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January 26, 2010

Towards a New European Security Pact – A Russian Perspective

Interview with Mr Agakishiev, associate professor at the historical faculty of the MSU

Following the announcement of an initiative in mid 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev presented a draft treaty on European security in November 2009. According to the President, it is aimed at creating a new security structure that will legally seal the principle of indivisible security in international law and prevent any state or organisation from strengthening their security at the expense of others. It is also to provide mutual military assistance for all European nations. The Russian initiative has been welcomed by Medvedev’s counterparts in Western Europe as well as by the heads of NATO, the EU and the OSCE. However, the willingness of Western countries and organisations to openly endorse the Russian push towards a new pan-European security pact can so far be summarised as being rather reluctant and cautious.

In order to shed some light onto the Russian initiative, which seems to have temporarily stalled with the freezing temperatures of hibernal Europe, Nicolas von Kospoth of defpro.com talked to Ismail Aliyevich Agakishiev*, deputy director of the Information Analysis Centre of Post-Soviet States studies and associate professor in the historical faculty of the Moscow State University (MSU).

NvK: Mr Agakishiev, is the Russian plan for a new security pact “just another document”, or could it have a positive influence on the security of possible member countries and their neighbours?

Agakishiev: The Russian project undoubtedly deserves consideration as an attempt to build a new greater European model. However, the motivation for Russia’s aspirations lies not only in its attempt to totally reorganise the European security system, which was formally shaped by the 1990 Paris peace treaty. It is being initiated as a response to events in Georgia and the acknowledgement of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as by the Balkan Wars, the division of Yugoslavia and the separation of Kosovo from Serbia.

The Russian side is convinced that an entirely new situation has arisen, one that the existing international legal norms should have prevented. However, that’s not how things turned out in practice. It has become fashionable to manipulate different parts of treaties, their weaknesses, in as much as they were concluded before the split-up of the USSR and the final disintegration of Yugoslavia. It wasn’t possible to avoid war in Europe, and that’s why Russia considers it necessary to change the stipulations of the treaty.

As for the strengthening of their neighbours’ security, there are certainly a number of points in the Russian draft regarding the direct defence of sovereignty, the prevention of aggressive actions and other infringements on territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the general European attitude is very cautious. They need their own model, not one based on Russian convictions and postulates. It is here where the level of trust becomes apparent and the continental split can be ascertained. In the present state of confrontation between Russia and Georgia, as well as Moscow’s disapproval of the “Kosovo precedent”, it would seem to be extremely difficult to listen to the Russians and use their model for a future European system. Russia does not have any leverage with which to impose its values, and, indeed, Russia itself is demonstrating a greater and greater resistance to attempts to impose on it other patterns of behaviour and responses.

However, in my opinion, a policy of confrontation with modern Russia is absurd and it is necessary to find common approaches to solving topical problems. Modern Russia is not a country with a totalitarian ideology, but a country which has chosen the path of constructing a democratic state. It is a priori not a menace for the democratic countries of Europe. It is high time to understand this and treat the Russian Federation as a real ally. The president’s proposal can be seen as a real step towards bringing closer together the positions of Russia and the Old World.

NvK: From your point of view, is the Russian project the right approach? Wouldn’t it be better for Russia’s strategic interests, as well as for the modernisation of its industry and military, to become a member of NATO?

Agakishiev: Strategically, proposing one’s own project for discussion is a very skilful diplomatic geopolitical move. However, real allies who would be able not only to say some sympathetic words and express an interest after their examination of the document are rare. Without a base of friends – Russia’s allies – it will be very difficult to promote the new version of the document. There are very few stalwart friends of Russia in the EU. From our point of view, the EU should try to do more than produce their own patterns of security, for example eastward expansion (in the form of the programme of the Eastern Partnership or proposals concerning association with the South Caucasus countries) and the eventual absorption of the Balkans. It is also necessary to consider the opinion of the governing body of Russia and work out joint mutually beneficial and constructive projects in favour of the maintenance of peace and development of co-operation.

Russia joining NATO still seems totally unrealistic in the present geopolitical situation. Co-operation and peaceful co-existence are possible, but the joining of NATO and incorporation into its military system are at the moment virtually impossible for Russia. Yet that does not mean that Russia has always been against joining NATO or that the state should be always opposed to this alliance.

For Russia, economic association with the EU and constructing common economic models would be more attractive. This is the sort of scheme that can lead to the necessity of ensuring common security hereafter.

I suppose that any extreme push to join NATO by Russia, if indeed such a thing ever came about, would really frighten Brussels. Russia interests Europe as an additional market and as a base from which to draw energy supplies, but only if the game is played by the rules of the transatlantic axis. If we draw parallels with the World Trade Organisation, Russia is not being admitted there because of its demands to maintain sovereignty over the banking sphere and other economic sectors. The same sort of schemes is applicable to NATO. If Russia joins NATO, where the consensus vote is applied, Russia will eliminate the system of decision making, which is in any case not entirely a harmonious one (after active eastward expansion).

