic themes upon which the plan is built. They are as follows:

(1) Governance and Service;
(2) Operational Excellence;
(3) Capacity Building;
(4) Resource Mobilization and Management.

Good governance determines the quality of life of citizens and corporations, as well as the quality of relations between ethnic groups, communities, regions and within the nation as a whole. It plays an important role in attaining the goals of the Vision 2030.

Operation Excellence is a result of the efficient business processes of the MoD. The main objective of this category is to ensure the sustained capability and readiness of the Namibian Defence Force and equipment for efficient deployment against any perceived or actual threat.

Capability Building means that efficient defence requires four basic elements: (i) human resources, (ii) infrastructure and facilities, (iii) military hardware and supplies, and (iv) intelligence and information support. The main objective of this category is to operate a strategic human resources plan that maintains relevant staff capacity at all levels of the MoD operations linked to its resource.

With regard to Resource Mobilisation and Management, one must consider that the MoD has been operating within the parameters of resource constraints. While the Institution has had consistent annual budgets, given current realities and trends, the resource level is not sufficient to effectively position the organisation at the cutting edge of its mission. There is inadequacy in a number of areas including a broadly qualified work force, working conditions, key military hardware, and infrastructure and support facilities.

The main objective of Resource Mobilisation and Management is to correct the mismatch between MoD budget and strategies to ensure adequate resource levels, priorities, linkages and controls.

NvK: Namibia is a country with a huge variety of landscapes and climatic conditions and has long borders which are difficult to watch and control. How does the NDF cope with these challenges and in what way can you benefit from being part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in this regard?

Namoloh: Indeed, Namibia’s landscape is manifold and presents challenges for defence. In addition to this, it is a relatively vast country with a small population. We have plans to respond to these challenges. With regard to what benefit we can get being part of SADC, I can say that being a member of the SADC mutual Defence Pact minimises the possibility of an inter-regional armed conflict since we have mechanisms to address defence and security issues affecting the region and the world. However, I should add that being a member of SADC does not absolve us from addressing our national security as well as to defend our region as the price of collective defence. Most importantly, it provides instruments for confidence building measures between member states.

NvK: One of the most important assets of the Air Force is the Chinese-built FT-7 fighter aircraft. How did you tackle the integration process of a supersonic fighter into the Air Force and how is the military co-operation of the NDF with China proceeding in general?

Namoloh: The NDF is in the process of modernising its equipments. The Namibia Air Force was preceded by the NDF Air Wing, which was equipped with the US-donated Cessna aircraft and some helicopters purchased from other countries [2]. As a sovereign state we buy from countries which meet our requirements and are ready to do business with us in an honourable manner and with mutual respect. [The Minister would not further comment on matters of military co-operation with China. – Ed.]

NvK: Obviously the Namibian Navy significantly benefits from the co-operation with Brazil. Does this bilateral friendship extend to other services of the NDF and can you give any details on future steps and prospects regarding this particular co-operation?

Namoloh: Indeed, we have an agreement with Brazil which was signed in the mid 1990’s and includes, among others, development of the Maritime Wing to a fully fledged Navy. This was achieved through training of commanders at various levels as well as naval staff officers. The process of implementation is still in full swing. With regard to whether the bilateral agreement is extended to other services, my answer is no. I should, however, add that there is nothing that prevents us from buying assets for other services from Brazil, and when you buy new assets you will need training to operate those assets.

NvK: Some of the military equipment of the NDF is ageing and may not be enough in terms of quantity to meet the requirements of such a large country. Are you considering any further procurement or modernisation of equipment during the next five years?

Namoloh: The Namibian Defence Force, like other militaries, is facing the future with ageing equipments. Most of the equipment in the NDF’s arsenal was donated by the SWAPO [3] and was rather suited for non-conventional warfare. The procurement is dictated by need but constrained by limited resources. Namibia, like other countries, was affected by the global economic downturn. Besides this, national defence is competing for financial resources with other government programmes such as education, health and many others. The will to modernise, therefore, will be affected by the priority to address other national programmes by the government.

NvK: Do you see any opportunities of establishing military co-operation with European countries? Would you wish for an increased co-operation and exchange of experience with Western armed forces?

Namoloh: Namibia is ready to co-operate with any country, European countries included. As an example, the integration and training of members of the Namibian Defence Force was carried out with the help of the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic of Germany is also providing the NDF with material and training through the German Advisory Team based in Windhoek. NDF members continue to receive training from many Western countries, including the US, the United Kingdom, Germany and Greece. However, we maintain that cooperation should be without strings attached and with respect to Namibia’s sovereignty.

NvK: As a member of the African Union you contribute to peace-keeping missions such as the United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). How important are such multinational operations for Namibia and will Namibia be able to extend its contributions to peace-keeping and stabilisation missions of the African Union in the future?

Namoloh: Namibia was partly a product of the international community. During the Liberation Struggle the international community gave us material, political and moral support and the UN played a midwife role when the United Nation Transitional Group (UNTAG) was deployed in Namibia. As citizens of the world, we feel that we have to contribute to international peace and security. Participating in peace support mission is the means for our country to contribute to international peace.

The Constitution of Namibia Article 96 (b) – (c) states: “The state shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it: (a) promotes international cooperation, peace and security; (b) creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among nations.” Our participation in peace missions is not limited to the UN and the African Union. The SADC region is in the process of building the capacity of the SADC Standby Force which will be able to participate in peace support missions as part of the African Union Standby Force or on its own.

NvK: As our last question, we would like to ask what your personal visions and aims are for the future of the Namibian Defence Force.

Namoloh: The Vision of the NDF, as stated in the Defence Policy which was tabled in parliament early this year (2010), is “develop and maintain a small, highly mobile and professional force which excels in service through discipline, vigorous training and possession of modern armament”. My personal vision is to realise this dream.

NvK: Thank you very much, Mr Namoloh.

(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in March 2010. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)


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Notes:
[1] Maj.Gen. (rtd) Charles Namoloh (Ho-Chi-Minh) has been appointed Minister of Defence of the Republic of Namibia in 2005. Mr Namoloh’s military career began after going into exile to Zambia in 1974, where he quickly rose through SWAPO’s military ranks, becoming Plan Chief of Staff under General Dimo Hamaambo in 1979. He headed the SWAPO military team working with UNTAG and SADF/SWATF to form a new defence force during the transition to independence. In 1990 he was head of the defence force team that worked with the British Military Advisory Team to set up NDF structures. He served as Chief of Staff in the NDF under Army Commander Major General Solomon Hawala until 1995, when he was switched to a diplomatic post in warring Angola. After eight years in Luanda, during which Namibia sent soldiers into Angola to flush out Unita (1999-2000) forces, he was transferred to New Delhi and subsequently assumed his current office.
[2] Namibia today operates Russian Mi-35 Hind-Es (2), French SA 319 Alouette III’s (2), as well as Indian HAL Chetak (2) and one HAL Cheetah.
[3] The SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) is the governing political party in Namibia, evolving from the former liberation movement. It has been the governing party in Namibia since independence in 1990.

Towards a New European Security Pact – A Russian Perspective

Interview with Mr Agakishiev, associate professor at the historical faculty of the MSU

Following the announcement of an initiative in mid 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev presented a draft treaty on European security in November 2009. According to the President, it is aimed at creating a new security structure that will legally seal the principle of indivisible security in international law and prevent any state or organisation from strengthening their security at the expense of others. It is also to provide mutual military assistance for all European nations. The Russian initiative has been welcomed by Medvedev’s counterparts in Western Europe as well as by the heads of NATO, the EU and the OSCE. However, the willingness of Western countries and organisations to openly endorse the Russian push towards a new pan-European security pact can so far be summarised as being rather reluctant and cautious.

In order to shed some light onto the Russian initiative, which seems to have temporarily stalled with the freezing temperatures of hibernal Europe, Nicolas von Kospoth of defpro.com talked to Ismail Aliyevich Agakishiev*, deputy director of the Information Analysis Centre of Post-Soviet States studies and associate professor in the historical faculty of the Moscow State University (MSU).

NvK: Mr Agakishiev, is the Russian plan for a new security pact “just another document”, or could it have a positive influence on the security of possible member countries and their neighbours?

Agakishiev: The Russian project undoubtedly deserves consideration as an attempt to build a new greater European model. However, the motivation for Russia’s aspirations lies not only in its attempt to totally reorganise the European security system, which was formally shaped by the 1990 Paris peace treaty. It is being initiated as a response to events in Georgia and the acknowledgement of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as by the Balkan Wars, the division of Yugoslavia and the separation of Kosovo from Serbia.