NvK: What do you think NATO’s reaction to this political move by Russia will be?

Agakishiev: After their expansion, NATO and the EU began paying much more attention to issues of European security, extending their zones of influence. Therefore, for NATO, the prospects for European security are far from a trivial matter. However, the first reaction to the Russian initiative turned out to be quite a cool one. It was voiced by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen himself. Having come to Moscow, he showed an interest in examining the issue, but expressed reservations beforehand, saying that he did not consider it necessary to change anything conceptually in the approaches to European security.

If the EU can be considered to be the essence of European policy and diplomacy, then NATO is substantially full of American influence. This is where the greater coldness to such initiatives in Russia comes from. For the US, the new treaty could become another element in the diplomatic bargaining with Russia on the multidimensional aspects of their relationship. In the present political situation, it is not at all a priority for NATO to change the current correlations of security.

NvK: What are the political challenges of establishing such a security pact? Where are the greatest stumbling blocks on the way to implementing it?

Agakishiev: As has been already mentioned, transatlantic Europe is not interested in a treaty originating in the East. The present security system, judging by the declarations of the leaders of the EU and NATO, needs no change. It allows the possibility of expansion – in particular, the absorption of the Balkans. As a matter of fact, the Kosovo story tangibly spoils the saintly image of universal safety and security. As for Russia, it put forward its argument in the form of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, having made use of the irresponsible actions of the Georgian authorities. Against this background, the advancement of a project dealing with a new agreement on European security by Russia or any other country will be suspected of looking to strengthen the status quo in one form or another. The secession of Kosovo from Serbia and the acknowledgement of its sovereignty are unacceptable for Russia. Also, Europe and the US do not accept the independence of the former Georgian territories. Imagining a situation in which history can be wound back like a cinema reel is very difficult and even stupid. When established principles and stereotypes are introduced into diplomacy in place of legal norms and even common sense, it is impossible to reverse the situation.

NvK: Regarding the current security political challenges of the EU and Russia, who would gain the most from such a security pact? Or would there be mutual and, in particular, equal benefits?

Agakishiev: I think that if the EU doesn’t reject the Russian initiative right away, and enters into a dialogue and introduces its remarks and suggestions, and, in short, give a well-reasoned answer, containing the points of the text that it likes and doesn’t like, this would be a lot more productive and significant for a common understanding of this issue. On the other hand, when the UN Secretary General, during his stay in Moscow says that they are interested in the Russian proposals, but don’t need them, this is unconstructive and wrong. In my opinion, the West should certainly give a detailed answer to the Russians concerning what they like and what they dislike. This wouldn’t impose any additional obligations leading to the unavoidable acceptance of a new treaty on European security. If the EU calls itself Russia’s partner, it would be worth having an explanation. This would be mutually advantageous. If one only thinks about one’s own security, drawing new lines of partition in Europe, this will doom the continent to new conflicts and disputes.

NvK: How would the creation of a pan-European security pact influence the Russian-Chinese relationship? Could it create an increased polarisation between these two giants in the Far East?

Agakishiev: A new pan-European security treaty in this sense of this concept is about a new just system of relations in Europe after two hot world wars and one cold one, as well as the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and would certainly prove advantageous for Russian-Chinese relations. It would make the territory to its east more predictable for China. The new European pact would be by no means anti-Chinese or indeed aimed against anybody else. It would be more likely to regulate international relations in Europe, without touching on external boundaries. Russia as a European and simultaneously Asian power is obliged to build common spaces to its east, as well as to its west and south.

This is the meaning of security agreements – to prevent the continuation of conflict and to introduce a system to resolve disputes in a civilised way.

NvK: If the security pact had already been in force at the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008, what would have been the likely reactions of the members?

Agakishiev: If the new treaty system suggested by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had been functioning during the run-up to the well-known events, the war in South Ossetia could have been avoided. Georgia wouldn’t have taken the risk of restoring its territorial integrity in this way and it cannot be ruled out that this integrity could have been ensured in another way. Nevertheless, any treaty is just a model and real European conflicts have their own specific characters, and sometimes they don’t fit into a common scheme. The actions of participant countries are in practice very difficult to predict, because it is necessary to take into account geopolitical realities and the system of relations.

NvK: What is the estimated timetable for the implementation of such a security pact? When might we see it to come into effect?

Agakishiev: It is a long process, if only because it is still in a draft form. The discussion on reforms in the OSCE and then on the new treaty on a European security system initiated by Russia will last for a long time. It would be naïve to suppose that the Europeans will consent to the Russian suggestions. But Russia should continue diplomatic talks so that its national interests are taken into consideration in Europe’s new configuration.

NvK: Thank you very much, Mr Agakishiev.

(This entry is an interview I originally made for the defence news site defpro.com in January 2010. For a list of all interviews I made, please click here.)

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* Mr Ismail Aliyevich Agakishiev is deputy director of the Information Analysis Centre of Post-Soviet States studies and associate professor in the historical faculty of the Moscow State University (MSU). Furthermore, he is deputy head of the sub-department of foreign affairs at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH), head of the Scientific Information Centre for Caucasus Studies, RSUH, and general director of the Information Analysis Centre “The Herald of the Caucasus”. Mr Agakishiev is an expert in the field of economic and political problems, particularly in the field of energy security of Russia, the South Caucasus countries and the Caspian region. His doctoral thesis was titled “Energy security of the Caspian region countries.”

November 11, 2009

Chavez: Playing a Dangerous Game Without Trumps

Chavez calls on Venezuela’s military leadership to prepare for war with Colombia


Whenever I read about the latest news produced in very regular intervals by Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chavez, somehow there is always an aftertaste of an era that I hoped to be long gone. Not in terms of events but, rather, of mindset and course of action – in simple terms, a political die-hard is at work that plays too inconsiderate with the fate of a continent and of his own people. Chavez’ recent announcement to his Army, calling for an increased preparedness for war with its neighbour Colombia and – what is even worse – for a war that might spread over the entire continent is more than just the usual sabre rattling. It is an irresponsible culmination of a process that has since long left the political level and has become an unbearable personal crusade of a man that misleadingly sees his historical legitimacy and tradition in Simón Bolívar – the latter, ironically enough, a man which had great admiration for the political foundation of the United States.

The growing alliance of socialist-led South American countries, as well as Venezuela’s latest military equipment deals with Russia, provided Chavez with increased confidence. His further support of countries with controversial governments (such as Cuba and Iran) that seem to parallel the international position of Venezuela, aims at emphasising that Chavez will not accept any meddling of third parties (foreign as well as national) into internal issues of his country – although many of these issues influence the regional international economy, political stability and welfare of the people.

There is no question that a strong, stable and modern Venezuela is not only the inherent right of the nation but also a prerequisite for a prosperous development of the north of the continent. Many steps in the external and internal affairs of Venezuela – some being a true thorn in the side of Colombia and the United States – follow a liberal approach, particularly in the field of international economics. However, any confrontation that might lead to an all-out war, whichever side it may originate from, cannot be in the interest of Venezuela or Colombia.

During the past months the rhetoric upward spiral on both sides has particularly increased with the issue of the establishing of US military bases in Colombia that are reportedly required for the fight against drug-traffic, originating from the troubled South American country, as well as to support Colombian forces in their struggle against the FARC. In early November, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Nicolas Maduro, blasted the new military cooperation agreement between Colombia and the US and called it “a shame for the history” of the continent. However, these protests are ridiculous considering the actual extent of this 10-year deal: a total of 800 military personnel and 600 civilian contractors will be deployed at seven military bases in Colombia.

Calling this military presence a “serious threat to stability in the region” either proves poor judgement or the attempt to further agitate the already troubled water. This general assessment of a threat to the stability is even substantiated by Maduro’s further statement that “there is no guarantee that the Colombian territory could not be used against other countries in the region”.

Exceeding the rhetoric exchange of blows, President Hugo Chavez sent 15,000 troops to the volatile border between Venezuela and Colombia, claiming that the US planned to use Colombian bases to mount an invasion of his oil-rich nation. As a result of Chavez’ statements, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe considered to appeal to the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS).

Rather than the stationing of a few US soldiers on Colombian soil, the greater source for the destabilisation of the region has been the shopping tour of the Venezuelan administration amounting to $3 billion in arms purchases from Russia. Allegedly, the procurement push of September 2009 is to improve the country’s ability to defend itself against an invasion. This comprises the establishing of a multi-layered air defence network consisting of Russian-made S-300, Buk-M2 and Pechora air defence systems, financed by a Russian $2.2 billion loan. Furthermore, the deal includes the purchase of 92 T-72 main battle tanks and an undisclosed number of Smerch multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). The tanks will replace the 80 outdated French-built AMX-30 main battle tanks and several dozen AMX-13C light tanks. In late 2008, Venezuela has also received 24 Su-30MK fighter aircraft which by far outclass the current inventory of the Colombian Air Force. Between 2005 and 2007, Moscow and Caracas signed twelve contracts worth more than $4.4 billion to supply arms to Venezuela, including the Sukhoi jets, helicopters and Kalashnikov assault rifles.

Nevertheless, Venezuela did not receive the state-of-the-art weapon systems of the last deal, so far, and the integration as well as the training of the troops will still require some years before the Venezuelan Armed Forces are in the position to use them successfully in combat, be it in a defensive or offensive way. Therefore, we may prepare for further sabre rattling and a rhetoric slugfest for the time being. A war between the two countries, blessedly, is not in sight yet. But the current development is not very healthy for the political, economic and social situation in the north of the continent.

If ever a war with an allied US-Colombian adversary should come to pass, Chavez will have a hard time to find his “battle of Carabobo”. Once more in modern politics it can only be hoped that the involved parties may learn from history and may begin to cherish and build upon their common past. This is what would truly do justice to the legacy of Simón Blolívar.

(This entry is an OpEd that I originally wrote for the defence news site defpro.com in November 2009)