The Russian side is convinced that an entirely new situation has arisen, one that the existing international legal norms should have prevented. However, that’s not how things turned out in practice. It has become fashionable to manipulate different parts of treaties, their weaknesses, in as much as they were concluded before the split-up of the USSR and the final disintegration of Yugoslavia. It wasn’t possible to avoid war in Europe, and that’s why Russia considers it necessary to change the stipulations of the treaty.

As for the strengthening of their neighbours’ security, there are certainly a number of points in the Russian draft regarding the direct defence of sovereignty, the prevention of aggressive actions and other infringements on territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the general European attitude is very cautious. They need their own model, not one based on Russian convictions and postulates. It is here where the level of trust becomes apparent and the continental split can be ascertained. In the present state of confrontation between Russia and Georgia, as well as Moscow’s disapproval of the “Kosovo precedent”, it would seem to be extremely difficult to listen to the Russians and use their model for a future European system. Russia does not have any leverage with which to impose its values, and, indeed, Russia itself is demonstrating a greater and greater resistance to attempts to impose on it other patterns of behaviour and responses.

However, in my opinion, a policy of confrontation with modern Russia is absurd and it is necessary to find common approaches to solving topical problems. Modern Russia is not a country with a totalitarian ideology, but a country which has chosen the path of constructing a democratic state. It is a priori not a menace for the democratic countries of Europe. It is high time to understand this and treat the Russian Federation as a real ally. The president’s proposal can be seen as a real step towards bringing closer together the positions of Russia and the Old World.

NvK: From your point of view, is the Russian project the right approach? Wouldn’t it be better for Russia’s strategic interests, as well as for the modernisation of its industry and military, to become a member of NATO?

Agakishiev: Strategically, proposing one’s own project for discussion is a very skilful diplomatic geopolitical move. However, real allies who would be able not only to say some sympathetic words and express an interest after their examination of the document are rare. Without a base of friends – Russia’s allies – it will be very difficult to promote the new version of the document. There are very few stalwart friends of Russia in the EU. From our point of view, the EU should try to do more than produce their own patterns of security, for example eastward expansion (in the form of the programme of the Eastern Partnership or proposals concerning association with the South Caucasus countries) and the eventual absorption of the Balkans. It is also necessary to consider the opinion of the governing body of Russia and work out joint mutually beneficial and constructive projects in favour of the maintenance of peace and development of co-operation.

Russia joining NATO still seems totally unrealistic in the present geopolitical situation. Co-operation and peaceful co-existence are possible, but the joining of NATO and incorporation into its military system are at the moment virtually impossible for Russia. Yet that does not mean that Russia has always been against joining NATO or that the state should be always opposed to this alliance.

For Russia, economic association with the EU and constructing common economic models would be more attractive. This is the sort of scheme that can lead to the necessity of ensuring common security hereafter.

I suppose that any extreme push to join NATO by Russia, if indeed such a thing ever came about, would really frighten Brussels. Russia interests Europe as an additional market and as a base from which to draw energy supplies, but only if the game is played by the rules of the transatlantic axis. If we draw parallels with the World Trade Organisation, Russia is not being admitted there because of its demands to maintain sovereignty over the banking sphere and other economic sectors. The same sort of schemes is applicable to NATO. If Russia joins NATO, where the consensus vote is applied, Russia will eliminate the system of decision making, which is in any case not entirely a harmonious one (after active eastward expansion).

NvK: What do you think NATO’s reaction to this political move by Russia will be?

Agakishiev: After their expansion, NATO and the EU began paying much more attention to issues of European security, extending their zones of influence. Therefore, for NATO, the prospects for European security are far from a trivial matter. However, the first reaction to the Russian initiative turned out to be quite a cool one. It was voiced by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen himself. Having come to Moscow, he showed an interest in examining the issue, but expressed reservations beforehand, saying that he did not consider it necessary to change anything conceptually in the approaches to European security.

If the EU can be considered to be the essence of European policy and diplomacy, then NATO is substantially full of American influence. This is where the greater coldness to such initiatives in Russia comes from. For the US, the new treaty could become another element in the diplomatic bargaining with Russia on the multidimensional aspects of their relationship. In the present political situation, it is not at all a priority for NATO to change the current correlations of security.

NvK: What are the political challenges of establishing such a security pact? Where are the greatest stumbling blocks on the way to implementing it?

Agakishiev: As has been already mentioned, transatlantic Europe is not interested in a treaty originating in the East. The present security system, judging by the declarations of the leaders of the EU and NATO, needs no change. It allows the possibility of expansion – in particular, the absorption of the Balkans. As a matter of fact, the Kosovo story tangibly spoils the saintly image of universal safety and security. As for Russia, it put forward its argument in the form of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, having made use of the irresponsible actions of the Georgian authorities. Against this background, the advancement of a project dealing with a new agreement on European security by Russia or any other country will be suspected of looking to strengthen the status quo in one form or another. The secession of Kosovo from Serbia and the acknowledgement of its sovereignty are unacceptable for Russia. Also, Europe and the US do not accept the independence of the former Georgian territories. Imagining a situation in which history can be wound back like a cinema reel is very difficult and even stupid. When established principles and stereotypes are introduced into diplomacy in place of legal norms and even common sense, it is impossible to reverse the situation.

NvK: Regarding the current security political challenges of the EU and Russia, who would gain the most from such a security pact? Or would there be mutual and, in particular, equal benefits?

Agakishiev: I think that if the EU doesn’t reject the Russian initiative right away, and enters into a dialogue and introduces its remarks and suggestions, and, in short, give a well-reasoned answer, containing the points of the text that it likes and doesn’t like, this would be a lot more productive and significant for a common understanding of this issue. On the other hand, when the UN Secretary General, during his stay in Moscow says that they are interested in the Russian proposals, but don’t need them, this is unconstructive and wrong. In my opinion, the West should certainly give a detailed answer to the Russians concerning what they like and what they dislike. This wouldn’t impose any additional obligations leading to the unavoidable acceptance of a new treaty on European security. If the EU calls itself Russia’s partner, it would be worth having an explanation. This would be mutually advantageous. If one only thinks about one’s own security, drawing new lines of partition in Europe, this will doom the continent to new conflicts and disputes.

NvK: How would the creation of a pan-European security pact influence the Russian-Chinese relationship? Could it create an increased polarisation between these two giants in the Far East?

Agakishiev: A new pan-European security treaty in this sense of this concept is about a new just system of relations in Europe after two hot world wars and one cold one, as well as the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and would certainly prove advantageous for Russian-Chinese relations. It would make the territory to its east more predictable for China. The new European pact would be by no means anti-Chinese or indeed aimed against anybody else. It would be more likely to regulate international relations in Europe, without touching on external boundaries. Russia as a European and simultaneously Asian power is obliged to build common spaces to its east, as well as to its west and south.

This is the meaning of security agreements – to prevent the continuation of conflict and to introduce a system to resolve disputes in a civilised way.

NvK: If the security pact had already been in force at the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008, what would have been the likely reactions of the members?

Agakishiev: If the new treaty system suggested by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had been functioning during the run-up to the well-known events, the war in South Ossetia could have been avoided. Georgia wouldn’t have taken the risk of restoring its territorial integrity in this way and it cannot be ruled out that this integrity could have been ensured in another way. Nevertheless, any treaty is just a model and real European conflicts have their own specific characters, and sometimes they don’t fit into a common scheme. The actions of participant countries are in practice very difficult to predict, because it is necessary to take into account geopolitical realities and the system of relations.

NvK: What is the estimated timetable for the implementation of such a security pact? When might we see it to come into effect?

Agakishiev: It is a long process, if only because it is still in a draft form. The discussion on reforms in the OSCE and then on the new treaty on a European security system initiated by Russia will last for a long time. It would be naïve to suppose that the Europeans will consent to the Russian suggestions. But Russia should continue diplomatic talks so that its national interests are taken into consideration in Europe’s new configuration.

NvK: Thank you very much, Mr Agakishiev.

(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in January 2010. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)

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* Mr Ismail Aliyevich Agakishiev is deputy director of the Information Analysis Centre of Post-Soviet States studies and associate professor in the historical faculty of the Moscow State University (MSU). Furthermore, he is deputy head of the sub-department of foreign affairs at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH), head of the Scientific Information Centre for Caucasus Studies, RSUH, and general director of the Information Analysis Centre “The Herald of the Caucasus”. Mr Agakishiev is an expert in the field of economic and political problems, particularly in the field of energy security of Russia, the South Caucasus countries and the Caspian region. His doctoral thesis was titled “Energy security of the Caspian region countries.”